Transcript of Iran Knows America Is Running Out of Missiles | EYES ON GEOPOLITICS

Hey everybody, welcome to another episode of Eyes on Geopolitics. I'm here with Mark Polymeropoulos, Andy Milburn, Mick Mulroy. A lot happening as usual. Um, Iran is the big news. Iran-US, um, the last 2 weeks, 13 consecutive nights of strikes against Iranian targets. Iranians have been shooting, uh, missiles and drones at our bases in the region and, um The Houthis also got involved in this now too. They started bombing a couple of Saudi targets. Um, it's interesting, on Friday there was a pause. Obviously, um, there is word that there is talk, they're trying to work out something diplomatically. There was something today I just saw Mick reposted it actually, that somebody took out a huge position that shorting oil, uh, basically, you know, thinking that oil is gonna tank when the market opens. Um, so there's that. God knows. And I read that tweet, Mick, it said Axios link. So I don't know what that means. Like, does that mean Axios guy? It's a link to the, to the somebody at the website, at the news organization? I don't know. But somebody took out a huge, uh, position. Um, Iran came out as well saying that like, we're, you know, Oh, forget that.

The big question, uh, thing was to Iran, uh, Ukraine hit some Russian tankers or Russian like, uh, ships that were supposedly bringing, uh, supplies to Iran from Russia. So we have like this melding of both wars kind of going into it this week. A lot of, uh, dignitaries are coming from other countries. I think it's supposedly for Lindsey Graham's funeral, but Zelensky is going to be here next— this week coming up. Netanyahu is going to be here this coming up. So there's a lot happening, and it looks like maybe there's going to be another pause possibly, or another MOU or something before shit hits the fan. But I mean, it will— time will tell if Iran starts letting people go through the Strait of Hormuz unharassed or not. And you know, that obviously will dictate terms of this. So I don't know where you guys are at, where you guys are tracking. Uh, let's go with Mark P first.

First of all, D, I want to say that the Red Sox are back in the hunt. Your New York teams, the Yankees, are nervous now. I know you're a Mets fan and Juan Soto's out.

I'm a Yankee fan.

Totally. You're a Yankee fan. All right.

Yeah, I hate the Red Sox. And you?

I was up at Fenway. Awesome vibes. You guys are screwed. Red Sox will win the World Series. Moving on to less important things. No, one of the really interesting things, and I know we're going to jump into it, has to do with all the reporting. I think the New York Times led with this about the the US stocks of interceptors and frankly how Chairman of the Joint Chiefs perhaps gave some advice to Trump in the White House saying that, you know, some type of major escalation would not be wise right now because of this. But I think, and so that is an issue. It's something we should discuss. But in some ways I think it actually hides a bigger issue is what actually can be done militarily whatsoever. Is there a military option and one that actually, that one that's feasible that doesn't involve, you know, New York Post had a story today and I don't know if this is projection or not. I sent it to you guys that, you know, about a US Special Operations Command mission to go after Pickaxe Mountain. This would entail thousands of troops. I don't know if this is what they're advocating or not, but there's a whole bunch of options that are so politically unpalatable that would involve ground forces.

That I don't think that's even on the table. So the real question is what can be done via air whatsoever? I mean, is there actually a strategy in which the US could militarily within the parameters of no ground troops, you know, force the Iranians to the table? And I think there's a lot of people now who are saying no, actually this is, and it's almost a question, I hate to even say this, this goes against what Mick says all the time and I agree with it, you know, our goal is to win somehow. So can we is the question. Is there a military option? Because if the answer is no, then the diplomatic option is Iran's going to get the Strait of Hormuz because then they know they have the leverage over us. And so if you're kind of looking at it, the kind of the geostrategic sense or in terms of strategy, you know, we all can be critics and we certainly— I certainly have been, but I'm not sure what the option is. Is there a good option that's left here? And that's the big dilemma. As Mick, I think, Andy, you might have said it before, there's no magic bullet.

There's no there's no solution just hanging out there that, boy, we should really be doing this, because I think if that would have been on the table already. So bit of a pickle we're in. And again, it's easy for us to criticize. We're good at that. But the whole point is, if you're in the chair, I'm not actually sure what we should do right now. And that's quite, I think for all 4 of us here, that's in an unusual position. We're stuck here. And I hate to be in that position. I hate to even say that.

Andy, let me get your take on like, we talked about it a bit last week, about what other military options there possibly could be, you know.

Yeah, I'm, you know, just saying that the military options are very limited doesn't mean that there's nothing that the US can do necessarily. But I'm intrigued by, first of all, I'm not surprised, but I am as near as it comes to being surprised that the president already announced that, quote, the United States is going to go after Pickaxe Mountain next. I suppose it's the trendy name perhaps that that caught his attention.

But, um, it's kind of interesting.

So he's announced that one of the problems— you know, backtrack a little bit. I'm answering your question, D. There's very little military that can be done, okay? Um, there's just more of the same. And if going after Iran's nuclear program, even if we have the bunker busters lined up, even if we conduct a really extraordinarily successful strike. I doubt, I just don't think that the, if the Iranians are half as crafty as they've shown so far, their nuclear program is beyond reach. I mean, it was always Midnight Hammer or whatever the plan was, was always a long shot and it became increasingly are not always a long shot. To begin with, when that plan was developed, it wasn't such a long shot, but there were political reasons, right, why it wasn't being carried out. And for the longest time, the US was in the position of trying to dissuade Israel from conducting those strikes. And by the way, one of the downsides of that, and this is open source, but so I can talk about it now, one of the downsides that was always, always prevalent, and it was front and center when planners were talking about it, was the fact that Iran would close the Straits of Hormuz and the effect, knock-on effect, on the global economy.

