Dylan Patel of SemiAnalysis joins Dwarkesh Patel for a deep dive into the three main bottlenecks on scaling AI compute: logic chips, memory, and power. The conversation walks through the economics of AI labs, hyperscalers, foundries and chip equipment makers, including how GPU rental prices and depreciation work and why long-term contracts shape who gets capacity.
They discuss how EUV lithography machines from ASML may become the binding constraint by 2030, why memory prices are surging, and how alternative power sources could fill grid gaps. Listeners will also hear the guest's views on China's semiconductor prospects, space-based data centers, and the risks around Taiwan.
Many forecasts are presented as the guest's own estimates rather than settled facts.
In this episode Dwarkesh Patel, Dylan Patel
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Alright, this is the episode where my roommate teaches me semiconductors.
It's also the send-off for this, uh, this current set.
It's fun. Yeah, you're— you know, after you use it, I'm like, I can't use this again. I gotta get out here.
No sloppy seconds for Dwarkesh.
Yes. Okay, Dylan is the, uh, CEO of SemiAnalysis. Dylan, the burning question I have for you, um, if you add up the Big Four— Amazon, Meta, Google, Microsoft— their combined, uh, forecasted capex that you published recently this year is $600 billion. And given, uh, you know, yearly prices of renting that compute, that would be, like, close to 50 gigawatts. Now, obviously we're not putting on 50 gigawatts this year, so presumably that's paying for compute that is going to be coming online over the coming years.
So I have a question about what— how to think about the timeline around when that capex comes online. Similar question for the labs where, you know, OpenAI just announced that they raised $110 billion, Anthropic just announced they raised $30 billion. And if you look at the compute that they have coming online this year, um, you should tell me how much it is, but like, is it not— is it not another 4 gigawatts total that they'll have this year? It feels like the cost to rent the compute that OpenAI and Anthropic will have this year to, like, sustain their compute spend at, you know, $10, $13 billion a gigawatt.
Those individual raises alone are, like, enough to cover their compute spend for the year. And then this is not even including the revenue that they're going to earn this year. So help me understand, first, when is the timescale at which the big tech capex is actually coming online? And two, what are the labs raising all this money for if, like, the yearly price of a 1 gigawatt data center is, like, $13 billion?
So when you talk about the capex of these hyperscalers, right, on the order of $600 billion, and you look at the cost, the rest of the supply chain gets you to on the order of $1 trillion. A portion of this is, you know, immediately for compute going online this year, right? The chips and the, uh, the other parts of capex that do get paid this year. But there's a lot of setup capex as well, right? So when we have— when we're talking about 20 gigawatts this year in America, roughly.
Incremental.
Incremental added capacity. A portion of this is not spent this year. A portion of that capex is actually spent the prior year. And so when you look at, hey, Google's got $180 billion, actually a big chunk of that is spent on turbine deposits for '28 and '29. A chunk of that is spent on data center construction for '27. A chunk of that is spent on, you know, power purchasing agreements and down payments and all these other things that they're doing, uh, for further out into the future so that they can set up this super-fast scaling, right?
And this applies to all the hyperscalers and other people in the supply chain. And so, you know, 20 gigawatts roughly deployed this year, um, a big chunk of that being hyperscalers, chunk not being. And all of these companies, their biggest customers are Anthropic and OpenAI. Um, Anthropic and OpenAI are in the, you know, 2 gigawatt and, you know, 2.5 gigawatt and 1.5 gigawatts roughly right now. They're trying to scale to much larger, right? If you look at what Anthropic has done over the last few months, you know, $4 billion, $6 billion revenue added.
And if we just draw a straight line, hey, yeah, they'll add another $6 billion of revenue a month. Uh, people would argue that's bearish and that they should go faster. What that implies is that they're going to add $60 billion of revenue across the next 10 months, right? And $60 billion of revenue at the current gross margins that Anthropic had, at least last, uh, reported by media, um, would imply that they have, you know, roughly $40 billion of compute spend for that inference, for that $60 billion of revenue. That $40 billion of compute at roughly $10 billion a gigawatt, um, rental cost means that they need to add 4 gigawatts of inference capacity just to grow revenue.
And that's saying that their research and development training fleet stays flat, right? So, you know, in a sense, Anthropic needs to get to well above 5 gigawatts by the end of this year. And it's going to be really tough for them to get there, but it's possible.
Can I— can I ask a question about that? So, um, if Anthropic was not on track to have 5 gigawatts by the end of this year, but it needs that to serve both the revenue that's gone crazier than expected, and maybe it's going to be even more than that, plus the research and training to make sure its models are good enough for next year, how— how— where is that going to come from?
You know, Dario, when he was on your podcast, was very, very, like, conservative. He's like, you know, I'm not going to go crazy on compute because if my revenue inflects at a different rate at a different point, I don't want to go bankrupt. You know, I want to make sure that we're being responsible with this scaling. But in reality, you know, he's definitely missed the pooch in terms of, like, going like OpenAI, which was, let's just sign these crazy fucking deals, right? Um, and OpenAI has kind of got way more access to compute than Anthropic by the end of the year. And so what does Anthropic have to do to get the compute? Well, they have to go to lower quality providers that they would not have gone to before, right?
You know, optimally, you know, Anthropic at least historically has had the best quality providers been like Google and Amazon. Um, whereas, you know, at least historically minded, you know, the biggest companies in the world, um, now Microsoft and now they're expanding across the supply chain and going to other players that are newer. Um, OpenAI has been, you know, a bit more aggressive on going to many players. Yes, they have tons of capacity from Microsoft. Uh, they have Google and Amazon as well, but they also have, like, tons with CoreWeave and Oracle. And they've gone to, like, random companies or, you know, one would think random companies like SoftBank Energy, who has never built a data center in their life, but, you know, they're building data centers now for OpenAI.
So they've gone to and many others like Nscale and others, um, that they're going and getting capacity from. And so there's this, like, conundrum for Anthropic because they were so conservative on compute, um, because they didn't want to go crazy, right? And in some sense, a lot of the financial freakouts in the second half of last year were like, OpenAI signed all these deals, but they don't have the money to pay for them. Um, okay, Oracle stock's going to tank. Oh, okay, CoreWeave stock's going to tank. Oh, okay, like, you know, all these companies' stocks tanked. Um, and credit markets went crazy because people were like, the end buyer can't pay for this.
Now it's like, oh, wait, they raised a ton of money. Okay, fine, they can pay for it. But in the sense, Anthropic was a lot more conservative. They were like, we'll sign contracts, but we'll be principled, um, and we'll purposely undershoot what we think we can possibly do. Um, and be conservative because we don't want to potentially go bankrupt.
But the thing I want to understand is, so in a what— what does it mean to have to acquire compute in a pinch? Um, is it that you have to go with, like, NeoClouds that is it that they have worse compute or something? Like, in what way is it worse? And is it that you have to pay gross margins to a cloud provider that you wouldn't have otherwise had to pay to because they're coming in at the last minute? Who built the spare capacity such that it's available for Anthropic and OpenAI to get last minute? And, like, basically what is the concrete advantage that OpenAI has gotten if they end up at similar compute numbers by 2027? Um, is it just like they're going to end this year with different gigawatts?
If so, how many gigawatts is Anthropic and OpenAI going to have by the end of this year?
Yeah. So to acquire excess compute, I mean, yes, there is capacity at hyperscalers that, um, and not all contracts for compute are long-term, right? Five years, right? There's compute that in 2023 or 2024, H100s, 2025, that were signed at not five-year deals, right? OpenAI, the vast majority of their compute is signed at five-year deals, but they can, you know, there were there were many other customers that had one-year, two-year, three-year deals, six-month deals on demand. And as these contracts roll off, who is the participant in the market most willing to pay price?
Um, and in this sense, right, we've seen H100 prices inflect a lot and go up and people willing to sign long-term deals for, you know, as above $2 even, right? Like, I've seen deals where certain AI labs— I'm going to be a little bit, uh, vague here for a reason— uh, have signed at as high as $2.40 for two to three years for H100s, which if you think about the margin, $1.40 for Hopper when you release it, uh, or Hopper to build it, um, across five years, and now two years in you're signing deals that are two to three years that are at $2.40.
Those margins are way higher, right? And so now you can crowd out all of these other suppliers, whether it's Amazon had these or CoreWeave had these or Together AI or Nebius or whoever it is, right? You know, the these NeoClouds are the firms that had a higher percentage of Hopper in general because they were more aggressive on it, A, and B, they tended to sign shorter-term deals, you know, not CoreWeave, but the others tended to sign shorter-term deals. And so, hey, if I want Hopper, there is some capacity out there.
And then also, while most of the capacity at, like, an Oracle or a CoreWeave is signed for a long-term deal in terms of Blackwell, uh, anything that's going online this quarter is already sold. Um, and in some cases, they're not even hitting all the numbers that they promised they would sell because there's some data center delays, not just those two, but like Nebius and all the other folks, Microsoft, Amazon, Google. But there is a lot of NeoClouds as well as some of the hyperscalers who have capacity they're building that they did not sell yet or capacity that they were going to allocate to some internal use, uh, that is not necessarily super AGI-focused that they may now turn around and sell.
Interesting.
Or they may, you know, in the case of Anthropic, they don't have to have all the compute directly, right? Amazon can have the compute. They can serve Bedrock or Google can have the compute and serve Vertex or Microsoft can have the compute and serve Foundry and then do a revenue share with Anthropic or vice versa.
Okay. Basically you're saying Anthropic is having to pay either this, like, 50% markup in the sense of the revenue share or in the sense of last-minute spot compute that they wouldn't have otherwise had to pay had they bought the compute early.
Right. And, and, you know, there's a trade-off there. Uh, but also at the same time, um, you know, for a solid, like, four months, everyone was like, OpenAI, we're not going to sign deals with you. Like, that sounds crazy, right? Because you guys don't have the money. Now everyone's like, yeah, OpenAI, we believed you the whole time. We can we can sign any deal because you've raised all this money. Um, but in a sense, Anthropic is constrained in that sense. Um, there are not that many incremental buyers of compute yet because Anthropic hit the capability tier first where their revenue is mooning.
Oh, that's interesting. Like, that's this, you know, because otherwise we're like, well, having the best model is an extremely depreciating asset that, you know, three months later you don't have the best model. But, like, the reason it's important is that you can sign these deals and then lock in the compute in advance, get better prices. Um, doesn't this also imply, by the way, and maybe this is an obvious point, but there's at least until recently people had made this huge point about, oh, what is the depreciation cycle of a GPU? And the bears, Michael Burry or whatever, have said, look, people are saying that four or five years for these GPUs.
And in fact, if you maybe it's because the technology is improving so fast or whatever, it might make sense to have two-year depreciation cycles for these GPUs, which increases the sort of, like, reported amortized capex in a given year. Uh, and so makes it maybe financially less lucrative to building all these clouds. But in fact, you're pointing at, like, maybe the depreciation cycle is even longer than five years because if we're using Hoppers and then especially if AI really takes off and in 2030 we're like, fuck, we got to, like, get the seven nanometer fabs up and we got to, like, we got to go back to the A100s, like, turn on the A100s again.
Uh, then it's like actually the depreciation cycle is incredibly long and, um, uh, so I feel like that's an interesting financial implication of what you're saying.
Yeah, there's a few, um, strings to pull on there. One is, um, what happens to depreciation of GPUs, right? Um, and I guess I didn't answer your prior question, which is like Anthropic, I think will be able to get to like five gigawatts-ish, maybe a little bit more by the end of the year through themselves as well as their product being served through Bedrock or through Vertex or through Foundry. Uh, I think they'll be able to get to five or six gigawatts, uh, which is way above their, like, initial plans, right?
Right.
Um, you know, and anyways, that's sort of like and OpenAI will be a little roughly the same, maybe a little higher. Um, actually a little bit higher based on our numbers. But anyways, the depreciation cycle of a GPU, right? Michael Burry was saying it's, you know, three years or less, right, is like sort of his argument. And there's sort of two ways and lenses to look at this. Like mechanically, um, in this, you know, there's a TCO model, right? Uh, total cost of ownership of a GPU where we sort of project pricing out for GPUs and, uh, build up the total cost of a cluster.
But there's a number of costs, right? There's your data center cost, right? Um, there's your networking cost, there's your smart hands and people in the data center swapping stuff out. There's your spare parts, right? There's your actual chip cost, there's your server cost. All these all these various costs get slumped together and there's some depreciation cycles on it. You know, there's certain credit costs on it. Um, and you get to, oh, okay, that's how you build up, hey, an H100 costs $1.40 an hour to deploy at volume across five years if your depreciation is five years. And then if you sign a deal at $2 an hour for those five years, your gross margin is roughly 35%.
It's a little bit above that, but, you know, if you sign it for $1.90, it's 35% roughly. Um, and then at you assume at that fifth year, the GPU falls off a bus, right? It's debt. Um, and in some cases, you know, sort of the argument people are making is, well, if you didn't sign a long-term deal because every two years Nvidia's tripling, quadrupling the performance while only 2xing the price or 50% increasing the price, then the price of an H100, sure, maybe the value in the market was $2 at 35% gross margins, um, in 2024, but in 2026 when Blackwell is in super high volume and deploying millions a year, you're actually now worth $1 an hour.
And when Rubin in 27 is in super high volume, right, even though it starts shipping this year, is in super high volume next year, um, doing millions of chips a year, uh, deployed into clouds, uh, you've got another 3x in performance and another 50% or 2x in price. Actually, the Hopper's only worth 70 cents an hour. Um, and so the price of a GPU would continue to fall. That's like one lens. The other lens is what is the utility you get out of the chip, right? Because if you could build infinite Rubin or infinite, um, of the newest chip, then yes, that's exactly what would happen. The price of a Hopper would fall, um, at a spot or a short-term contract rate, uh, as the new chips come out and the price per performance goes up.