Number 2 was even, even when we thought the nuclear program was, uh, was vulnerable to the use of, uh, you know, bunker busters and, and U.S. strike Uh, it— we knew that the most we could do was set it back. Okay, that isn't me just posturing and throwing out bullshit. I mean, those were always assumptions made by planners. And again, I'm not saying anything that's classified now. It's all open source. So now, after we've launched Midnight Hammer, after we have conducted weeks and weeks and weeks of strikes, and we have announced announced that we're going after the remnants of their nuclear program. Do you think the Iranians haven't done something already? You know, put those centrifuges out of reach, disperse the enriched uranium. I mean, it would be remarkably stupid if they hadn't done that. And I think whatever you say of the Iranians, the one thing you really can't call them is stupid. Um, you know, there's that, and then there's all the other reasons that we talked about why cranking up military force is unlikely to achieve. You know, we've already reached the law of diminishing returns. The— we've, we've talked about why missile launches are hard to hit.

We've talked to why mines, drones are also hard to go after, and even the small boat problem. Those are the real risks. And meanwhile, we're seeing Iran ramp up pressure on, uh, other countries in the region, notably Saudi Arabia, right? Attacking Jizan, the Houthis attacking Jizan, and a Saudi tanker exploded. And that's, you know, that's what the Saudis say, exploded in the Gulf after hitting a mine. So sorry for the lengthy answer. Militarily, I just don't, you know, I've been reading all the trash talk on social media, but cranking it up and cranking it up. Doesn't really promise much in terms of returns. Last thing I'll say, even if, even if, as we've said on this program, that the US forces its way to escort, I mean, it continuously forces an armed escort of tankers through the Gulf. The problem is still there. And the problem is that fact you're dealing with commercial vessels, insurance rates are always going to be high as long until Iran agrees not to strike them. So how, I guess the question to answer is, how do you crank up pressure on Iran to bring Iran to the negotiation table?

And it doesn't look like pure military pressure is working. There probably has to be a carrot. I'll leave with a question. Maybe, maybe there are things that can be done in other areas. Okay. Maybe a combination of cyber, and I'll defer to my CIA colleagues, maybe Title 50 type stuff, right? I don't know. That's, that's a question for you guys.

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They call him Tuttle Fitty. Tuttle Fitty Mickey.

Yeah, so I'll get back to the Title 50 stuff, but I'd start— obviously, to Mark's point, we got to come out of this successfully, um, and there's no easy path toward it, but I'm gearing everything that I'm going to comment on, on that. So obviously the Strait of Hormuz is the main issue right now, and that wasn't the issue before the war started. But to that point, uh, we saw this massive, uh, flow of assets to the region. We saw the president talk about, you know, it's going to be bigger than anything we've seen so far, including Epic Fury. Um, I was thinking that the point was to try to go after targets that could essentially start strangling the IRGC of the funding they need to keep in operations, right? The only thing that really matters to them is their money. So the blockade is doing that with a naval blockade. I was assuming that we were going to go after ground targets like railroads, bridges, things that they— transportation hubs that they need to be able to transfer their energy out by other means and of course get armaments in to keep the fight going.

Uh, that still might be the case, but that seemed to make sense to me. But I would agree that military action alone, it's not going to do it. And I think we've seen reporting from Mark and my old organization and the DIA that said as such, that we could expend a lot more munitions, but it's unlikely to change the perspective of the IRGC. So the military is not the end-all be-all. We have the best in the world, but we need to stop relying on it as if it can just change everything. It's a part of it. It could go after these targets and I think further isolate the regime. But it's important to point out that's going to take time. So, and it's not, it's not something that we all think is accurate. As far as why it was called off, if it was like the— I think it was the New York Times reported that Vice President and, uh, Chairman went over there and explained the interceptor situation, you know, the PAC-3s, the all the interceptors that we use to stop attacks against us and our allies. I mean, they knew that while they were doing the buildup.

So I don't know that's accurate. I mean, obviously the military is not like, oh, wait a minute, we don't have enough. This is something they knew. If they stopped because of that, then, then certainly that's a fair reason. That brings up a whole other discussion that we could have another episode on, is we are fighting a regional war with a second-tier adversary, and we were having a damn hard time keeping up with production, defense production. That's a big problem. It's not a political statement. This is a big problem for the United States. We need to, we need to just fix this, right? Can you imagine if we were fighting a near-peer competitor? Can you imagine if we actually had ground forces right now? Which means you're going to expend a lot more precision munitions and protective munitions. So that's a big issue. But if that's what caused this, what I'm concerned about is this was somewhat of a bluff, and now the Iranians know it was a bluff, and now the chances of negotiations now get harder because they feel like they're in the driver's seat. Don't know if it was, but if it was, that's problematic because the Iranians already think they have all the leverage now with the Strait of Hormuz, potentially the Bab el-Mandeb with the Houthis.

That's going to increase the pressure. So how do we get the Strait of Hormuz open? Well, I don't remember which member of the government came out and said they, but they did come out and said yesterday they made $18 billion this year on the sale of their oil. So it's 60% of what they normally sell in a year, which is unacceptable, right? I don't know if it's true. I'm sure our intelligence community is going to look at it and find out. If it is, One, the pressure we're trying to exert on the regime isn't working if they can sell this much. Because if they can sell that much and fund 60% of what they normally do and the year's not over, that's not enough pressure at all. So we need to do everything we can to build an international coalition, further sanctions, enforce secondary sanctions, find IRGC commercial infrastructure all around the world. It exists. Freeze assets. I know there's people that know these things, so I'm sure I'm not— it's not a revelation to anybody in the government right now. But if they're really making $18 billion a year, then this economic isolation isn't gonna work unless we change that.

And it's not just from the blockade. So how do you change this? In addition to that, I think it's being very specific on targets. And we might have the right to ride this out. I don't see how the United States just accepts the Strait of Hormuz is now the sovereign property of Iran. And we have done, other than Midnight Hammer, which did do a lot to degrade the nuclear program, from then on, we haven't really done much to degrade it. On Pickak Mountain, I think the issue is our munitions simply won't penetrate it. I don't know that to be the case. I've been out of government a long time, but obviously that's the biggest speculation. It's 300 feet of solid granite. Even our, you know, GBU-57 Alphas, I don't think they can reach that deep unless something else has changed. If they would, we've already hit it. So there you go. So that's why they're talking about a ground operation. That would be the most, I think, most complex special operations mission I've ever heard of, because it would be, I think Mark and/or Andy said it, it would be potentially weeks on the ground.

I don't know. Um, and it would be in the— it's in the middle of the country, right? It's right near Natanz. It's right in the middle of the country. They would mobilize tens of thousands of troops, and of course there would be non-stop bombarding of forces. It is intact, so that would be at least a better scenario than some of the facilities that are destroyed. But I just don't see that happening. It's already an unpopular war, and this would cause casualties, uh, and it's unclear to me what is actually in there. So we're going to have to figure out a way to, to get them to change their perspective. It's going to take building an international coalition, and unfortunately, it's going to take time, um, and there's no guarantee. But the alternative is the U.S. calls it quits And that's a strategic— I mean, nobody can spin us out of that. If Iran's— and now there's reporting that, and you can make— you can see why this would be the case, that the new Supreme Leader wants a nuclear weapon, right? So now we have a scenario where they want a nuclear weapon, they're not interested in no enrichment, and they're not interested in giving up the Strait.

So, uh, I would suggest One, making this more of a bipartisan issue, engaging Congress, talking to the committees, coming up with ideas, reaching out. International coalition, you could say, well, why would they join now? Well, because this isn't really just about the United States, right? You can disagree with the war, but this has an impact on your citizens, right? They're paying more for gas. They're paying more for food. You, whatever country you are, shouldn't accept another country simply taking over one of the key 8 waterways in the world that they're making money off. So I know that's easier said than done for all the above, but we are in a, in a very difficult situation. The last thing I'd say is I wanted to make this point. I'm pretty sure it's going to be fixed probably before we wake up tomorrow, but put the 4 that were killed back on the list of those that were killed in action. They were literally killed by enemy action. So the idea that it was somehow in a ceasefire is just nonsensical. Cruel. It's not fair. It's not respectful to those service members and families. They say it was a glitch.

I'm not saying it wasn't, but instead of talking about it a lot, just fix it and apologize for the glitch. Just wanted to put that in there.

I mean, they say it's a glitch, but it's been days now of this. So are they— yes, do they not work on the weekend? I mean, it seems to me this is now deliberate.

Fix it. It's, uh, it's disrespectful for those who—

I agree.

I mean, they were killed by enemy fire. 3 of them were killed by direct enemy fire. The other one was killed because of enemy fire, you know, the Shaheed drone they were trying to exploit. All of that is killed in the line of duty, in action, in combat.

I think, Mick, on a couple of your points, I agree with you. The only problem is I don't think it's going to happen because the Trump administration, it's not possible. There is no dialogue with Democrats on this. There's no bipartisan— in fact, there's total war with the Democrats on this. So I don't think they have it in their ability to reach across the aisle. And the Democrats actually are not in any position to accommodate the White House as well. So I don't think that's going to happen. And on the international coalition, it's the same thing. You know, our inability to make nice with our allies, you know, negates this even being a possibility. And when I think the British did announce the other day that there would be some more talks and more discussion and perhaps even planning for some kind of joint maritime mission. But the problem is they then say it'll only happen when the war's over. So while those are the right things to do, I just don't think the Trump administration, just because there is such hostility on both sides of the aisle and there's an inability to do anything with our allies, I just don't think it's gonna happen.

And so again, it's— possible. Um, uh, or, you know, so we can, we can advocate, and I think you're right to say that this is what we should do. I just don't think that that's in the wheelhouse of the Trump administration, um, uh, to, to take those kind of steps. They've shown no inclination to do this, uh, uh, in the past. And so that's what concerns me. I think you're right in what this is the right thing. I just don't think it's going to happen.

I think that's a fair point. And what I'm advocating for is not just a big discussion, but it's like legislation. Like, what are we going to do to reinforce sanctions, secondary sanctions? I mean, they're talking about it because they're putting it in the bill that Senator, the late Senator Lindsey Graham, you know, has on Russia. And now we can see they're connected. I mean, we can go into that, but I mean, I do get your point. It's easy to say these things, whether they happen or not, it's another thing. But there is actual things that people in Congress can do.

Could be done, yeah.