But because you are so limited on semiconductors, um, and deployment timelines and all these things, you end up with actually what prices these chips is not, hey, what's the comparative thing I can buy today? It's actually what is the value I can derive out of this chip today, right? And in that sense, um, let's take GPT-5.4. GPT-5.4 is both way cheaper to run than GPT-4, uh, has fewer active parameters. Um, it's much smaller, right, in that sense of active parameters.
Plus, because it's a, you know, a sparser MOE versus GPT-4 being a coarser MOE. Um, there's also been so many other advancements in training, RL, uh, model architecture, et cetera, et cetera, data qualities, um, all these things that have made GPT-5.4 way better than GPT-4 and it's cheaper to serve. And so when you look at an H100, it can serve more tokens per GPU of 5.4 than if you had ran GPT-4 on it, right? So, so at some sense, it's producing more tokens of a model that is of higher quality.
Interesting.
And so in some sense, you know, obviously GPT-4, what is the maximum TAM for its tokens? You know, maybe it was a few billion dollars, maybe it was tens of billions of dollars. Adoption takes time. For GPT-5.4, that number is probably north of 100 billion, but there's an adoption lag and there's competition, so other people are getting it and there's the constant improvements that everyone else is having. So if improvements stopped, you know, here, the value of an H100 is now predicated on the value that GPT-5.4 can get out of it instead of the value that GPT-4 can get out of it and the margins and all that stuff that these labs are doing and they're in a competitive environment, so their margins can't go to infinity.
Um, so you sort of have this, like, dynamic that is quite interesting in that an H100 is worth more today than it was three years ago.
That's crazy. And I mean, it's also interesting from the perspective of, like, just take that forward. If you if we had actual AGI models developed, if we had, like, genuinely a human on a server and a human, like, on a floop basis, an H100, these are such hand-wavy numbers about how many floops can the brain do, but on a floop basis, an H100 is estimated to, uh, 1e15 is like how much some people estimate the human brain does in floops. Um, obviously in terms of memory, the human brain has way more. H100 is like 80 gigabytes and brain might have petabytes.
Oh, yeah. You've got petabytes. Name a petabyte of ones and zeros, bro. Name me a string.
Well, this is actually the point where like actually in.
No, we've just got the best sparse attention techniques ever.
Oh, genuinely, right? Like, in the sort of like amount of information that is compressed, it might be petabytes, but like the actual, like, you know, it's like extremely sparse MOE. Um, but anyways, imagine if we had a human knowledge worker can produce six figures a year of value. And so if a H100 can produce something close to that, if we had actual humans on a server, uh, the value of an H100 is like it can repay itself in the course of like a couple of months. So as I've been going through everything to prep for taxes, I realized that I worked with over 50 different contractors last year, from cinematographers to audio technicians to editors, and I owed all of them 10 nighty nights.
It just does not make sense why he keeps making these statements about being more conservative on compute or to your point, buying being less aggressive than OpenAI on compute. Um, and I guess that point got lost because then people were like roasting me about like, oh, this podcast was I tried to convince this like multi-hundred billion dollar company CEO, like why don't you yolo it, bro? But no, I was trying to say that his internally his, uh, statements are inconsistent. Um, uh, anyway, so it's good to iron it out.
Yeah, I think, you know, going back to like sort of the earlier view that if the models are so powerful, uh, the value of a GPU goes up over time.
Yeah.
As we approach closer and closer to, you know, let's say a point where right now only OpenAI and Anthropic have that viewpoint, but as we approach further and further out, actually everyone is going to, even with open source models, be able to like sort of like start to, uh, see that value skyrocket per GPU. And so in that sense, you should you should commit now to compute. But interestingly, in like in Anthropic fashion, right, um, you know, there's a bit of a meme that they are, uh, they don't they have problems with commitment issues and they're like sort of polyamorous.
So not Dario, but like this is a bit of a meme.
This explains everything. Um, by the way, so there's this interesting economics effect called Alken-Allen, which is the idea that if you increase the fixed cost of different goods, one of which is higher quality and one which is lower quality, that will make people choose the higher quality good on the margin. So to give a specific example, suppose the, you know, better tasting apple costs $2 and then like the shittier apple costs $1. Okay. Now suppose you put an import tariff on them. And so now, uh, now it's $3 versus $2 for like great apple, medium apple, right?
Is that because they both increase by a dollar or should it be like 50% increase?
No, no, because they both increase by a dollar. The whole effect is that if there's a fixed cost of supply to both, the relative price, the price difference between them, um, the ratio changes. So previously it was like this, the more expensive one was 2x more expensive, now it's just 1.5x more expensive. So I wonder if applied to AI, that would mean that look, if, um, if GPUs are going to get more expensive, there will be a fixed cost increase in the price of compute.
Yes.
As a result, that will push people to be willing to pay higher margins to for slightly better models because the calculus is I'm going to be paying all this money for the compute anyways. I might as well just pay slightly more to making sure it's like the very best model rather than a model that's slightly worse.
Right. So the Hopper went from $2 to $3. And if a Hopper can make a million tokens of Opus and it can make 2 million tokens of Sonnet, um, the price differential between Opus and Sonnet has decreased, um, because the price of the GPU has increased by a dollar from $2 to $3. Um, interesting. I think that makes a ton of sense. Also, I think we just see all the volumes are on the best models today. All the revenue is on the best models today. And in a compute limited world, um, there's sort of two things that happen, right?
A, companies that have locked up, you know, and don't have commitment issues, you know, have these five-year contracts for compute, they've kind of locked in a humongous margin advantage because they've locked in compute for five years at a price of what it transacted at five years ago or three years ago or two years ago, whatever it is. Whereas if you're now three years into that five-year contract and someone else's two-year contract or three-year contract rolled off and now you're trying to buy that at, you know, modern pricing, when your price to the value of models, the price is going to be up a lot more. Um, and so in a sense, like the person who committed early has better margins in general.
Um, and the percentage of the market that is in long-term contracts is much larger than the percentage of the market in short-term contracts that can be this sort of flex capacity that you add at the last second. And at the same time, right, um, so where does the margin go, right? Uh, because models get more valuable. Um, how much can the cloud players flex their pricing? Well, if in fact, like if you look at CoreWeave, their average term duration is like over three years right now, um, for like 90% plus of their compute.
It's over three years. Um, and so they end up with this like conundrum of like, well, they can't actually flex price, but every year they're adding incrementally way more capacity than they had previously, right? Um, this year alone, right, Meta is adding as much capacity as they had in the entire fleet of compute and data centers for all purposes for serving WhatsApp and Instagram and Facebook in 2022 and doing AI, right? Um, they're adding that alone this year. So in the same sense, you know, you talk about Meta's doing that. CoreWeave and Google and Amazon, all these companies are adding insane amounts of compute year on year on year.
That new compute gets transacted at the new price. Um, so in a sense, yes, you've locked in as long as we're in a sort of a takeoff, right? Oh, OpenAI went from 600 megawatts to 2 gigawatts last year and from 2 gigawatts to, you know, 6 plus this year and, you know, 6 to 12 next year, right? The incremental added compute is where all the cost is, not the prior long-term contracts. So then who holds the card is the infra providers for charging margin, right? So now the cloud players, the Neo Clouds or the hyperscalers can charge the margin. Oh, they can't because, um, or they can to some extent, but then as you go upstream to, oh, well, who has access to all the memory and logic capacity?
Well, it's Nvidia for the most part. They've signed a lot of long-term contracts. Um, you know, they've got like $90 billion of long-term contracts today and they're negotiating three-year deals with the memory vendors today. Um, you know, you've got you've got, you know, obviously Amazon and Google through Broadcom and their, you know, Amazon directly and all these companies sort of AMD. These companies hold all the cards because they've secured the capacity. Um, and TSMC is not raising prices, but memory vendors are just like sort of to some extent raising a lot of price, right? So they're going to double or triple price again. Uh, but then they're also signing these long-term deals.
So who is able to accrue all the margin dollars is actually, you know, potentially the cloud, potentially the chip vendors, um, and the memory vendors, um, until TSMC or ASML like break out and they're like, no, actually we're going to charge a lot more. Um, but at the same time, do the model vendors get to charge crazy margins? Um, I think at least this year we're going to see margins for the model vendors go up a lot, right? Because they're so capacity constrained, they have to destroy demand, right? There is there's no way they can continue. Anthropic can continue at the current pace without destroying demand.
Yeah. Uh, let's get into logic and memory. Um, how specifically Nvidia has been able to lock up so much of both. So if you I think according to your numbers by 2027, Nvidia is going to have like 70 plus percent of N3 wafer capacity or something like that. Um, uh, or around that area. And then I forget what the numbers were for memory at SK Hynix and Samsung and so forth. But, um, if you look at so think about how the Neo Cloud business works and how Nvidia works with that or how the, uh, RL environment business works and how Anthropic works with that.
In both those cases, Nvidia is purposely trying to fracture the complementary industry to make sure that they have as much leverage possible. So they're giving, you know, allocation to random Neo Clouds to make sure that there's not one person that has all the compute. Similarly, Anthropic or OpenAI when they're working with the data providers, they say, no, we're going to just seed a huge industry of these things so that, um, we're not locked into any one supplier for, uh, for data environments. And I wonder why on the 3 nanometer process, that's going to be Trainium 3, that's going to be TPU v7, uh, other accelerators potentially.
And why is TSMC just giving it all up to Nvidia rather than, you know, trying to fracture the market?
Yeah. So I think, um, there's a couple like points here, right? Um, on 3 nanometer, you know, if we go back to last year, the vast majority of 3 nanometer was Apple. Right. Apple is being moved to 2 nanometer. Memory prices are going up. So Apple's volumes may go down, right? Because as memory prices go up, they have to either they cut margin or they, uh, move, move on. You know, there's some time lag because they have long-term contracts. But basically, Apple likely reduces demand slash moves to 2 nanometer faster where 2 nanometer is only capable of sort of mobile chips today.
Um, and in the future, AI chips will move there. So sort of Apple has that. And then Apple is also talking to, uh, third-party vendors because they're getting squeezed out of TSMC a little bit. Um, because TSMC's margins on high-performance computing, um, HPC, AI chips, et cetera, is higher than it is for mobile. Um, because they have a bigger advantage in mobile, um, sorry, in HPC than they do in mobile. But anyways, when you look at what's what's TSMC running calculus here, actually they're providing really good, um, allocations to companies that are doing CPUs, right?
So when you think about, hey, Amazon has Trainium and Amazon has, uh, Graviton, both of those are on 3 nanometer, Graviton being their CPU, Trainium being their AI chip, they're actually TSMC is much more excited to give allocation to Graviton than they are to Trainium because they view CPU business as more stable long-term growth, right? And as a company that is conservative and doesn't want to ride cycles of growth too hard, you actually want to allocate to the, uh, the market that is more stable and lower growth rate first before you allocate all the incremental capacity to the fast growth rate market.
Now, that is that is the case generally. And so when you look at like, hey, same for AMD, right? The allocations they get on, um, you know, their CPUs is like TSMC is much more excited about those than they are for GPUs. Um, likewise for Amazon. And Nvidia, um, is is a bit unique because all yes, they have CPUs, yes, they make switches, yes, they make networking. Um, they make NVLink, they make all these different InfiniBand, Ethernet, all these different products, NIX. Um, by and large, most of these things will be on 3 nanometer by the end of this year with the Rubin launch and all the chips that are in that family.
Um, the GPU being the most important one. And yet Nvidia is getting the majority of supply, right? Part of this is because you look at the market and you like sort of like, you know, TSMC and others like they there are many ways that they forecast market demand. Um, but also it's market signal, right? The market signaled, hey, we need this much capacity next year. We need this much. We need this much. We'll sign non-cancel, non-returnable. We may even pay deposits, right? Things like this. Nvidia just did it way earlier than Google or Amazon.
And in some cases, Google and Amazon had stumbling blocks. You know, there was one one of the chips got delayed slightly by a couple quarters. Trainium and all these sorts of things happen. And then so in that case, there was a huge sort of like, okay, well, these guys are delaying, but Nvidia is wanting more, more, more, more, more. And we are checking with the rest of the supply chain, is there enough capacity? Right. So they're going to all the PCB vendors and they're saying, hey, is there enough, uh, Victory Giant? Is there enough PCB? This is like one of the largest suppliers of PCBs to Nvidia and they're a Chinese company. All the all the PCBs come from China, sort of from them.
Um, or many of them. And anyways, they're like, do you have enough PCB capacity? Great. Oh, hey, uh, memory vendors, who has all the memory capacity? Oh, okay. Nvidia does. Great. Um, so when you look at sort of in the same way, you know, who who is AGI pilled enough to buy compute in long timelines at levels that seem ridiculous to people who aren't AGI pilled, but nonetheless, they're willing to pay a pretty good margin, um, and sign it now because they view in the future that that ratio is screwed up. The same thing happens with the supply chain for semiconductors, right?
Nvidia was while I don't think Nvidia is quite AGI pilled, right? You know, Jensen doesn't believe software is going to be automated fully and all these things, right?
Accelerated computing, not AI chips, right?
It's AI chips, right?
But that's what he calls it, right?
Yeah. Because I mean, I think there's a broader term, right? AI is within that, but like physics modeling and simulations and like.
Or maybe just like he's not embracing the sort of like main use case and.
I think he's embracing it, but like I just don't think he's like AGI pilled like Dario, right? Or Sam, but he's still way, way more AGI pilled than Google was at Q3 of last year or Amazon was at Q3 of last year. And he saw way more demand, right? Um, and and and the reason is pretty simple. You know, you can see all the data center construction. He's like, okay, I want to have this market share. Um, you know, we sort of like have all the data centers tracked and, you know, you can see, you know, there's there's a lot of data centers that you could say, well, they could be one or the other, right? And so in some to some extent, Google and Amazon, you know, Google especially, even though their, you know, their TPU is just better for them to deploy, they have to deploy a crap load of GPUs because they don't have enough TPUs to fill up their data centers.
They can't get them fapped.