To put the pressure on Iran. And if they do it in a bipartisan way, that would send a message to Iran, who right now is trying to leverage the fissures. They're trying to leverage the upcoming election, right? So it doesn't mean that all the Democrats have to now agree that the war is a good idea, but they can't agree that we need to change the perspective so that America comes out successful on this. And that's not happening. And maybe it's because Nobody's asked, but it would be good to the extent that that actually has an impact. I think it could on— there's, there's several like legislative initiatives on Iran trying to increase economic pressure. Like, let's talk about all of them and see if we can't start get some moving. Not only would it help— again, it will take time, but it does send the right message to Iran that we're— that we are more unified than than they would like, which right now we're not.

Hey, can I, can I ask one quick thing here? And this is actually— I was excited to talk to you guys today on this. I got a note from a former pilot and he was talking to me about this issue of ordnance and interceptors and everything. And he said, actually, um, and I'm not going to say who it is, but I'm going to read from this. Um, but it was, it was nothing— it's, it's the notion that we are running out of more advanced weaponry we actually do have more smart bombs, more dumb bombs. There's dumb weapons which would entail US aircraft getting closer, not the standoff strikes from B-1s, etc. It would be closer range aircraft, you know, perhaps even launching from the Gulf. Again, very risky. But there are munitions out there that could be used. They're just not of the advanced type, which lowers the risk. And that's something that the administration is very, very worried about. Does that sound consistent to you all?

Yes, absolutely. I believe that's the case.

Gotcha. Okay, thanks.

It just puts a pilot more at more risk to use those munitions, but we have a lot of them.

We do have them.

Yeah. Yeah.

Yeah.

And then the other point on— I mean, if you hadn't figured out who's our enemy and who is our ally by now, I'm baffled. But I think the highlighting that Russia is actually giving Iran targeting data to kill our service members and CIA officers, I think, is something we all knew was happening. And now I would hope that we take it seriously and respond accordingly. And it's a good thing that Ukraine's actually targeting ships that are en route to resupply Iran to shoot at American service members. So just one more data point to know we should be on the side of the Ukrainians and against Russia. And we need to make that abundantly clear. They are, they are purposefully helping Iran now, uh, kill American service members. And we knew it, but now I think we have more information that points to that. And the Chinese, right? I think they can see where their satellites are oriented. I think that's what's happening, and that's why people are like, well, obviously they're, they're They're collecting information, uh, on, on U.S. military positions, including naval vessels.

Do you guys think in some ways that all of this talk on foreign policy, or we're missing a point, that everything that's going to happen in the war in Iran now is going to be geared to the U.S. domestic audience and to the midterms? I mean, is that— it's so, so whether it's whatever the White House does or what the Democrats do, that, that really the midterms are the number one thing, um, period, end of story. And even the right courses of action, or if there were to be one, wouldn't even be considered because now it's just political. It's whoever's going to win in November. What do you all think of that notion? Because I'm actually starting to subscribe to that now.

I think the Iranians subscribe to it. Yeah, for sure. Um, and they probably— it's going to have an impact, there's no doubt about it. It's a very unpopular war. It's more unpopular than like 3 years into the Iraq War, right?

It's the most unpopular war in the history of wars.

Yeah.

And polling.

And polling.

So I guess one thing, and it's not a good thing, but for all the leverage that the election has, there's gonna be a day after the election.

Yeah.

Right? So from the Iranian perspective, it's all focused on that. Like, just make it so painful. Well, whatever happens on election day happens. And then that leverage point goes away. So, and then, you know, President Trump, he doesn't have another election and he— his party doesn't while he's in office. So, um, that leverage point goes away. And so, uh, what does that mean?

I would, I would also say that the Democrats, if they take the House and the Senate, can make life exceedingly hard in terms of funding.

Oh yeah.

Yes. So there's an old adage— this will drive Dee crazy when I say this, and I— because, because, you know, Dee, I geek out on kind of Middle Eastern stuff and Israeli politics, but In Israel, everyone says there's no such thing as Israeli foreign policy. It's only domestic policy. Now it's a tiny little country. You understand why. But in some ways you could say the same thing right now about the war in Iran. It is domestic policy or domestic concerns that I think are going to dominate. So I just have to talk about this.

I think it's understandably so why they should dominate. I mean, the Pentagon's asking for like an extra $80+ billion in ancillary funding for this. And there's no end in sight and people are paying more money at the gas pump, more money at the grocery store. So it's very easily exploited politically. I mean, I can make— I can write you an ad right now, a political ad, you know, shitting on the Republicans for this. So, yeah, I think that's something to be considered, at least in a democracy, right?

Like, can I ask you a quick question just about assuming Andy's out somewhere? Outside of the country, perhaps in a region we know well. But just what are the attitudes of people on the street in the Middle East towards this, particularly the Gulf? I mean, sometimes, you know, we get asked questions, you know, what do the Gulf Arabs say? But that actually is a pretty giant conglomeration. And I think there are differences between the Emiratis and the Saudis and the Omanis, the Qataris. Can you kind of give a little background where you think that is heading now, popular opinion or governments? They are taking the brunt of a lot of this stuff. And you now have, I guess the reports are true of Kuwaiti and other Gulf air forces in the mix.

Yeah, that's a great question. So, and there is a, there's a, the only, the two countries that I'm directly familiar with, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. I've traveled frequently to Jordan in the last few weeks. I will say this, the Saudis are very guarded. About what they think. I think it's part of Saudi culture. They are unfailingly courteous and very hesitant to criticize openly. But obviously, there's a good deal of frustration here, and obviously, it has hurt their pocketbook. But for the average, I mean, I'm not pretending to be able to read the Arab street, but For the average guy in the street, life kind of goes on here for a number of reasons. You know, Saudi economy, the average person is somewhat insulated from perhaps from what is going on. In Jordan, that is very different. In Jordan, if when people find out you're American, I mean, there's not hostility, but they want to tell you how pissed off they are and tell you the stories about how it has ruined, you know, whatever it may be, the hotel you're staying in, the— even, you know, when I went to have my haircut, I, uh, I, I— the guy should have tipped me for, for being the subject of his venting.