Wait, can I so I have a question about that. Google sold, I think, a million. Was it the v7s of the Ironwoods to Anthropic? And you're saying in general, there's this the big bottleneck right now, this year, next year, I mean, I guess going forward forever now is going to be the the, you know, logic memory, the stuff that like it takes to build these chips. And Google has DeepMind. This is the other third prominent AI lab. And if this is the big bottleneck, why would they sell it rather than just giving it to DeepMind?
Right. So, so this is again like a problem of like, you know, DeepMind people were like, this is insane. Why did we do this? Right.
Actually.
Classify that. Executive saw a different thought process, right? And um, you know, you and I know the compute team, there's one guy from, you know, both of them actually came from Google, uh, at at the main people on on, uh, the compute team at Anthropic. They saw this dislocation, they negotiated a deal, and they were able to get access to these to this compute before Google realized. And so actually the chain of events, at least from our data that we found was in in early Q3, um, we saw over the course of two, uh, over the course of like six weeks, we we saw capacity on, um, Anthropic or sorry, on TPUs go up by a significant amount over the course of those six weeks.
And it went up like multiple times in those six weeks, right? There were multiple requests. Google even had to go to TSMC and explain to them why they needed this, uh, increase in capacity because it was so sudden. But that a lot of that capacity increase was for selling to Anthropic.
Yeah.
Because Anthropic saw it before Google. And then Google had Nano Banano and Gemini 3, which caused their user metrics to skyrocket and leadership at Google was like, oh, and then they started making the statement of we have to double compute every, is it six months or I don't remember the exact number that they said. Um, but they they really woke up a lot more and then they're like, oh, hey, TSMC, we want more. We want more. And it's like, well, sorry guys, like we're sold out for next year. Um, we can work on next year. We can maybe get like 5, 10% more for 26, but really we're going to work on 27, right? There's sort of like, you know, there's this like information asymmetry of the labs in my mind, right?
I don't know if this is exactly the narrative I've spun myself from seeing all the data in the supply chain on like wafer orders and like what's going on with the data centers that, you know, Anthropic signed and Fluid Stack signed and all this like sort of it's it's it's it's pretty clear to me that Google screwed up. And you can see this from Google's Gemini ARRs, right? Um, they had next to nothing in Q1 to Q3, uh, Q3 a little bit, right? Once they started inflecting, but Q4 they were at like 5 billion ARR, right? Um, exiting or something like this. So it's like or 5 billion revenue for Q4, uh, on an ARR basis.
Um, and so it's clearly like Google didn't see revenue skyrocket. Um, and in a sense, right, Anthropic was not willing, you know, kind of had like a little bit of commitment issues before their ARR exploded, even though they have far more information asymmetry and see what's coming down the pipe. Google is going to be more conservative than Anthropic is, A, and B, Google had had even less ARR. Um, so they they sort of were like, I think, just not willing to like sort of do it and then they realized they should do it. And so now since then, Google, um, has gotten absurdly AGI pilled, right?
Uh, in terms of like what they're doing. They bought an energy company. They're buying putting deposits down for turbines. Uh, they're buying a ridiculous percentage of the powered land. Uh, they're going to utilities and negotiating long-term agreements. They're doing this on the data center and, um, power side, um, very, very aggressively, right? So, you know, I think Google woke up towards the end of last year, but it took them some time.
And how many gigawatts do you think Google will have by the end of next year?
By my data.
You charge for that kind of information.
Yes. Yes.
Um, I feel like every year the bottleneck for what is preventing us from scaling AI compute keeps changing. Uh, a couple years ago it was coast. Last year it was power. This year you'll tell me where the bottleneck is this year. But I want to understand five years out what will be the thing that is constraining us from deploying the singularity.
Yeah. I think the biggest bottleneck is compute. And for that, the longest lead time supply chains are not power or data centers. They're actually the semiconductor supply chain themselves, right? It switches back from being power and data center, uh, as a major bottleneck to chips. And in the chip supply chain, there's a number of different bottlenecks, right? There's memory, there's, uh, logic wafers from TSMC, there's, uh, there's fabs themselves. Construction of the fabs takes a couple years, three, two to three years versus a data center takes, uh, less than a year, right?
Uh, we've seen Amazon build data centers in as fast as eight months, right? So there's a big difference in lead times because of the complexity of the building, the fab that actually makes the chips, and then the tools, right? Those also have really long lead times. And so the bottlenecks as we've scaled have shifted from, hey, what is the supply chain currently not what is it currently not able to do? Um, which was coost and power and data centers, but those were all shorter lead time items, right? Coost is a much more simple process of packaging chips together. Um, power and data centers are ultimately way more simple than the actual manufacturing of the chips.
And so there's been some sliding of of of capacity across, you know, mobile or PC to data center chips, but that's been somewhat fungible. Whereas on in whereas coost and power and data centers have sort of had to start anew as supply chains, but now there's sort of no more capacity for the mobile and PC industries, which used to be the majority of the semiconductor industry, to shift over to AI, right? Nvidia is now the largest customer at TSMC and Nvidia is the largest customer at SK Hynix, the largest memory manufacturer, right?
So it's sort of impossible for this scaling or this sliding of resources away from the common person, right? PCs and and smartphones to shift anymore towards the AI chips. And so now how do we scale the AI chip production? And that's the biggest bottleneck as we go to 2030 is those.
It'd be very interesting if there is an absolute gigawatt ceiling that you can project out to 2030 based just on, hey, we can't produce more than this many EUV machines.
Right. So to scale compute further, right? There's some different bottlenecks this year, next year. Uh, but ultimately by 28, 29, the bottleneck falls to the lowest rung on the supply chain, which is ASML, right? ASML makes the world's most complicated machine, i.e., an EUV tool. Um, and the selling price for those is 300, 400 million dollars. And currently they can make about 70. Next year they'll get to 80. Uh, even under very aggressive supply chain expansion, they only get to a little bit over 100 by the end of the decade.
And so what does that mean? Okay, they can make 100 of these tools by the end of the decade and, um, you know, 70 right now. How does that actually translate to AI compute, right? We we see all these numbers from Sam Altman and and many others across the supply chain. Gigawatts, gigawatts, gigawatts, right? How many gigawatts are we adding? Um, and we see, you know, Elon saying, "Hey, the 100 gigawatts in space a year." A year, right? The the problem with any of, uh, these numbers or the challenge to these numbers is, you know, actually not the power, not the data center. We can dive into that, but it's it's it's manufacturing the chips, right?
So a gigawatt of, you know, Nvidia's Rubin chips, right? So Rubin is announced at GTC, uh, I believe the week this podcast goes live. And to make a gigawatt worth of data center capacity of Nvidia's latest chip that they're releasing at the end of this year, towards the end of this year, you need, you know, a few different wafer technologies, right? Um, you need about 55,000 wafers of 3 nanometer. You need about 6,000 wafers of 5 nanometer. And then you need about 170,000 wafers of DRAM, right?
Memory. And so across these three different buckets, um, each of these requires different amounts of EUV, right? So when you manufacture a wafer, uh, there's thousands and thousands of process steps where you're depositing material, removing them. But the sort of key critical step, which at least in advanced logic is like 30% of the cost of the chip, is something that doesn't actually put anything on the wafer, right? You take the wafer, you deposit photoresist, which is like a chemical that basically chemically changes when you expose it to light. Then you stick it into the EV tool, which shines light at it in a certain way.
It patterns it, right? Because there is what's called a mask, which is a stencil effectively for the design. And so when you look at a wafer, um, you know, leading edge 3 nanometer wafer has 70 or so masks, right? 70 or so layers of lithography, but 20 of them are the most advanced EUV, right? And that specifically, you know, if you think about, okay, well, if I need 55,000 wafers for a gigawatt, if I do 20 EUV, uh, passes per wafer, you then you can do the math. That's like, okay, that's 1.1 million passes of EUV for a single gigawatt.
So actually, like it's pretty simple. And then once you add the rest of the stuff, it ends up being 2 million right across 5 nanometer and all the memory. You're at roughly, um, 2 million EUV passes for a single gigawatt. You know, these these tools are very complicated. So, um, when you think about what it's doing across a wafer, it's taking the wafer and it's scanning and it's stepping across, right? It's scanning, stepping across, and it does this hundreds of times across the entire or dozens of times across the whole wafer. And and so when you're talking about, hey, how many EUV passes, that's the entire wafer is being exposed, um, at a certain rate.
A wafer EUV tool can do roughly 75 wafers per hour. Um, and the tool is up roughly 90% of the time, right? So in the end, you end up with actually I need about three and a half EUV tools to do the 2 million EUV wafer passes for the gigawatt. So three and a half EUV tools, uh, satisfies a gigawatt. So it's funny to think about the numbers, right? Because we're talking about, oh, what's a gigawatt cost? It costs like $50 billion roughly, right? Whereas what does three and a half EUV tools cost? That's like 1.2, right? Um, it's actually like quite a lower number, which is which is interesting to think about like, oh, 50 gigawatts of economic, you know, sort of capex in in the data center and what gets built on top of that in terms of tokens is even larger, right?
It might be $100 billion worth of AI value into the supply chain is held up by this $1.2 billion worth of tooling that simply just cannot expand its supply chain quickly.
And I think so you you you read this article recently where you were saying over the last three years TSMC has done $100 billion of capex. So it's like 30, 30, uh, 40. And if if you think about I mean a small fraction of that is sort of like being used by Nvidia for the 3 nanometer that it's going to or you know previously 4 nanometer that that it's using for its chips. Um, but Nvidia has turned that into what was what what it's like earnings last quarter was like 40 billion and so 40 billion times 4. So $160 billion.
So Nvidia alone is turning some small fraction of 100 billion in capex that's going to be depreciated over many years, not just this one year, into $160 billion in a single year. And then that gets even more intense when you go down the supply chain to ASML, which is taking a billion dollars of the machines to produce a gigawatt. And of course those machines last for more than a year, right? So it's it's doing more than that. Okay. So now I want to understand, okay, well, how many such machines will there be by 2030 if you include not just the ones that are sold that year, but are have been compiling over the previous years. Um, and what does that imply about the Sam Altman says he wants to do a gigawatt a week in 2030.
Are are when you add up those numbers, is that compatible with that?
Right. That's that's completely compatible, right? Because if you think about TSMC and the entire ecosystem has something 250 to 300 EUV tools already. Um, and then you stack on 70 this year, 80 next year, growing to 100 by 2030, you're at like 700 EUV tools by the end of the decade. Um, 700 EUV tools, three and a half tools per gigawatt. Um, assuming it's all allocated to AI, which it's not, but three and a half tools per gigawatt gets you to 200 gigawatts worth of AI chips for the data centers to deploy, right? So 200 gigawatts. Sam wants 50 gigawatts, right?
52 gigawatts a year. He's only taking 25% share then, right? Obviously, there's some share given to, um, you know, mobile and PC. Uh, assuming that, you know, for some reason we're allowed to even have consumer goods still, um, you know, and we don't get priced out of them, but, you know, roughly like he's saying 25%, 50%, you know, 25% market share of the total chips fab. That's that's kind of like very reasonable given, you know, this year alone, I think he's going to have access to 25% of the Blackwell GPUs that are deployed, right?
So it's it's not that crazy.
I find it surprising that, you know, when was the first, uh, when did ASML start shipping EUV tools? When 7 nanometer started. I don't know when that was exactly, but you're saying in 2030 they're going to be using machines that initially were shipped in 2020. So 10 years you're using the same most important machine in this most technologically advanced industry in the world. I I find that surprising.
So ASML has been shipping EUV tools now for roughly a decade, but it only entered mass volume production around 2020. You know, the tool is not the same. Um, you know, back then the tools were even lower throughput. Um, there were there's various specifications around them called overlay, right? You know, I was mentioning you're stacking layers on top of each other, right? You'll do some EUV, you'll do a bunch of different process steps, depositing stuff, etching stuff, cleaning the wafer, you know, dozens of those steps before you do another EUV layer. Um, there's a spec called overlay, right? Which is okay, you did all this work, you know, you drew these lines on the wafer.
Um, now I want to draw these dots, right? Let's just say I want to draw these dots to connect this these lines of metal to and then dot, you know, holes and then the next layer up is another set of lines that goes perpendicular. So now you're connecting wires going perpendicular to each other. Um, there you have to you have to be able to land them on top of each other. So it's called overlay. And overlay is a spec that's been improved rapidly by ASML. Wafer throughput has been improved rapidly by ASML. And also the price of the tool has gone up, but not as much as the capabilities of the tool, right? Initially the EUV tools were like 150 million and over time they're now like 400 million.
Uh, you know, as I as I look out to 2028, but the capabilities of the tools have more than doubled as well, right? Especially, um, on throughput and overlay accuracy, which is the ability to stack, you know, accurately align the the subsequent passes on top of each other. Um, even though you do tons of steps between. And so this is this is, um, you know, ASML is improving super rapidly. I think it's also something noteworthy to say ASML is, you know, maybe one of the most generous companies in the world, right? They have this linchpin thing.
No one has anything competitive. Maybe China will have some EUV by the end of the decade, but no one else, you know, has anything even close to EUV. Um, and yet they haven't taken price and margins up like crazy, right? You know, you go ask, you know, some other folks, you know, that we talk to all the time, like, you know, for example, Leopold, and they're like, "Why, you know, let's let's, you know, let's let's have the price go up, right?" Uh, because they can. The margin is there. You can you can take the margin. Like Nvidia takes the margin. Memory players are taking the margin. But ASML has never risen the price more than they've increased the capability of the tool.
Um, and so in a sense they've always provided net benefit to their customer. It's not that the tool is stagnant. It's just that like, you know, these tools are old. Yes, you can upgrade them some and the new tools are coming. And for simplicity's sake, we're kind of ignoring, you know, the advances for this podcast, the advances in overlay or throughput per tool.
So you say we're producing 60 of these machines, uh, this year and then 70, 80 over subsequent years. What what would happen if ASML just decided to double its capex or triple its capex? What is preventing them from producing more than 100 in 2030? Why why are why are you so confident that even five years out you can be uh relatively sure what their production will be?