But, um, I mean, and I understand it totally. I mean, it has— I— part of it is the fact that, um, yes, for the other countries, Saudi Arabia, UAE, the economy is very dependent on fossil fuels and that has been affected. But, um, and it has particularly affected UAE too because of the expat community. Those of you who've been to Dubai anytime in the last decade know that it's hard to, you know, you, you'll see the Emiratis are vastly outnumbered by expats. Well, expats have fled from UAE and it doubtless has had a huge knock-on effect to the economy there. But I couldn't tell you directly how the Emiratis are reacting. So in Saudi, very guarded, and there's no kind of open hostility, but definitely concern, especially with the attack on Jizan, the attempted attacks yesterday on oil refineries. Remember the Saudis, the Houthis delivered a successful attack against the Aramco facility a while ago, 2019, but the Saudis remember that. And also the fact that, of course, they're under direct squeeze of oil. The Straits of Hormuz are all cut off. The last thing, generally, a lot of concern about desalination plants. If you look across the— I think we talked about this last time we were on air, but Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia to include it, Saudi Arabia probably less than the other Gulf countries.

I think it varies between dependence on on desalination plants for water, about 70% here in Saudi Arabia. That goes all the way up to 100% or 90 to 100% places like Kuwait and Bahrain.

Kuwait.

And the Iranians announcing that they plan the next escalation plan is to go after desalination plants is causing a lot of concern. Back to Jordan though. Tremendous, tremendous, like nothing I've been visiting Jordan for on and off for about 15 years. And I've never seen— and normally they're really pro-American. That has changed. Absolutely changed.

Did they say in Saudi, did they say anything about this nuclear agreement that was and then wasn't?

No. You know, again, I think it's part of the culture. Courtesy. They will talk about— they love talking about the World Cup. You know, I'm talking about colleagues in the Ministry of Defense. But we'll politely, you know, and it's the issues like that are not common conversation. But I will say this, if you watch Al Arabiya here and the state, there's tremendous amount of excitement, doubtless. You know, there's a feeling that, you know, there's always kind of a feeling. I mean, everyone's proud of their countries here, right? And you say there's a lot of Saudis are proud to be Saudis and there's always this feeling that they should be regional leaders, that they're not one of the Gulf states, you know. I mean, and, and so, uh, this, uh, this agreement about, uh, enrichment is, um, is very important to them. And it's not this, you know, it's not about building the bomb, it's everything that it enables. Um, the Saudis burned through a huge amount of fossil fuel in order to provide the energy that they provide. The deal gave UAE— has already given UAE the ability to produce half of their energy from, uh, from nuclear power, which is— it's a tremendous improvement.

So it's not, it's not about building the bomb, it's about particularly in Saudi Arabia being, uh, being able to align their means of energy production in line with MBS's transformation vision for 2030, which is— which means moving the Saudi economy away from relying solely on fossil fuels. I mean, that is, that is his stated objective. So being able to have an agreement to enrich uranium, that's why it's always been important to the Saudis.

Well, That was pretty shocking. So that's one thing is, you know, I'm not saying it's the end-all be-all, but I think Secretary Rubio should be more involved in all these negotiations and his team in general, because we've had one MOU that was so vague that it kind of fell apart as soon as it started. And then you had an agreement that I think took, from what I'm told, took months of really detailed negotiations that fell apart after it was signed. Because of something that, if it was a requirement in the first place, should have been identified, right? If, if it always required Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords. Yeah, with that, maybe I'm missing something.

Oh yeah. Oh, that— yeah, so that— so I, I— that's a non-starter, I can tell you that, in, in Saudi Arabia. Um, right.

So why, why was there all these negotiations and signing ceremonies, and then, then that's popped on? So it just— and I bring that up obviously because it's problematic, but it's also problematic when it comes to ending the war through a negotiated process. We need to have a functional negotiation process that actually is really descriptive so that we know what we're getting into and what we're actually agreeing to. If we have these things that start and stop, start and stop, it— I mean, from the— not that I care so much about the Iranian perspective, they might just like, look, it's not even worth the effort. And it is for us worth the effort. We want this to end diplomatically. We don't want to see a major escalation.

Don't you think they're stringing us along? I mean, they just, so they show a little leg every once in a while. They act reasonable, whatever these recent proposals are. The Omanis were there yesterday, I guess. And so, and Trump made some statements saying that there does seem to be progress. And so, I mean, they're just, they're masters at this. They're just, you know, this is just going to last forever. And they just want it. They kind of, as the economic pain grows inside the United States, back to this, the kind of the Saudi stuff. I mean, it is amazing to me that we took the single biggest carrot that we had with the Saudis, which is normalization with Israel. And we took that off the table for this nuclear deal, for the Saudi, the US-Saudi nuclear deal. I mean, it is. You know, the, and of course, especially when there's likely going to be a change in the Israeli government in October, in which they can utter the words yes to a future Palestinian state without having Netanyahu's crazy coalition stopping that. You know, that would be something that would be really significant in the Middle East.