So I think I think a couple factors here, right? ASML has not decided to just go yolo, let's expand capacity as fast as possible, right? Um, in general, the semiconductor supply chain has not, right? It's lived through the booms and busts and, uh, we can talk a bit more about it, but basically no one, you know, some players as of very recently have like woken up, but in general, no one really sees demand for 200 gigawatts a year of AI chips or, you know, trillions of dollars of spend a year in the semiconductor supply chain.
They're just like they're not they're not AI pilled, right? They're not AGI.
We're going to get to a trillion dollars this year.
Yeah. I I I I I I I feel you, but I'm saying like no one really understands this in the supply chain. Um, constantly we're told our numbers are way too high and then when they're right, they're like, "Oh, yeah, yeah, but your your next year's numbers are still too high." And it's like, but anyways, like ASML has sort of their tool has four major components, right? It has, um, the source, right, which is made by Simer in San Diego. Um, it has the, uh, reticle stage, which is made in Wilmington, uh, Connecticut, right? It has the wafer stage, um, and the, um, the optics, right?
The lenses and such. And those two are made in Europe, right? And so when you when you look at each four each of these four, they're tremendously complex supply chains that a they have not tried to expand massively and b when they try to expand them the time lag is quite long, right? Um, and so again this is the most complicated machine that humans make period, right? At at a volume, um, any sort of volume, but like let's talk about the source specifically, right? What does the source source do? It drops these tin droplets.
It hits it three subsequent times with a laser perfectly. So the first one, uh, hits this tin droplet, expands out. It hits it again. So it expands out to this perfect shape and then it blasts it at super high power and, um, the tin droplets get excited enough that they release, uh, EUV light 13.5 nanometer and then it's in this thing that is like basically collecting all the light and directing it into the lens stack, right? Then you have the lens stack, which is Carl Zeiss, right, as you mentioned, and and and some other folks, but Zeiss being the most important part of it. Um, they also have not tried to expand production capacity because they don't see any, you know, they they they're like, "Oh, yeah, yeah.
Like we're growing a lot because of AI. We're growing from 60 to 100, right?" It's like, "No, no, no, no. We need to go to like a couple hundred, but it's it's fine. Whatever." Um, each of these tools has, you know, I think 18, um, of these lenses effectively. Um, mirrors. Um, they are they are multi-layer mirrors, which are perfect layers of molybdenum and, uh, ruthenium, if I recall correctly, um, stacked on top of each other in many layers and then the light bounces off of it perfectly. But it's not just like, you know, like when we think about a lens, you know, it's it's like in a shape and it focuses the light. This is a this is like a mirror that's also a lens.
And so it's pretty complicated. Any defect in this perfect layer of stack in this in these like, uh, super thinly deposited stacks will mess it up. Uh, any curvature issues, like there is a lot of challenges with scaling the production. Um, it's quite artisanal, right, in this sense, right? Because you're not making tens of thousands of these a year. You're making hundreds. You're making thousands, right? Uh, you know, talk about 60 tools a year. Um, 18 of these per tool. You end up with, you know, you're still in the, um, you know, hundreds of tools, uh, or thousand.
You're at the thousand number roughly for these these lenses, um, and projection optics. So then you and then you step forward to the reticle stage, uh, which is also something really, uh, crazy. This thing moves at, I want to say, 9Gs. Like it it will shift 9Gs because as you step across a wafer, the tool will go, um, and and the wafer stage is complementary. It's the wafer part. So you you line these two things up. You're taking all the light through the lenses that's focused and and here's the reticle, here's the wafer, and you're passing, uh, the reticle's moving one direction, the wafer's moving the direction the other direction as it scans a, uh, 26x33 mm section of the wafer and then it stops.
It shifts over to another part of the wafer and does it again. And it does that in just seconds, right? And and each of them are moving at 9Gs in opposite directions. So each of these things is like a wonder and marvel of like chemistry, uh, fabrication, you know, um, you know, sort of like mechanical engineering, um, optical engineering because you have to align all these things and make sure they're perfect. Uh, all these things have crazy amounts of metrology because you have to perfectly test everything because if anything is messed up, the yield goes to zero, right?
Because this is such a finely tuned system. And by the way, you it's so large that you're building it in all these you're building in the factory in Hindhoven, uh, Netherlands, and they're deconstructing it and shipping it on many planes to the customer site, and then you're reassembling it there and testing it again. And that process takes many, many months. So like it's it's just there's so many steps in the supply chain, right? Whether it's Zeiss making their, uh, lenses and projection optics or Simer, which is an ASML-owned company making the EUV source. And each of these has its own complex supply chain, right?
ASML's commented their supply chain has over 10,000 people in it, right?
Like individual suppliers.
Yes. And it might not be directly. It might be through like, "Hey, you know, Zeiss has so many suppliers and, you know, XYZ company has so many suppliers," but, you know, they these, you know, if you just think about like, okay, you're talking about two physically moving objects that are like this large and this large, you know, um, the size of a wafer, right? And it has to be accurate to the level of, you know, single digit nanometers or even smaller because the entire system, the overlay, right, uh, layer to layer, uh, variation has to be on the order of 3 nanometers, right?
Um, and so if the overlay is 3 nanometers, that means each individual part, the accuracy of its physical movement has to be even less than that, right? Has to be sub 1 nanometer in most cases because the the error of these things stacks up, right? And and and so there's no way to like, you know, just like snap your fingers and increase production, right? You know, things simple as power, right? The US going from 0% power growth to 2% power growth, even though China's already at 30, was like so hard for America to do, right? Um, and and and that's a really simple supply chain with very few people in the supply chain, right?
Uh, who make difficult things. And there's, you know, probably what, 100,000 electricians slash people working the supply chain, uh, of electricity, um, or more in the US. And, you know, when you look at, oh, ASML employs like so few people, Carl Zeiss probably employs like less than a thousand people working on this. And all of those people are like super, super specialized. So, you know, you can't just train random people up for this like in the snap of a finger. You can't just get your entire supply chain to get galvanized, right? Nvidia's had to do a lot, um, to get the entire supply chain to even deliver the capacity they're going to make this year.
Even though when you go talk to Anthropic, they're like, "Well, we're short of TPUs. We're short of training. We're short of GPUs." When you go talk to OpenAI, they're like, "We're short of these things," right? Um, so OpenAI and Anthropic, they know they need X. Nvidia is not quite as AGI pilled and they they're building, uh, you know, X minus one. Um, and you go down the supply chain, everyone's doing minus one. And in some cases, they're doing like divided by two, right? Because they just don't they're not AGI pilled, right? I think and and and so you end up with the time lag for this whip to react, right? You know, the the cur the sort of AI pilledness is and and desire to increase production is so long.
And then once they finally understand, "Hey, we need to increase production rapidly," right? And they they think they understand, "Oh, AI means we have to go from 60 to 100." In addition to the tools all just getting better and faster, you know, the source getting higher power from 500 watts to 1,000 and, you know, all these other aspects of the supply chain, you know, advancing technically plus increase of production. They think they're they're like actually increasing production a lot. But if you float through the numbers of, "Hey, what does Elon want? He wants 100 gigawatts a year in space by 2028, is it? Um, or 2029?"
And, you know, Sam Altman wants 50 gigawatt, 52 gigawatts a year, um, by the end of the decade. And you look at, you know, probably Anthropic needs the same. And then, you know, Google needs that. You know, you go across the supply chain, it's like, "Wait, no, the the supply chain can't possibly build enough capacity for everyone to get what they want on the side of compute."
Therefore, AI compute can't scale more than X. But then, as you've written about, oh no, if you know, say the grid is a bottleneck, then we just do um we just do behind the meter on the site, we do gas turbines, etc. If that doesn't work, there's like all these other alternatives that people fall back on. And I I want to ask you a question about whether we can imagine a similar thing happening in the semiconductor supply chain. So, if EUV becomes a bottleneck, well, you know, what if we just went back to 7 nanometer and do what China is doing currently and producing 7 nanometer chips with uh multi patterning with DUV machines.
Um, and you know, if you look at a 7 nanometer chip like the A100, um, there's been a lot of progress obviously since from the A100 to the B100 or B200, but um, how much of that progress is just numerics? And then like if if you just told constant say uh FP16 from A100 to B100, the B100 is like a little over one petaflop and then uh A100 is like 300 teraflops. And so you have you have like basically 3x uh holding numerics constant.
You have like a 3x improvement from A100 to B100. And then some of that is the process improvement. Some of that is just the accelerator design improving which you know we could replicate again in the future. And so then it just seems like actually it's like very small effect from the process improving from 7 nanometer to 4 nanometer. So, I don't know. Say we have I don't know the numbers offhand, but let's say there's like 150k wafers per month of 3 nanometer and then eventually similar amounts for 2 nanometer, but then there's a similar amount for 7 nanometer, right? So, if you have all those old wafers and then there's maybe a 50% haircut because the process, you know, the bits per wafer area are like what is it?
50% less or something. Um, then it's like it doesn't seem like that bad to just bring on 7 nanometer wafers and then, oh, that gives you another 50 or 100, another 100 gigawatts. Um, yeah. Tell me why that's naive.
Yeah. So, I think, you know, we potentially do go crazy enough that this is this happens because we just need incremental compute and the compute is worth the higher cost, power, etc. of these chips. But it's it's also unlikely to some extent uh to a large extent because of I think I think just comparing you know some of these are like not fair comparisons, right? Um, for example, you know, from A100, which is 312 teraflops, to uh Blackwell, which is like 1,000 umish of FP16, um, or maybe it's 2,000 and then Rubin is like 5,000 or so FP16.
It's it's not a fair comparison because these chips have vastly different um, you know, design targets, right? At at A100, that's what that that is what Nvidia optimized for was FP16, B float 16 numerics. When you look at uh Hopper, they didn't care as much about that. They cared about FP8. When when you look at Rubin, they don't care about about FP16 and BF16 as much. Uh, they care mostly about FP4 and 6, right? Um, and so numerics like are what they've designed the search designed their chip for.
Um, and so there's a couple like, you know, okay, let's just say let's redesign, let's make a new chip design on 7 nanometer. Sure, we can do that. Like, and then it's optimized for uh the numerics of the modern day. The performance difference is still going to be much larger than the flops different you mentioned, right? Um, often it's easy to boil things down to flops uh per watt or flops per dollar, but that's actually not a fair comparison, right? Um, and so this is where sort of you can bring in, hey, let's look at Kimi K1 or Deepseek.
When you look at Kimi or or Kimi K2.5, sorry, and Deepseek, when you look at these two models and you look at their performance on Hopper versus Blackwell on, you know, very optimized software, you get vastly different performance, right? And most of this is not attributed to flops. A lot of this is and or numerics, right? Because those models are actually 8 bit. So it's not like Blackwell's uh and Hopper, they're both optimized for 8 bit and Blackwell's not really taking advantage of its 4 bit there. Um, you know, the the performance gulf is is actually much larger and you know, the way you can sort of compare them and think about them is sure, it's one thing to, you know, shrink process technology and make the transistors smaller and each chip has X number of flops, but you forget the big gating factors is these models don't run on a single chip.
They run on hundreds of chips at a time, right? If you look at Deepseek's production deployment, which is well over a year old now, they were running on 160 GPUs, right? Um, and that's what they serve production traffic on. And so they split the model across 160 GPUs. Every time you cross the barrier of a chip to another chip, there is an efficiency loss because you now have to uh transmit over, you know, high-speed electrical certies. And there's a latency cost, there's a power cost, there's a there's all these um dynamics that hurt. As you shrink and shrink and shrink the process node, you've increased the amount of compute in a single chip.
Now, in chip, right, uh, movement of data is, you know, at at hundreds or of of at least tens of terabytes a second, if not hundreds of terabytes a second. Um, whereas between chips, you're on the order of a terabyte of second, right? Um, and and and so this this movement of data between chips that are super close to each other physically, and then you can only put so many chips close to each other physically, so you have to put chips in different racks. The order of uh data uh between that is on the order of hundreds of gigabits a second, right? 400 gig or 800 gig a second.
Um, so 100 gigabytes a second roughly. And so you've got this like huge ladder of like, oh, on chip I can communicate at super fast speeds. Within the rack, I can communicate at, you know, order of magnitude speeds. Outside the rack, I can communicate at an even order of magnitude lower than that. And as you break the bounds of chips, you end up with this performance loss. So anyways, the reason I explain this is because when I look at when you look at Hopper versus Blackwell, even if both of them are using, you know, a rack worth of chips, the Hopper is significantly slower because the amount of performance that you have leveraged to the task within that, you know, within each domain of, hey, tens of terabytes of seconds of communication between these transistors or or these processing elements and, you know, terabytes a second between these processing elements is much, much higher and therefore the performance is much higher.
So when you look at inference at let's say 100 tokens a second for Deepseek and Kimi K2.5, Hopper versus Blackwell, the performance difference is on the order of 20x.
Interesting.
Not 2 or 3x like the flops performance difference indicates, even though those are on the same process node. Um, you know, there's just differences in networking technologies and what they've worked on. And so you can translate some of these back. Um, but when you look at like Rubin, what they're doing on 3 nanometer, some of these things are just not possible to do all the way back on A100, even if you make a new chip for uh 7 nanometer. There's just like certain architectural improvements you can port. There's certain ones you cannot. Um, and and so the performance difference is not just going to be the difference in flops. It's in some senses cumulative between the difference in, you know, flops per chip, networking speed between chips, how many flops are on a chip versus a system, memory bandwidth on a single chip and on an entire system.
All of these things compound.
Can I ask a very naive question? So, this year, last year, the B200 has now two dies on a single chip. So, you can get that bandwidth on a single chip without having to go through NVLink or InfiniBand. And then next year, Rubin Ultra will have four dies on one chip. What is preventing us from just doing that with an old like how how many dies could you have a single chip and still get these tens of terabytes a second?
Yeah. So, so even within Blackwell, um, there are differences in performance when you go when you're communicating on the chip versus across the chips. Uh, those those bounds are obviously much smaller than when you're going, you know, out of the entire chip, but each die versus uh, you know, within the package. And so anyways, when you scale per uh, you know, the number of chips up, there is some performance loss. It's not just perfect, but it is way better than different entire packages. Now, how large can advanced packaging scale? Um, the way Nvidia is doing it is coauth the way, uh, you know, Google and with Broadcom and MediaTek and, you know, Amazon, Trainium, all these chips are doing is called coauth.
But actually, you can go and look back at what, um, what Tesla did with Dojo, right? Dojo, uh, which they cancelled and restarted. I don't know. Anyways, Dojo was a chip that was the size of an entire wafer. They had 25 chips on it. Um, and there were some trade-offs, right? They couldn't put HBM on it. Um, but the positive side of it was that they had 25 chips, uh, on it. And so today, it is still probably the best chip for running convolutional neural networks. Um, it's just not great at transformers because the, you know, the sort of the shape of the chip, the memory, the arithmetic, all all these various specifications of it are just not well suited for transformers.
They're well suited for CNNs. Um, and anyway, so, so, you know, Dojo chips were optimized around that. They made a bigger package, but at the same time, you know, as you make packages bigger and bigger and bigger, you have other constraints, right? Networking speed, uh, memory bandwidth, cooling capabilities, all of these things start to rear their heads. It's not simple, but yes, you will see a trend line of more chips on the package. And yes, you're going to be able to do that on 7 nanometer. In fact, that's what Huawei did with their, um, Ascend 910C or D.
Uh, they put they put they were initially just one and then they did two. Um, and they're focusing on scaling the packaging up because that is an area where they can advance faster than sort of process technology where they can't shrink. But at the end of the day, that's still, you know, that's something that you can do on the leading edge chips, too, right? Anything you do on 7 nanometer, you can also probably do on 3 nanometer in terms of packaging.
Um, so if we're if you end up in this world in 2030 where the West has the most advanced process technology, but it has not ramped it up as much, whereas China, I don't know if you think about 2030, they would have EUV in, I don't know, 2 nanometer or whatever, but they are semiconductor pills, so they are producing in mass quantity. Um, basically, I'm wondering what the year is where there's a crossover where our advantage in process technology has faded enough and their advantage in scale has increased enough and also their advantage in like having one country that has the entire supply chain envisionized rather than having random suppliers in Germany and Netherlands and whatever would mean that China would be ahead in its ability to like produce mass flops.
Yeah. So to date, um, China still does not have, you know, entire indigenized semiconductor supply chain, right?
But within 2030.
Yeah. By 2030, it's it's possible that they do. Uh, but but today, right, all of of China's 7 nanometer and 14 nanometer capacity uses ASML DUV tools, right? Um, and the amount that they can ship and import from ASML is is large. And, uh, but the point being that the vast majority of ASML's revenue, especially on EUV, all of it, uh, is outside of China. So, the scale advantage is still in the favor of the of let's call it the West plus Taiwan, Japan, etc.
But they're trying to make their own DUV and EUV tools, right?
They're they're trying to do all these things. The question is how fast can they advance um and and scale up quality.
It is.
We haven't seen that. Now, I'm quite bullish that they're going to be able to do these things over the next 5 to 10 years, right? Really scale up production, really uh kick it into high gear. They have more engineers working on it. They're um they have more uh desire to throw capital at the problem.
So by 2030, do they have fully indigenized DUV?
Uh, I think for sure. For sure. DUV. Yes.
And fully indigenized EUV by 2030?
I think they'll have working tools. I don't think that they'll be able to manufacture a bunch yet, right? You know, there's there's sort of having it work and then there's production hell, right? Um, and ultimately like ASML had EUV working in the early 2010s at some capacity, right? Now, the tools were not accurate enough. They were not uh scaled for high production for scaled for high volume manufacturing reliable enough and then they had to ramp production and that all took time. Production hell takes time, right? Which is why it took another five to seven years to get EUV into mass production at a fab rather than just working in the lab.
So how many um DUV tools do you think anybody will manufacture in 2030?
ASML?
No, uh, China.
Well, that's a great question. Um, you know, current it's it's it's a bit of a a challenge to look into this supply chain, especially. We try really hard. Um, but you know, in some instances, they're like buying stuff from Japanese vendors, and if they want a fully indigenized supply chain, they need to not buy these lenses or buy these uh projection optics or stages from Japanese vendors. They need to build it internally. So, it's really tough to say where they'll be able to get to. Like, I honestly think it's like a shot in the dark, but it's it's probably not unlikely that they'll be able to do, you know, on the order of 100 DUV tools a year.
Uh, whereas ASML is doing hundreds of DUV tools a year currently. You know, no one's made a process node. No company has a process node where they make a million wafers a month, right? Um, Elon says he wants to do it and China's obviously going to do it, right? Uh, and I don't think the, you know, TSMC is trying to do that. Um, the memory makers may get there as well, right, to the million wafers a month, but not in a single fab. It it's it's it's sort of mind-boggling to think of that scale.
Um, and challenging to see the supply chain galvanized for that. So, I'm not sure. You know, I don't want to doubt, you know, China's capability to scale, right?
I guess this is an interesting question that I think it might, you know, at some point, some analysis will do the deep dive on this, but I think this question of like by when would China be able like indigenized Chinese production would be could be bigger than the rest of the West combined if you just add up like all the and put in the input of your model when they'll have DUV machines at scale, when they'll have EUV machines at scale because I think there's this like question around if you have long timelines on AI by long meaning 2035 which is not that long in the grand scheme of things.
Um, should you expect a world where China is like dominating in semiconductors which I think I don't know doesn't get asked enough. This would be in San Francisco where just like thinking on time scale of like you know weeks and then if you're outside of San Francisco you're not thinking about AGI at all. And so this question of like okay what if we have AGI? What if you have this transformational thing that is commanding tens of trillions of dollars or hundreds of trillions of dollars of economic growth and weight, you know, token output and so forth. Uh, but then it happens in 2035 and like what does that imply for the West versus China? I think just like I don't know.
The semi-analysis has got to write the definitive model on this.
Yeah. So, I I think it's it's really challenging when you move time scales out that far, right? Like what we tend to focus on is like we're tracking every data center, we're tracking every fab, we're tracking all the tools, and we're tracking where they're going. But the the time lags for these things are are relatively short, right? Um, we can only make like reasonably accurate estimates for data center capacity based on, you know, land purchasing and, you know, permits and turbine purchasing and all these things. And we know where all these things are going and we like that's what the data we sell is.
But like, you know, as you go out to like 2035, you know, things are just so radically different and, you know, your error bars get so large, it's kind of hard to make an estimate. Uh, but at the end of the day, like, you know, there is if takeoff or timelines are slow enough, right? Um, then certainly China I I don't see why they wouldn't be able to catch up drastically, right? Um, you know, in in some sense we've got like this valley, right, of where, you know, call it three to six months ago Chinese models were or maybe even now Chinese models are competitive as they've ever been.
I think I think Opus 4.6 and GPT 5.4 have really pulled away and made the gap a little bit bigger, but I'm sure, you know, some new Chinese models will come out. But as we move from, you know, hey, these companies are selling tokens where they provide the entire uh reasoning chain and all that to uh selling automated, you know, white collar work, right? Automated software engineer, send them the request, they give you the result back, and there's a bunch of thinking on the back end that they don't show you. The ability to distill out of American models into Chinese models will be harder. A, B, as the scale of the compute that the labs have, right?
OpenAI exited the year with roughly 2 gigawatts last year. Um, Anthropic will get to, you know, 2 plus gigawatts this year and and by the end of next year they'll both be at like 10 gigawatts of capacity. Um, China has is not scaling their AI lab compute nearly as fast. And so at some point, you know, when you can't distill the learnings from these labs into the Chinese models plus this compute uh race that OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, etc., Meta are all racing on, at some point they end up getting to a point where, you know, the model performance should start to diverge more.
Um, and then all of this capex that's being spent on, you know, data centers and all that, right? Amazon, you know, 200 billion, Google 180, you know, so on and so forth. All these companies are spending hundreds of billions of dollars of capex. Um, you know, there's there's, you know, nearly a trillion dollars of capex being invested in data centers in America this year roughly, right? Um, you you end up with, okay, well, what's the return on invested capital here? Uh, you and I would think that the return on invested capital for data center capex is very high. Um, and at least if we look at Anthropic's revenues in, you know, January, they added like 4 billion in February, which is a shorter month.
They added like six. Um, we'll see what they can do in March and April. Um, given compute constraints are what's bottlenecking their growth, right? The reliability of cloud code is actually quite low because they're so compute constrained. Uh, but if this continues, then the ROIC on these data centers is super high. Um, and at some point the US economy starts growing faster and faster over the next, you know, this year and next year because of all this capex and all this revenue that these models are generating. Um, and downstream supply chain versus China doesn't have that yet, right?
Um, they have not built the scale of infrastructure to then invest in model, uh, to invest in models to get to the capabilities to then deploy these models at such scale, right? Because when you look at like Anthropic, hey, they're at call it 20 billion ARR of that, you know, the margins are sub 50% at least last reported by the information. So then, you know, you're at, okay, that's like 13, 14 billion dollars of compute that it's running on rental cost wise, which is actually like 50 billion dollars worth of capex that someone laid out for Anthropic to generate their current revenue.
Um, and China has just not done this. If if and when Anthropic 10x's revenue again, uh, and I think our our answer would be when, not if, um, then China doesn't have the compute to deploy at that scale. And so there is some sense of like, oh, we're in fast takeoffish, right? It's not like we're talking about, you know, Dyson sphere by X date. It's more like the revenue is compounding at such a rate that it does affect the economic growth. Um, and the resources these labs are gathering are going so fast that, you know, and and China hasn't done that yet.
So in that case, the US and the West is actually diverging. The flip side is actually these these infrastructure investments have middling returns. Maybe they're not as good as as as hoped. You know, maybe Google is wrong for wanting to take free cash flow to zero and spend 300 billion dollars on capex next year. Maybe they're just wrong. Um, and you know, people on Wall Street who are bearish and people who don't understand AI are correct, right? Um, and in which case then the US is building all this capacity. It doesn't get really great returns. And China is able to build the fully vertical indigenized supply chain.
Not, you know, US, Japan, Korea, uh, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, you know, Europe, all these all these countries together building this like less vertical supply chain. Um, and in a sense at some point China is able to scale past us if AI takes longer to get to certain capability levels than, you know, I would say the vast majority of your guests on this podcast believe.
It's like fast timelines, US wins, long timelines, China wins, right?
But I don't know like I don't know what fast timelines means, right? Like I I like don't think you have to believe in AGI to have the timelines where the US wins.
Okay, let's go back to memory because I think this is maybe people on Wall Street and people in the industry are understanding how big this is, but maybe generally people don't understand how big a deal this is. So, we've got this memory crunch as you're talking about. And earlier I was asking about, oh, could we solve for the EUV tool shortage by going back to 7 nanometer? So, let me ask a similar question about memory. Um, uh, HBM is made of DRAM but has 3 to 4x less uh bits per wafer area than the DRAM it's made out of. Is it possible that accelerators in the future could just use commodity DRAM and not HBM?
And so just we can make much more uh capacity out of the the DRAM we get. And the reason I think this might be possible is look if we're going to have agents that are just going off and doing work and it doesn't really you don't it's not a synchronous chatbot application then you don't necessarily need extremely high uh fast latency kinds of things anymore. And so maybe you can have the low low bandwidth uh because the reason you stack DRAM into stacks and make HBM is for higher bandwidth.
And so is it possible to go to HBM uh accelerators and um and basically have the opposite of cloud code fast like have cloud code slow and and do that?
Yeah, I think I think at the end of the day the incremental purchaser who's willing to pay the highest price for tokens also ends up being the one that's like less price sensitive and you know the the compute should be allocated in a capitalistic society towards the val the the goods that have the highest value and the private market determines this by willingness to pay. And so to some extent um sure Anthropic could actually release a slow mode right they could release clawed slow mode and have an increase in tokens per dollar by a significant amount. Um, they could probably like reduce the price of Opus 46 by, you know, 4x, 5x, and reduce the speed by another by maybe just like 2x.
Like the curve on inference throughput versus speed is there already just on HBM. Um, and yet they don't um because no one actually wants to use a slow model. And furthermore, on these agentic tasks, you know, it's it's great that the model can run at this time horizon of hours. That's kind of like, okay, well, if the model was just running slower, that hours would become a day, right? Um, or vice versa, right? If the model's running faster, that hours becomes hour. Um, and yet no one really wants to move to that day-long wait period because the highest value tasks also have some time time sensitivity to them, right?
And and so I'm I struggle to see, you know, yes, you could use DDR. Um, but then there's a couple like things that are challenging with this, right? You could use regular DRAM. Um, one is you're you're still limited, you know, one of the like core constraints of chips, even though they're, you know, sort of like, you know, there's a chip is like a certain size, all of the IO escapes on the edges of the chip, right? So oftentimes, you know, what you see is the left and the right of the chip are HBM. The IO from the chip to the HBM is on the sides and then the top and bottom are IO to other chips, right?
Um, and so if you were to change from HBM to DDR, then all of a sudden this IO on this edge would have significantly less bandwidth, but it had significantly more capacity per chip. Yeah. Because and and and so yes, you're making less um you know the the the metric that you actually care about is bandwidth per wafer, not bits per wafer.
Because the the thing that is constraining the flops is just getting in and out the next matrix and for that you just need more bandwidth.
Yeah. Getting out the weights and getting out getting in and out the KV cache. Right. And so in many cases these GPUs are not running at full memory capacity. Yes, it's obviously like a system design thing, you know, model hardware, software co-design of hey what do I what do I how much KV cache do I do? How much do I keep on the chip? How much do I offload to other chips and call when I need it for tool calling or whatever? How much do I um how many chips do I parallelize this on? Obviously, these are like the the search base of this is like very broad, which is why we have like inference X. Like this is like an open source model like searches all the optimal points on inference for a variety of eight different chips um and models.