But now we've just given them the nuclear deal. Whatever Trump said afterwards, you know, because there was so much criticism of this. I mean, the one that's something I think the Biden administration got right, the carrot. For this US-Saudi nuclear deal was Saudi joining the Abraham Accords if the Israelis could say the magical words about a Palestinian state. I mean, lots of moving parts, but we just botched that whole thing. And the dysfunction in the administration was such that Trump was pissed about it because the, I guess the US Energy Secretary didn't even tell the White House he's going to announce this. Again, this goes back to something we've talked about all the time about lack of planning in the national security process. There's no, you know, and whose job is that? It's Marco Rubio, the National Security Advisor.

Yeah, but it can't be both. It can't be both, you know.

Or the Secretary of State, whatever. But the idea that, I mean, this whole thing was just a go rope. The Saudis are now, don't really understand what we're up to now. And I think there is some thought that the deal might go through anyhow. But that Trump was really covering his rear because of the criticism thrown his way. But again, we, you know, the idea of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham, I've never been a fan of the Abraham Accords because it never addressed the Palestinian issue. I thought just because Israelis could go ski at Ski Dubai in Emirates. Great place. I've been there. Indoor skiing. That's wonderful. But it didn't solve a fundamental problem, especially since the countries that signed the Abraham Accords were never actually at war with Israel. But the notion of Israel-Saudi rapprochement, signed the Abraham Accords with the Israelis formally saying something about a future state, that's a really big deal. And I think we blew all our leverage. I don't understand why we did that. That was diplomatic malpractice.

Yeah, I mean, the agreement was signed on— I mean, it's already been signed, right?

On—

it was last week, the 22nd. I think it's— I mean, it's fair to say it's not an immediate green light to enrich. I am— you know, it establishes this 2-year US-Saudi study, right, to determine whether domestic enrichment is practical. I mean, commercially viable, whether it's warranted. And then after that, then— so 2 years, I mean, anything could happen potentially in those 2 years, right? It could be a new administration. But nevertheless, it's a start and it has generated a good deal of excitement.

So is it still in place? I thought President Trump came out and said it was over, kanked it. So not the case.

Confusion. Yeah. I mean, I'm sure the Saudis were not happy about Trump's statement saying it's all contingent on the Abraham Accords.

Yeah, he did say, he said it was, he said it will be approved. And then he said it's totally subject to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords.

So I—

and then who knows, they won't do it. So, all right.

But again, that's the dysfunction. This doesn't happen if you have a functioning National Security Council. It just doesn't. Yes, period.

Would have had that— that, that's a pretty big requirement, right? So it would have been discussed over and over and over again.

And the right requirement, which was not in anything— the Saudis came out and then said, actually, this was not part of the requirement, sorry, and it's binding. So who knows? It's very—

the JCPOA was by—

by Truth Social is amazing.

Yeah, the messaging is really tricky. I mean, you have the Energy Secretary coming out and there's the other side of the room, the other side of the office doesn't know what's going on.

It's—

and it's not just some bullshit that you can, you know, throw out on Friday nights for people to forget about. It's something directly pertaining to our issues in the Middle East, right? Like if we're going to give Saudi the A-OK to enrich uranium.

But, you know, I think it's been, again, I think the danger of the agreement has been overstated. All right. A 2-year study, which gives all kinds of leeway. And then the agreement itself isn't giving the Saudis the technology to enrich their own uranium. It's establishing what's been called a black box facility, which is physically located in Saudi Arabia, but it's operated by American companies without transferring the enrichment technology directly to the Saudis. So it's kind of enrichment enabling, but you've got this gate of a 2-year study, right? And then you've got American operational control. So for those who are criticizing the agreement on its own merit and saying, hey, how come we're doing this? We may not have We may not have stipulated the Saudis need to join a non-proliferation— sign a non-proliferation agreement, but if you look at the terms of the actual agreement, there's no need to do that if we're not transferring the technology directly to them.

I agree. I think the agreement— I mean, again, but there's no carrot. I mean, the idea would be they gotta sign— they gotta join the Abraham Accords. Yeah. And then they get this. And I think, I think they— and frankly, I think US national security planners and the Israelis and others would be more comfortable with that, if there's going to be, you know, uh, because then you end up having a Saudi-Israeli alliance. Of course, all of this is not even possible with the current Israeli government, so we shall see. I just think we should— I don't understand why this happened now. Why did we not wait till there's a change in Israeli administrations where you could actually have significant progress?

I, I think— I don't know, but I, I think some of this might have been a Trumpian reaction to, to the fact that in the, in the media, and, and it's, you know, no secret, uh, Saudi Arabia was becoming very frustrated with, uh, the administration's lack of information sharing, right, about intentions. And so what was the name, what was the name of the operation, uh, that, that MBS said, hey, when we're going to deny access, okay, we, we, we're done. Uh, we're going to deny access to, um, uh, Saudi airspace if you want to continue this. I forget it was, it was like in week 5 of the 7-week campaign.

Yep.

I think it was just recently too. It was recent.

Yeah.

Yeah.

So, so, yeah, you know, I, I mean, doubtless Trump administration that has always been ostensibly very friendly and welcoming to the Saudis, in practice has kind of cold-shouldered them at a time when the Saudis were taking, along with UAE, the brunt of many of the attacks. And there was the feeling that they were being slighted, and I think with some justification, a great deal of justification. So I felt that this was, again, kind of a Trumpian, hey guys, you're still my friends, look what I'm doing. Without really surprisingly, right, laying the diplomatic groundwork, uh, for this to be a, a move.

Mick, see you, bro. Love you.

All right, fellas, have a great day.

Wrap up with Andy. Oh yeah, uh, so Andy, all the interesting guys have left, so yeah, it's okay now. This part's not sponsored by the CIA.