Um, anyways, like the point is you don't necessar you're not always necessarily constrained by memory capacity. Uh, you can be constrained by flops, you can be constrained by network bandwidth, you can be constrained by memory bandwidth, uh, or you can be constrained by memory capacity. There's sort of like four, if you're really to simplify it down, there's like four constraints and each of these can break out into more. But in this case, if you switch to DDR, yes, you produce 4x the bits per DRAM wafer, but all of a sudden the constraints shift a lot and your system design shifts a lot.
You go slower. Yes. Is the market smaller? Okay, maybe possibly. But also now all of a sudden all these flops are wasted because they're just sitting there waiting for memory. It's like great, I don't need all that capacity because I can't really increase batch size because then the KV cache is going to take even longer to read. And so you never you can Yeah.
Interesting. What is the bandwidth difference between HBM and uh a normal DRAM?
Yeah. So an HBM stack uh of HBM4, let's just talk about like the stuff that's in Rubin because that's what we've been indexing on is 2048 bits across connected in an area that's like 13 mm wide. Um, so 2048 bits and it it transfers memory at around 10 gigatransfers a second. So HBM, a stack of HBM4 is 2048 bits on an area that's 13 mm wide roughly or 11. And that's that's the shoreline that you're taking on the chip. And in that shoreline, um, you have 2048 bits transferring at 10 gigatransfers per second.
Uh, you multiply those together and you divide by eight bits to bytes. You're at roughly 2 and a half terabytes a second per HBM stack, right? When you look at DDR, um, in that same area, it's maybe 64 or 128 bits wide. And that DDR5 is transferring at any, you know, anywhere from 6.4 gigatransfers a second to maybe 8,000 gigatransfers a second. So, your your bandwidth is like significantly lower, right? It's 64 * 8,000 / 8. Um, you're at 60 64 GB a second.
Um, and even if you take a generous interpretation of 128 * 8 gigatransfers, you're at 128 GB a second for the same shoreline versus 2 and a half terabytes a second. There's there's an order of magnitude difference in bandwidth per edge area. And if your chip is a square or it's 26 by 33, right, is the maximum size for a chip individual die, um, you only have so much edge area. And then on the inside of that chip, you put all your compute. Um, there's things you can do to try and change, right? More SRAM, more caching, blah blah blah. Uh, but at the end of the day, you're very constrained by bandwidth.
Interesting. So, um, then there's the question of like where can you destroy demand to free up enough for AI. Um, and uh, and I guess the picture is especially bad because as you're saying, if it takes 4x more wafer area to get the same byte for HBM, you had to destroy 4x as much consumer demand for laptops and phones and whatever in order to free up one byte for AI. So, yeah, what does this imply for the next year or two of sorry for the run on question. I think on your newsletter you said 30% of the capex in 2026 of big tech is going towards memory.
Yes.
That's insane, right? Like of the 600 billion or whatever, you're saying 30% is going just to just to.
And you know, obviously there's some level of like margin stacking that Nvidia does and so if you separate out, you know, and you apply their margin to the memory and the logic, but at the end of the day, yeah, like a third of their capex is going to memory.
That's that's so that's crazy. Okay. So, what is the question I'm trying to ask? Something like, yeah, what is this imp what basically what should we expect over the next year or two as this memory crunch hits?
Yeah. So, memory crunch will continue to be harder and harder. Um, and prices continue to go up and this affects different parts of the market differently, right? Um, gets to sort of the like are people going to hate AI more and more? Yes. Because now smartphones and PCs are not going to get incrementally better year on year. And in fact, they're getting incrementally worse.
If you look at the bill of materials of a iPhone, what what fraction of it is the memory? Like how how much more expensive does an iPhone get if the memory is 2x more expensive or whatever it has to be?
So, um, I believe an iPhone has 12 GB of memory. Um, each gig cost used to cost roughly $3 or $4. So, it's 50 bucks. Um, but now the price of memory is like tripled. Let's call it if it's now uh it's 12 bucks per gig for DDR. So, now you're talking about $150 versus $50, right? A $100 increase in cost on Apple. Also, Apple has some margin. They're not just going to eat the margin. So, now that's a $100 cost increase. That's just on the DRAM. The NAND also has the same sort of like market. So, in fact, you know, it's probably a $150 increase on the on the iPhone.
Apple has to either pass that on to the consumer A or B, they have to eat it. I don't see Apple reducing their margin too much. Maybe they eat a little bit, but at the end of the day, that means the end consumer is paying $250 more for an iPhone. Um, and now that's on like, hey, what is last year's memory pricing versus today's? Now, there is some lag for Apple to have to feel the heat because they have tended to have, you know, three, six, or a year-long contracts for a lot of memory. But at the end of the day, Apple gets hit pretty hard by this. Um, but they won't they won't really adjust until the next iPhone release.
But that's the high end of the market. Actually, that's only a few hundred million phones a year, right? Apple sells what, 2 300 million phones a year. The bulk of the market is is mid-range low end, right? Uh, used to be 1.4 million smartphones were sold a year. Now we're at like 1.1. Uh, but our projections are we maybe get down to like 800 million this year and next year like 600 or 500 million because and and we look at like you know there's some data points out of China um from some of our analysts in Asia and Singapore and Hong Kong and Taiwan. They've they've been tracking this and they see Xiaomi and Oppo are cutting low-end and mid-range smartphone volumes by half because yes, it's only a $150 price increase on a $1,000 smartphone um or $150 bomb increase on 100 on $1,000 iPhone where Apple has some larger margin.
But if we look at the smaller phones, the percentage of the bomb that goes to memory and storage is much larger and the margins are lower. So, there's less capacity to even eat the margins. Um, and they have like generally tended not to do as long-term agreements on memory. Um, and why this is like a big deal is if smartphone volumes, let's say half, that halfing will frankly happen in the low and mid-range, not in the high end. So, it's not like the bits released are halfing, right? Um, you know, currently consumers more than half of memory um demand.
Even if you half the smartphone volumes because of the shape of the halfing, right? It's like low end gets cut by more than half, high end gets cut by less than half because you and I will buy, you know, the high-end phones that cost north of $1,000. We'll buy them even if they get a little bit more expensive and Apple's volumes will not go down as much as like a low-end smartphone provider. And and the same applies to PCs. And what this does to the market is quite drastic, right? Um, DRAM gets released, goes to AI chips who are willing to do longer-term contracts, willing to pay higher margins, etc., etc.
Because at the end of the day, the margin that they extract is much larger from the end user or whatever. Um, and so this this this probably leads to like people hating AI even more, right? Because they're going to start being like today you already see all the memes like uh on on like PC subreddits and PC like Twitter gaming PC Twitter is like you know cat dancing videos and it's like this is why memory prices is doubled and you can't get a new gaming GPU, right? Or you can't get a new uh desktop and and and it's going to be even worse when memory prices double again, especially DRAM. Another dynamic that's quite interesting is it's not just DRAM, it's also NAND.
Um, NAND is also going up in price. Both of these markets have expanded capacity very slowly over the last few years. Um, NAND almost zero, but smartphones, uh, the percentage of NAND that goes to phones and PCs is larger than the percentage of DRAM that goes to phone and PC. So, as you destroy demand, you unlock more, you know, mostly for the DRAM purposes, you unlock more NAND that gets allocated, uh, and can can sort of go to other markets. And so the price increases of DRAM will be larger than those of NAND because you've released more from the consumer.
Uh, and in fact, you've produced more memory for AI.
Sorry, but the NAND is maybe you just explained it and I missed it. Is it is it because SSDs are being used in large quantities for data centers or they are, but not as large quantity quantities as DRAM. Okay. But so you're saying they will also increase because they're using some quantity, but like there's not as much a need as there is for HBM. Makes sense. Um, one thing I didn't appreciate until I was reading some of your newsletters is that um basically the same constraints that are preventing logic scaling uh over the next few years are it's it's quite similar to what's preventing us from producing more memory wafers.
In fact, like literally the same exact machine this EUV tool is needed for memory. So, I I guess yeah, maybe there's a question that somebody could be asking right now like well, why can't we just make more memory?
Is that somebody? Yeah. Who knows? So, I think the constraints, as I was mentioning earlier, are not necessarily EUV tools today or to next year. Um, they they become that as we get to the latter part of the decade. Uh, but currently, right, the constraints are more so they physically just haven't built fabs, right? So, over the last three to four years, these vendors have just not built new fabs. Um, that's because memory prices were really low. Um, their margins were low, and in fact, they were losing money in 2023 on memory.
Um, so they were like, "Oh, we're not building new fabs." And then like the market slowly recovered over time, but never really got amazing until last year. Um, you know, in 2024, we were like banging on the drums that like, "Hey, resetting means long context, which means large KV cache, which means you need a lot of memory demand." Um, and we've been talking about that for like a year and a half, two years. Um, and people who understand AI like went really long memory then, right? Um, you know, and and so you've seen that sort of like dynamic, but now it finally played out in pricing. It took so long for what was obvious, right?
Hey, long context, KV cache gets bigger, you need more memory, and accelerators half their cost is memory. So, of course, they're just going to start, you know, they can they're going to start like going crazy on it. Um, it took a year for that to actually reflect in memory prices. Once memory prices reflected, then it took another six months, three months for the memory vendors to start building fabs. And those fabs take two years to build. And so we don't have really meaningful fabs that you can even put these tools in until 20 late 27 or 28, right? Um, and so instead what you've seen is like some really crazy stuff to get capacity, right?
Uh, Micron bought a fab from a company in Taiwan that makes lagging edge chips, right? Um, Hynix and Samsung are doing, you know, some pretty crazy things to try and expand capacity at their existing fabs. Uh, that also have like very not large knock-on effects in the economy. And so, hey, why can't we build more capacity? It's like there's nowhere to put the tools, right? And it's not just EUV. There's other tools involved in DRAM and logic, right? Like logic, you know, N3 30% or so of the cost, you know, 28% of the cost is EUV of the wafer of the final wafer.
When you look at like DRAM, it's it's it's in the teens. Um, and it's going up, but it's in the teens. So, it's as much smaller percentage of the cost as DRAM or or is EUV. These other tools are also bottlenecks, although their supply chains are not as complex as ASMLs. Um, and so you see Applied Materials and Lam Research and all these other companies also expanding capacity a lot. And anyways, you don't have anywhere to put the tool because the most complex building that people make is fabs, and fabs take two years to build.
I won't even ask you about the dirty rooms thing, but like let's say they build the clean rooms. Um, and for okay, I have a couple questions. One, do you think this is the kind of thing that Elon could build much faster than people are conventionally building it? This is not about building the end tools. This is just about building the facility itself. How complicated is it to just build a clean room and do it extremely fast? Is this something that like Elon with his move fast thing could do much faster if that's what we're bottlenecked on this year or next year? And two, um, does that even matter if in two years your view is that we're not bottlenecked on clean room space, but we're bottlenecked on the tooling?
So, I think I think you know as with any complex supply chain it takes time and constraints shift over time and even if something isn't any longer a constraint that doesn't mean that market no longer has margin, right? So, for example, um, energy will not be a big bottleneck as we get to, you know, a couple years from now. Um, but that doesn't mean energy is not growing super fast and there's no margin there. It's just like it's not the key bottleneck. And in the space of fabs, right? Clean rooms are the biggest bottleneck this year and next year. Um, and as we get over time, 29, you know, 28, 29, 30, there will be still constraints there.
The thing about Elon is I think he's had an a tremendous capability to garner physical resources and really smart people to build things. And the way he's able to recruit really amazing people is just try and build the craziest stuff, right? In the case of AI, that's not really worked because everyone's trying to build AGI. Everyone's very ambitious. But in the case of like we're going to make, you know, we're going to go to Mars, we're going to make rockets that land themselves, or we're going to make fully autonomous cars that are electric, right? Um, or we're going to make human robots, right? Like these are methods of recruiting the people who think that's the most important problem in the world to work on that problem because he's the only one trying really hard.
In the case of semiconductors, I want to make a fab that's a million wafers per month. No one has a fab that big. That's what he stated, right? He wants to make a million wafers a month. You know, it's possible that he's able to recruit a lot of really awesome people and get them on this hero, you know, this crazy task of trying to build a fab that does a million wafers per month. Step one is to build the clean room. And I think that he probably can do, right? I think, you know, there's some mindset, you know, his his mindset around like delete things. It can be dirty. It's fine. Probably not right. Or actually I I think 100% it's not right. You like need the fab to be very clean.
I think the entire air the entire all of the air in the fab gets replaced like every 3 seconds. It's like that fast and there's so few particles per but I think he can build the uh clean room. It'll take a year or two maybe. Initially it won't be super fast, but then over time he'll get faster and faster at it. But then the really complex part is actually developing the process technology and building wafers. And I don't think he can develop that uh quickly. I think that has a lot of built-up knowledge. It's again like the most complicated like integration of very expensive tools and supply chain that's done is a TSMC or an Intel or a Samsung.
And those some of these two other two companies aren't even that great and they're like tremendously complex.
How how how surprised would you be if in 2030 people like there there just happened to be some total disruption. We're not using EUV. We're using something that has like much better factors, much simpler to produce. We can produce in much bigger quantities. I'm sure as an industry insider that sounds like a totally naive question, but do you see what I'm asking? Like is it like how what probability should we put on oh something totally out of the left field comes out and none of this is relevant.
Something that's very simple and easy to scale, I have very very low probability for. Uh, there are a number of companies working on effectively like particle accelerators or synchrotrons that generate light that's either 13.5 nanometer like EUV or even uh x-ray like even even uh narrower wavelength like 7 nanometer whatever wavelengths of light to then use in lithography tools. But those things are like massive particle accelerators that are then generating this light. It's a very complicated thing to build. So, there's a couple companies and I think that that could be a big disruption to the industry uh beyond what EUV is.
I don't necessarily think that like we're going to just magically build something new that is like direct right and super simple um and can be manufactured at huge volumes. Although there are some attempts to do things like this.
Yeah. Because I I asked because if you think about Elon CO's in the past, rocketry was this thing that was thought to I mean it is incredibly complicated.
Look, I'm just a naive yapper compared to Elon, right? What have I built? I So maybe it's possible, right?
Yeah. Yeah. Um, in order to be able to build more memory in the future, could we build uh 3D DRAM the way do we do 3D NAND and then go back to DUV?
Um, this is the hope currently everyone's roadmap for 3D DRAM is that you'll still use EUV. Um, because you want to have that tighter overlay because now when you're doing these subsequent processing steps, you want it to be, you know, everything's vertically stacked. You have more layers on top of each other. Um, and you want the pitches to be tighter and all these things. So, so generally people are still trying to do an EUV, but what 3D would do is it would take the, you know, hey, a single EUV pass, how many bits can it make, right? If you do this sort of like calculation, and that number would go up drastically if you go to 3D DRAM.
That is the hope. But right now, everyone's roadmap is sort of like you go from current uh it's called a 6F squ uh cell to a 4F squ uh cell and then finally 3D DRAM like by the end of the decade or early next decade. So, there's still like a lot of R&D and manufacturing and integration to be done. Um, I wouldn't call that out of the cards. I think it's very much likely going to happen. It also is going to require a huge retooling of fabs, right? The the breakdown of tools in a fab are very different, right? Actually, the lithography tool is the only thing that isn't like that different, but the number of them relative to different types of chemical vapor deposition or atomic layer deposition or uh dry etch or different kinds of etch chambers with different chemistries.
All of these things, you have all these different kinds of tools for different process nodes. You can't just like convert a logic fab to a DRAM fab or vice versa back and forth or a NAND fab to a DRAM fab in in a short amount of time. And in the same way, existing DRAM fabs require a lot of retooling just to go from 1B or 1 alpha to 1 beta to 1 gamma process nodes because now they have to add the EUV and change the uh chemistry stacks for when you're using EUV in in terms of deposition and etch and the EUV tool has to be there. And furthermore, like when you change to 3D DRAM, there's going to be an even larger shift. And so there's a lot of retooling of these fabs that needs to happen um in terms of the tools.
And so that would be a big disruption. Um that would make EUV demand generally lower. But as we've seen across time, EUV demand as a percentage of wafer cost has trended up initially or lithography, right? Lithography initially, I want to say in like 2014ish era was like 16% of the wafer cost, 17%, and it's gone to 30 over the last, you know, 15 years. Um, and for DRAM, it was in the mid-teens as well or low teens, and now it's trended towards the high teens. Um, and before we get to 3D DRAM, it'll likely cross into the 20s percentage range.
But then if we get to 3D DRAM, it tanks again in terms of the total end wafer cost as a percentage of EUV.
Yeah. I I guess you care less about like the percent of cost and more about how much it bottlenecks being right.
But the percentage of cost is sort of a proxy. Yeah. Yeah. Um, so if you're uh if you're Jensen or Sam Altman or whoever who stands to gain a lot from scaling up AI compute, um, there's these stories that they'd go to TSMC and say, "Hey, why can't we actually Y and Z?" Um, but I think the point you're making here is it it doesn't really matter in some sense what TSMC does. And in fact, even if you have Intel and Samsung building more foundries, in in the long run, you're going to be bottlenecked by ASML and other tool makers and other material makers.
So, first, is that correct interpretation? And second, then why should basically Silicon Valley people be going to the Netherlands to try to pitch like right now? Should they be trying to pitch ASML to make more tools so that like in 2030 they can have more AI compute? You know, it's it's a funny dynamic we saw in 2324 uh and 2025. People who saw the energy bottleneck before others asymmetrically went to, you know, uh Siemens, Mitsubishi, and of course GE Vernova and bought up turbine capacity and now they're able to charge excess amounts for deploying these turbines uh places because of energy.
And in the same sense, this could be done for EUV except ASML is not just going to trust any random bozo who wants to buy EUV tools. Um, in the sense that like, you know, these turbines are much cheaper than EUV tools and there's many more of them produced, right? Especially once you like get to like industrial gas turbines or like, you know, not not just combined cycle but like the cheaper, smaller, etc., less efficient ones. People put down deposits for these. So, in a sense, someone could do this, right? Someone should go to the Netherlands and be like, "I'll pay you a billion dollars.
You give me the right to purchase 10 EUV tools two years from now, right? And I I have I'm first in line two years from now. Um, and then over those two years, you then go around and wait for everyone to realize, "Oh crap, I don't have enough EUV tools." And then you try and sell your option at some premium. But all you're effectively doing is you're saying, "ASML, you're dumb. You weren't making enough margin on these. I'm going to make margin." And the question is like, well, then will ASML even agree to this? Right? And I'm like, I don't think so. Right.
So, but like there's a world where they at least like get the demand signal from that to increase production.
Potentially. Potentially. I agree. Um, but it sounds like you're saying, oh, they couldn't even increase production if they wanted to given the supply. That's exactly the market in which if they can't increase production, just like TSMC cannot increase production that fast, and yet demand is mooning, then the obvious solution is to arbitrage this because you and I know demand is way higher than they're they're projecting and their capability to build. So then you arbitrage this by locking up the capacity and then sort of doing like a forward contract and and and then trying to sell it at a later date once other people realize actually shit everything is fucked and we don't have enough capacity and then you'll have like this insane margin that ASML and TSMC should have been charging.
But the thing is I don't know if ASML and TSMC will ever agree to this.
Um, okay. Let let me ask about power now. So, it sounds like you think power can be arbitrarily scaled. Um, not arbitrarily, but yes, but but beyond these numbers. And um, I think if I'm remembering correctly, your blog post on the power uh how how AI lives are increasing power. You were like where you were implying that uh GE Vernova and Mitsubishi and Siemens could produce and gas turbines was like 60 gigawatts a year and then there's these other sources but they're like less significant than the the turbines and so and only a fraction of that goes to AI I assume.
So yeah, if if in 2030 we have enough logic and memory to do 200 gigawatts a year, is it do you just think that these things are on a path to ramp up to more than 200 gigawatts a year or what do you see?
Yeah. So, I mean, I mean, right now we're at 30, right? Um, or 20 20. So, this is critical IT capacity, by the way, right? This is an important thing to mention. When I'm talking about these gigawatts, I'm talking about critical IT capacity, server plugged in, that's how much power it pulls. But there's losses along the chain, right? There is loss on the transmission. There's losses on the conversion. Uh, there's losses on cooling, etc. And so you should gross this factor up, you know, from 20 gigawatts for this year or 200 gigawatts by the end of the decade, um, to some number 20 30% higher.
And then you have capacity factors, right? Turbines don't run at 100%. In fact, like if you look at PGM, uh, which is the largest grid, I think, in America, um, sort of the Midwest, sort of Northeast kind of areaish, not not the full Northeast, but anyways, PGM, they rate in their models for like, hey, turbines, how much capacity we want to have excess, you know, roughly 20% capacity. Uh, in addition, in that 20% excess capacity, we're running all the turbines at 90% because they are derated some for reliability. Oh, things go down, maintenance, etc., etc., etc.
So then in reality, the nameplate capacity for uh energy is always way higher than the actual end critical IT capacity because of all of these factors. Yeah. Um, but it's not just turbines, right? If you're just making power from turbines, like that's simple, boring, easy, right? Um, we're, you know, humans and capitalism is far more effective. And so the whole point of that blog was yes, there's only three people making combined cycle gas turbines, but there's so much more we can do, right? We can do aeroderivatives, right? We can take airplane engines and turn them into uh turbines as well.
And there's even new entrants to the market like Boom Supersonics trying to do that, right? And they're working with Cruso and and also there's all the other ones like that already exist in the market. There's um there's medium speed reciprocating engines, right? Engines that spin in circles, right? So sort of like any diesel engine, right? There's like 10 people who make engines that way, right? So Cummins, you know, you know, at least I'm from Georgia and we we you know, people used to be like, "Oh man, you got a Cummins engine in there." Um, you know, like, you know, regarding RAM trucks, but it's like, well, actually auto automobile manufacturing is going down. These companies all have capacity and could scale and convert that to for data center power, right?
Stick all these reciprocating engines. Yes, it's not as clean as combined cycle. Maybe you can you can convert them from diesel to gas if you want. Um, but at the end of the day, these spinning engines, oh, what about ship engines, right? All of these engines for these massive cargo ships, those are great. Nebius is doing that for a data center in micro for Microsoft um in New Jersey, right? They're running these ship engines to generate power. Oh, there's um you know, Bloom Energy is doing uh fuel cells. We've been like very positive on them for like a year and a half now. Um, because they have like such a cap capability to increase their production.
Um, and their payback period for production increase is like very fast, even if the cost is a little bit higher than combined cycle, which is like the best cost and efficiency. Um, you know, and then and then there's solar plus battery, which as these cost curves continue to come down, those can come online. There's wind and you know, of course the derating of those, you know, hey, when you put on a wind turbine, you might say, "Oh, I'm only going to expect 15% of the maximum power because things just oscillate." But you add batteries. There's all these things. And then the other thing is that like the grid is scaled for um you know, hey, we are not going to cut off power at peak usage, which is like the hottest day in the summer.
Um, but in reality, that's a load spike that is 10, 15, 20% higher than the average. Well, if you just put enough utility scale batteries or you put peaker plants that only run a small portion of the year, then all of a sudden, you know, and those could be gas, they could be industrial gas turbines, they could be combined cycle, they could be any of the other sources of power I mentioned, um, they could be batteries, then all of a sudden you've unlocked 20% of the US grid for data centers because most of the time that capacity is sitting idle and it's really only there for that peak, right?
Which is a day or two, right? And it's a few hours of like maybe a few a few days of the full year is that peak. And so you just have enough capacity to absorb that that peak load. And all of a sudden you've transferred all and today data center is only 3 4% of the power of the US grid and by 28th they'll be 10%. But if you can just unlock 20% of the US grid like this, like it's like not that crazy. Um, you know, and and the US grid is terawatt level, not hundreds of gigawatts level, right? So, we we can add a lot more energy. It's not easy.
I'm not saying it's easy. These things are going to be hard. There's a lot of hard engineering. There's a lot of risks that people have to take. There's a lot of new technologies people have to use. But Elon was the first to do this behind the meter gas. Um, and since then we've seen an explosion of different things that people are doing to get power. And they're not easy, but people are going to be able to do them. And the supply chains are just way more simple than chips.
Interesting. So, I I guess he made the point during the interview that the specific blade for the specific turbine he was looking at, the lead times for that go out beyond 2030. And your point is that that's great. There's so many other ways to make energy. Like just be inefficient. Like it's fine, right? So, you're like right now, I guess combined cycle gas turbines have capex of $1,500 per kilowatt. And you're saying you could just it would make sense to have either technologies that are much more expensive than that or other things are getting cheap enough to that to make it competitive.
Exactly. Exactly. You know, there it can be as high as $3,500 per kilowatt uh even, right? So, it could be twice as much as the cost of combined cycle. And the total cost of the GPU, you know, you know, on a TCO basis has gone up a few cents per hour, right? Again, if we're because we've been talking about uh hopper pricing, $1.40 now becomes, you know, oh, the power price doubles. Okay, the hopper that was a $1.40 is now a $1.50 in cost. It's like, oh, I don't care because the models are improving so fast that the marginal utility of them is worth way more than that 10 cent increase in energy.
Okay. And then so you're saying 20% of the grid, so one terawatt about uh 20% of that can just come online from utility scale batteries increasing um what you'd be comfortable putting on the regulatory mechanism there is like not easy by the way but like that's 200 gigawatts like if that hypothetically happens but you're saying on just from the different sources of gas generation you mentioned the different kinds of engines and turbines um combined how how many gigawatts could they unlock by the end of the decade?
Yeah. So, we're we're tracking uh in some of our data where all, you know, there's over 16 different manufacturers of power generating uh things just from gas alone, right? So, you know, yes, there's only three turbine manufacturers for combined cycle. Um, but we're tracking 16 different vendors and we have all of their orders and things like that. And it turns out there is just hundreds of gigawatts of orders to various data centers. As we get to the end of the decade, we think like something like half of the capacity that's being added will be behind the meter. Um, and when we look at like a lot of this is actually behind the meter is almost always more expensive than grid connected, but there's just a lot of problems with getting grid connected and uh, you know, permits and interconnection queues and all this sort of stuff.
So, ends up being even though it's more expensive, people are doing behind the meter and then what they're doing behind the meter with ranges widely, right? It could be reciprocating engines, it could be ship engines, it could be aeroderivatives, it could be combined cycle, although combined cycle is not that great for behind the meter. Um, it could be uh Bloom Energy fuel cells, it could be solar plus battery, right? Like it could be any of these things.
You're saying any of these individually could do like tens of gigawatts?
Any of these individually will do tens of gigawatts and in a whole they will do hundreds of gigawatts.
Okay. So that that alone should more than um I mean it's going to take I mean like electrician wages probably double or triple again, right? And like there's going to be a lot of new people entering that field and there's going to be a ton of people who make money, but it is something that I don't like I don't see that as the main bottleneck, right? So right now in Abilene the 1.2 gigawatt uh data center that uh Cruso is building for OpenAI uh I think they have like 5,000 people working there or at peak they had did. Um, and if you turn that into um 100 gigawatts and I'm sure things will get more efficient over time, but that would be like 400k people it would take to build 100 gigawatts.
And if you think about the US labor force of how many electricians there are, how many construction workers there are, yeah, I guess there's like 800k electricians. Uh, I don't know if they're all substitutable in this way. There's millions of construction workers. But if we're in a world we're adding 200 gigawatts a year, are we going to be crunched on labor eventually or do you think that is actually not a real constraint?