We're losing, we're losing, uh, and then we've just lost 95% of our audience too.

No, I don't think so. I think You're wrong on that. Are you tracking at all what's going on with Israel, like with the political, like the election in October? I really haven't seen polls or anything like that. Does it really look like Netanyahu is going to get bounced? As far as you know?

I mean, so the— I don't have any insights into this beyond what I'm reading. And what I'm reading is conflicting, right? Um, it's really, I, I know I'm just hedging, but I'm just giving you an honest answer. I think it's, I think it's going to be a nail biter right down to the election itself. I mean, it's, we can go on and on about how there is a segment of the Israeli population that hates Netanyahu, but there's also a sizable segment of the Israeli population who will support him no matter what. Somewhat, you know, similar to, to our own president. So hard to say. I don't think— yeah, I'm not— too early to speculate on that.

All right, one last thing. What do you make of, uh, Ukraine hitting a couple of, uh, container ships heading towards Iran from Russia with military supplies, and Iran coming out saying— I think they said a sailor was killed and somebody else was injured.

Yeah.

Um, what do you make of that?

The Ukrainians have a legitimate beef with the Iranians from way back in early 2023, uh, actually late 2024, when the Russians first started using the Shahed drone. I mean, that's been— there's been absolute open collaboration between the Iranians and the Russians, and now the Russians are developing the Shaheds domestically with Iranian support. Of course, this is no— and the agreements on oil, all of these things. I mean, Iran is a Russian ally. It's a Russian ally. Okay, so absolutely legitimate. Ukraine has cut down Russian ability to refine and export their oil by the estimates on the media between 14% and 20%, right, which is significant. Some say higher. And you can see on RT, Russian-owned networks, long lines at gas stations. The Russian population is feeling the impacts of Ukrainian strikes on their oil infrastructure. So going after going after exports, um, it just makes sense too. And the Iranians have, uh, certainly no friends of, uh, of the Ukrainians. It's kind of ironic, you know. I mean, here's Ukraine pitching in to assist the United States. Yeah, well, yes.

Um, what else? There was something else I wanted to ask you. Um, and I forgot.

Hey, you know, one thing, I mean, John's not here, uh, and, and I would say, you know, we've been talking about the, the, the fact that more of the same military strikes is likely to have limited returns, and that understanding, uh, the kind of the mentality of Iranian leadership, they are very unlikely to negotiate and give concessions while still being struck, right? And so you've got this disparity that we just think, keep ramping up the kinetic pressure, ramp it up, ramp it up. At some stage, they're going to come to the negotiations table. But then from their point of view, it doesn't make sense at all. And that is not going to happen. I would think I would think that John, if he'd been here, would talk about the fact that sanctions so far have had limited effect for a number of reasons. One is that we impose sanctions in increments. I think there's been kind of 4 increments, right, since the conflict started. And what it's meant in each case, we impose sanctions and the Iranians adapt. They find workarounds. We go after those workarounds. You know, we've identified, I know, 32 individuals in 8 countries who are enabling Iran to rebuild their missile drone programs, right, by providing components everywhere from Hong Kong to Belarus.

We've identified the ships that are carrying Iranian oil. Invariably, they are flying flags of, um, of countries that would either deny us boarding rights or we have to ask those countries specifically before boarding their vessels. We can't just simply board vessels unless they are unflagged. So all of these things are happening. So I think John would probably say, hey, we just need to be more dynamic in our imposition of these sanctions and going after the supply chains rather than hitting the finished products in Iran. And what that means is imposing rolling sanctions, right? So we're constantly, um, identifying workarounds, going after individuals who are involved with those workarounds, putting pressure on, uh, governments that are allowing, uh, the components to export of components, etc., um, really imposing costs on banks, separating them from the financial system if they are even peripherally involved in supporting Iran by harboring Iranian assets or enabling Iranian assets to bypass US sanctions. All of these things are things that we can do. We can physically, you know, we, we can, and I'm a little bit thin ice here, but there are there are circumstances in which we can physically board ships even without permission of the countries that own them.

But for the countries that own them, we just simply need to put pressure on them and say, listen, uh, we need to, you know, these— this ship, we've got evidence, blah blah blah, we're going to board and search and impound if we find that it is evading sanctions. So there's a lot of things that can be done. And then on the targeting itself, look, I'm— we're playing whack-a-mole. We're playing whack-a-mole in the, in the area of sanctions and imposing costs and preventing workarounds and regeneration of these, of these programs and the weapons programs, all of these things. Um, and we're playing whack-a-mole when it comes to strikes. And so I'm thinking, okay, what do you do when, when you're going after assets that are hard to destroy. Um, and, and yes, you, you go after infrastructure to some extent, but the other thing is just making a very determined effort to go after layers of leadership, right? We've gone after the top layer of leadership, and then you keep lowering that, that layer. And it's especially important since the Iranians are— and I know this has become a cliché, but they're operating off of kind of a theory of mission command, decentralized command, where they push that decision-making down, the Mosaic Doctrine.

So we keep— we, we take— we make a very comprehensive approach to knocking off each layer of leadership. And I know I'd probably be critiqued for my rather cavalier terminology here, but that's, you know, when you're talking about bringing pain on the regime itself, not on the people, but on the regime itself, that's what you have to do. Those things in conjunction. Um, I know we're doing some of that, but we're not doing it— we're not doing it comprehensively, holistically, and we're not doing it in a way— uh, dynamic targeting, right?

In both—

in both ways, dynamic financial targeting, dynamic kinetic targeting. Um, is the way to approach this, right? At the same time, there's a whole realm of cyber stuff that we could be doing. And I know, I understand why we don't necessarily want to do it. We don't want to show our hands to what we, the countries, a country that we regard as being our real enemy. But nevertheless, there are things that we can do, I'm sure, in that area, offensive cyber operations, to also increase the pain directly on the Iranian regime. So I guess, you know, in a, In a nutshell, what I'm saying is rather than this rather broad targeting, and even though we've said that we've narrowed the aperture of that targeting to certain assets, we forget about those assets, we forget about the weapon which is downrange, and we go after the supply chains, we go after the financial, uh, the the money flow, right? And then we go after the actual leadership. A combination of those things would seem to be a more intelligent way perhaps to do this.

Andy, let me ask you, to have those rolling sanctions and the more dynamic sanctions, do you need a, uh, thing like a Congress to okay that, like a law to be passed or something like that? Or can we do that?

So, no, I mean, they said simply—

so why aren't we doing it?

This is direction to the Treasury. I mean, we didn't need—

Or you would need a functioning and dynamic NSC to do something like that.

We didn't need congressional approval to impose the 4 sets that we've already done. You know, I think it's just direction to Treasury and OFAC to go ahead and do it. I could be wrong on that. Okay. And I welcome any of our audience who can correct me. Um, it's not my area of expertise. Indeed. No real areas of expertise, but, um, but I do know that much, that, you know, going after the money, uh, is, uh, it is one of the things that, that we need to— going after the money, going after the components, upstream supply chain, and then downstream going after the people is a way perhaps to bring greater pressure. And then last thing is you've got to offer a carrot. All right. You got to think how the Iranian, this whole thing about unconditional surrender and they're going to give in and you have to, you have to, if you want to really bring them to the negotiating table, you ratchet up the pain in that way, in the ways that I've told you and be smart about it. But at the same time, you have to offer them some face-saving outlet.

Yeah. No, well said. All right, tell me about your book.

Yeah, so The War in Gaza, if you're interested in, uh, in chapter increments pending publication, which should be in early 2027, um, please sign on to my, uh, my Substack. And, um, uh, if it's— I, I will, you know, without Thank you. Thank you for this platform. I will say this, okay? Incredibly difficult topic to write about. It was, for a number of ways. And I've tried to, I think you'll see from the chapters that I've written, the chapters that I have been published, that it's as balanced as I possibly can make it. But I don't pull punches where punches need to be delivered. I deliver them in the book, but I back everything up with facts. I mean, you've read my articles on Gaza. But my point is too, I look at it totally. I mean, the people I've interviewed on both sides, I won't say both sides, all sides, it's a pretty comprehensive group. And to my knowledge, And I've either read or reviewed all the books on 7 October that come out to date. I don't think there is as holistic a comprehensive approach to the topic as in this book that is coming out.

Are you planning on posting a chapter, like every chapter? No, right? On Substack?

No, every chapter. No, I mean, between now and publication, I will public. I will post maybe a third of all of the book available free, right?

Cheapskate.

Yeah, that first chapter was incredible.

My Substack's free, totally.

Yeah, and that first chapter was incredible. I definitely suggest people go and check it out. That link is in the description for the Substack.

There is stuff in the book that has not been released elsewhere, um, especially when we're getting into what actually happened on 7 October, the lead-up, how Hamas prepared for it, and also within the subsequent conflict in Gaza and the conflict on the northern front. And although, you know, for the most part, a lot of my sources not all, but, you know, a lot of them wanted to remain anonymous. And of course, you know, I protect that. Where I have done so, then I find— I also find objective, um, proof of what they have said. So I'm not just simply taking people's word for it. But there is a lot in there that you will not find anywhere else.

Yeah, it's, uh, yeah, definitely check it out, everybody. All right, that's the show, I think, unless you have more to say, Andy.

I'll let you break it up.

I'll let you rip.

No, no, no, that's whack. Poetically, way, way too much of me, for sure.

I want everyone to do us a favor. I want everyone to like and subscribe this. If you're listening to us on audio, rate it 5 stars, subscribe there too, uh, tell a friend, you know, let a friend know what's going on. And he's got another book called When the Tempest Gathers, his autobiography. It's incredible as well. All those links are in the description, all the links for all the guys, John, Mick, Mark, links are in the description. And the best place to support the show, to have us keep going, is patreon.com/theTeamHouse. You get both Eyes On and Team House episodes ad-free and early, and you can watch Team House episodes as we record them live, and you can help support the show. So Andy, a pleasure as always. Rest in peace Sam Faddis, former CIA officer. He's been on the Team House, uh, a few years back now, probably 5 or 6 years back. Passed away. So rest in peace to Sam Faddis. That's it. Thanks, Andy.

Hey guys, I want to take a moment to tell you about the TeamHouse Podcast newsletter. If you go and subscribe, it's totally free. And what it will do is aggregate all of our data, all of our content that we put out, uh, things that are on the team house, on our geopolitics podcast Eyes On, things that I write journalistically with Sean Naylor on The High Side, anything else that we have going on, books we recommend, upcoming guests that we have coming on the show, and also, you know, filtering in some fun stuff in there as well. If you go and check it out, we send it out just once a week. We don't want to spam you guys. It's just a kind of roll-up of all of our content on a weekly basis. You can find our newsletter at teamhousepodcast.kit.com/join. Again, the website for that is teamhousepodcast.kit.com/join. So we hope to see you there. The link will be down in the description.