So, so labor is a humongous constraint in this. People have to be trained. Uh, likewise, we probably start importing the highest skilled labor in this in this way, right? Because now it makes sense that, you know, hey, a really high-skilled electrician in Europe who was working on destroying power plants now comes to America and is building data center uh, you know, high voltage electricity, you know, power moving across the data center, right? Something like this, right? Um, humanoid robots maybe start to or robotics at least start to, but the main factor is going to be for reducing the number of people is modularizing things and making them in factories in Asia.
Um, unfortunately, but you know, like at least for America, but you know, Korea, um, Southeast Asia, in in many ways, China as well, but you know, these areas are going to do are are going to ship more and more built out uh um built out sections of the data center and those will be shipped in, right? Maybe today you you know you currently ship servers in or a rack in and then you plug that into you know different pieces that you're shipping from different places but now you'll ship it to a factory and integrate the entire you know hey maybe this is a 2 megawatt block and this block goes from you know high voltage power to uh the you know the voltage power that you the voltage and uh and maybe DC that you deliver to the rack um instead of being AC and high voltage right or something like this right or cooling you take you you ship a fully integrated thing that has a lot of the cooling subsystems already put together or because plumbers are also a big constraint here or furthermore you take instead of just a single rack and now you have people wiring up all these racks of power and electricity and blah blah blah blah blah you take a skid and you put an entire row of of of servers and that is shipped from the factories um and and today a single rack maybe 120 140 kW but as we get to you know next generation you know Nvidia Kyber and things like that it's almost a megawatt and then in addition if you do an entire row it'll have the the rack it'll have the networking and it'll have the cooling and the power racks all integrated together.
So now when you come in actually you you have much less stuff to cable whether it be um networking fiber whether it be um the power right there's fewer power that power things to connect and then there's fewer plumbing things to connect right and so this drastically can reduce the amount of people working in data centers and therefore the capability to build these will be much larger and along the way there will be you know new things mean you know some people move faster to new things some people move slower right Cruso and Google have been talking a lot about this modularization as has people like Meta and you know many others right have been talking a lot about this modularization and others are going to be slower to doing it but at the end of the day you know and and and people who move faster to new things may have more delays or people who are slower have labor problems so there will always be dislocations in the market because this is a very complex supply chain.
At the end of the day, it's still simple enough that we will be able to solve it through capitalism and human ingenuity uh on the time skills that are required.
Yeah. Okay. So, speaking of um uh big problems to solve, I um uh Elon Musk is very bullish on space GPUs. If you're right that power is not a constraint on Earth, I guess the other reason they would make sense is that even you can phys there is enough there will be enough gas turbines or whatever to build it on Earth. I think Elon's next argument then is like you can't get the permitting to build hundreds of gigawatts on Earth. Do you buy that argument?
Landwise, it's pretty America's big. There doesn't data centers don't take that much space. You can you can solve that. Um, permitting wise, air pollution permits are a challenge, but the Trump administration has made it much easier. You go to Texas and you can skip a lot of this red tape. Uh, and so, you know, Elon Elon had to deal with a lot of like this complex stuff in Memphis and then building a power plant across the border. Um, and all these things for Colossus one and two. But at the end of the day, there's a lot more you can get away with in the middle of Texas, right?
Why why given that Elon lives in Texas, why didn't he just go to Texas?
I think I think it was partially like they overindexed on grid power for a temporary period of time, right? Because that's just what they they thought they needed more of.
You said an aluminum refinery connected to the grid there.
Uh, not it's a it was a it was an appliance factory that was that was idled. Um, but I think they may have indexed more to what was grid power. They may have indexed more to like water access and gas access because actually I think they bought that knowing that the gas line was right there and they were going to tap it. Same with water. Um, it was a whole host of different constraints. It was probably an area where electricians and things like that were easier to find. But at the end of the day, I'm not exactly sure why they chose that site. I bet Elon would have chosen somewhere in Texas if he could have like gone back. But because of the regulatory faces he's challenged he's challenges he's faced.
It's it's it's ultimately like permitting is a challenge, but America is a big place and there are 50 states and things will get done and there are a lot of small jurisdictions where you can just transport in all the workers that you need for a temporary period of 6 months to a year. Um, depending on the type of contractor, it can be even 3 months for depending on the type of the contractor uh that's coming in and put them in temporary housing, pay out the butt because labor is very cheap relative to the GPUs and the power not the power but the GPUs and the like the networking and so on and so forth and the end value of the tokens it's going to produce.
So, all of these things have plenty of room to like be paid for. Um, and so I think it's fine, right? You you and also people are diversifying now, right? Australia, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, these are all places where data centers are going up at a much faster pace, but currently still 70% plus of the AI data centers are in America and that continues to be the trend. And so I think people are figuring out how to build these things and permitting like I I just like ultimately like permitting and red tape in middle of nowhere Texas or middle of nowhere Wyoming or middle of nowhere like New Mexico is probably a hell of a lot easier than sending stuff into space, right?
Well, other than the fact that the economic argument uh makes less sense once you consider the fact that energy is a small fraction of the cost of ownership of a data center, what are the other reasons you're skeptical?
Yeah. So, obviously power's free in space basically. Uh, but that's the reason to do it. Yeah, that's the reason to do it. But then there's all the other counterarguments, right? Which is because even if power costs double, you're still at a fraction of the total cost of the GPU. The the main challenge is is and what we've seen that disperses, right? We have cluster max which rates all the neoclouds and we test them. We test over 40 cloud companies including the hypercalers and neoclouds. What differentiates some of these clouds the most outside of software is their ability to deploy and manage failure, right?
GPUs are horrendously unreliable. Uh, even today, 15% of black wells or so that get deployed have to be RMA. You have to take them out. You have to, you know, maybe just plug them and plug them back in, but sometimes you have to take them out and ship them to Nvidia or rather there are partners who do these RMAs and such. Um, what do you make of Elon's kind of argument that once you have the initial um after initial phase, they actually don't fail that much? Sure. But now you've you've done this. You've tested them all. You deconstructed them, put them on a spaceship, fucking put them into space, and then put them online again. That's months, right?
And if your argument is that, you know, hey, GPUs have a useful life of x years, right? If a GPU has a useful life of 5 years and it takes three additional months, probably six, let's say six additional months, then that is 10% of your cluster's useful life. And and because we're so capacity constrained, that compute is most valuable theoretically in the first six months you have it because we're more constrained now than in the future because that compute now can contribute to a better model in the future or can contribute to revenue now which you can use to raise more money to get you know all these all these sorts of things now is always the most important moment.
And so you've delayed your compute deployment by 6 months potentially. And and the thing that separates these clouds is we see clouds that take 6 months to deploy GPUs today on Earth, right? We see clouds that take a lot less than 6 months, right? And so the question is where does space get in there? I don't see how you would test them all on Earth, deconstruct them and ship ship them ship them into space and it not take longer than just putting them in the spot that you were testing them.
Yeah. So the question I wanted to ask is the topology of space communication. So um right now uh Starlink satellites talk to each other at 100 gigabits per second and you could imagine that being much higher with optical uh inner satellite laser links that are optimized for this. Um, and that actually ends up being like quite close to the infiniband bandwidth, which is like 400 gigabytes a second, right?
But that's per GPU, not per rack.
I see. Okay.
So, so multiply that by 72. Also, like that was hopper when you go to Blackwell and Rubin. That 2x is and 2x is again.
All right. But but how much compute is happening per um like during inference? Are the different scaleups still working together or is it just happening? It's a batch within a single scaleup.
Um, a lot of models fit within one scaleup domain, but many times you split them across multiple scaleup domains. I think that you really have to uh as models become more and more sparse, at least this is like the general trend, then you want to, you know, ping just a couple experts per GPU. And if leading models today have hundreds, if not thousand experts, then you want to run this across hundreds of chips or thousands of chips. Um, even as we continue to advance into the future.
And so then you end up with this problem of well now you need to you know need to connect all these satellites together commswise as well.
Okay. So that would be tough because I was imagine if there's a world where you could like do a batch inference for a batch on a single uh scaleup then maybe it's more plausible but if not then it's it's networking these chips together is a problem and and you can't just make this the satellite infinitely large right like there are a lot of challenges with physics to making a satellite really big right so then these inner that's why you need these inner interconnects between the satellites those interconnects are more expensive than the you know a cluster like 20% of the cost or 15% of the cost is networking all of a sudden now you're making it like space lasers instead of like pretty simple like lasers that are manufactured in millions of volumes with you know pluggable transceivers and those things are very unreliable as well more unreliable than the GPUs by the way across the life of a cluster you have to unplug clean it all the time right um unplug replug it just for random reasons these things are just not as reliable so you've got that also that problem as well like you've got a more expensive complicated space laser to communicate instead of this pluggable optical transceiver that's been in super high volume.
Okay. So, all in all, what does that imply for space data centers?
So, space data centers effectively are not limited by, you know, hey, we have this energy advantage. It's actually just limited by the same contended resource. We can only make 200 gigawatts of chips a year by the end of the decade. So, what are we going to do to get that capacity? It doesn't matter if it's on land or uh in in in space. You you're it doesn't really matter, right? Because you can build that power. And I think human capabilities and capacity to could get to the uh period where we're adding a terawatt a year globally of of various types of power.
At some point, we do cross the chasm where space data centers make sense, but it's not this decade, right? It is it is much further out once you have energy constraints actually being a big bottleneck. Once you have space land permitting be a much bigger bottleneck as it subsumes more and more of the economy. Um, and and chips are no longer the bottleneck because chips are the biggest bottleneck. And so you want them deployed working on AI the moment they're done being manufactured. And so there's a lot of things people are doing to increase that speed faster and faster, whether it be modularizing data centers or even modularizing racks where you actually put the chip in at the fa at the data center, but only the chip and everything else is already wired up and ready to go at the data center.
So there's things like this that people are doing to decrease that time that you cannot do in space. And at the end of the day, all that matters in a chip constrained world is get these chips working on to producing tokens ASAP in a world, you know, maybe 2035 once the semiconductor industry and ASML and ZISE and all these other suppliers, Lam Research applied materials, fab manufacturers like pendulum swings and they're able to make enough chips and really we're optimizing every dial and like it makes sense to optimize the 10% of energy cost or 15% of energy cost or as we move to ASICs potentially uh and Nvidia's margins aren't 70 plus% maybe that energy cost is 30% of the cluster um and fab construction all this like these are the things our data center construction these are the things to optimize but that's not a you know Elon doesn't win by doing you know 20% gains.
Elon never wins that way. Elon wins when he swings for the fences and does 10x gains, right? That's what SpaceX is about. That's what Tesla was about. That's what all of his success has been about, right? It's not been about these chasing the 20%. So, I think I think space data centers will eventually be a 10x gain uh potentially as as Earth resources get more and more contentious, but that's not this decade.
Yeah. I mean, I I think just to drive some intuition about how much land there is on Earth. Um, obviously the chips themselves, especially if we move to a world where you have racks that have megawatts uh megawatt charge, like literally it's not even a random factor.
That's the other thing, right? The power dense, you know, if chips are and manufacturing is the constraint right now, roughly it's 1 watt per millimeter squared. Yeah. Uh, for AI chips and such. One easy way is to pump that to 2 watts per millimeter squared. Now, you may not get 2x the performance. You may only get 20% more performance. And that requires much more exotic cooling, right? It requires uh more complicated cold plates and very complicated liquid cooling and or maybe it requires like things like immersion cooling. But in space, higher watts per millimeter is very difficult. Whereas on Earth, these are solved problems.
And one of these things enables you to get a lot more tokens. Maybe it's 20% more tokens per wafer that's manufactured. And that's a humongous win.
Sorry. Millimeter you mean of di area?
Yeah. Of di area. Square millimeters of a di area.
I I mean it would be better for space because if you can run more watts per millimeter would be the chip runs hotter and the hotter the chip. I guess this is a question of computer chip engineering, but but it like it cools to the power of fourth by Stefan Boltzmann's law. So if you can run a very hot chip because it allows you can't run hotter. You can only run it denser. And the problem is getting the heat out of that dense area means you have to move away from standard li air cooling and liquid cooling to more exotic forms of liquid cooling or even immersion to get to higher uh power densities. And that's more difficult in space than it is on Earth.
Yeah. And maybe it's at this point worth uh explaining what what what exactly a scaleup is and what it looks like for Nvidia versus um uh Tranium versus um versus uh TPUs.
Yeah. So earlier I was mentioning how communication within a chip is super fast. Communication within chips that are in the same rack is fast but is not as fast. And then, you know, it's on the order of terabytes and then communication very far away is on the order of gigaby hundreds of gigabytes, right? So this this order of magnitude as you get further distance compute and maybe across the country it's on the order of gigabytes a second, right? Scaleup domain is this like tight domain um where the chips are communicating on the order of terabytes a second. And so for Nvidia previously this meant an H100 server had eight GPUs and those eight GPUs could talk to each other at terabytes a second.
With Blackwell and VL72 they implemented rack scale scaleup and that meant all 72 GPUs in the rack would connect could connect to each other at terabytes a second speed and and the speed doubled gen on gen. But also the most important innovation they did was going from 8 to 72 in the domain. When we look at Google their scaleup domain is completely different, right? It has always been on the order of thousands, right? With TPU V4 they had pods the size of 4,000 chips. With V8 they have pods even you know or V7 they have pods in the 7,000 or sorry 8,000 9,000 range.
Um, and what's relevant here is that it's not it's not the same as Nvidia. It's not like for like. Google has a topology that's a tourist, right? So every chip connects to six neighbors rather than Nvidia, the 72 GPUs connect all to all, right? So they can send terabytes a second to each other to any arbitrary other chip in that pod of scaleup. Whereas Google, you have to bounce through chips, right? So this means if TPU 1 needs to talk to TPU 76, then it has to bounce through various chips. And there is always some blocking of resources when you do that.
So because that one TPU is only connected to six other TPUs. And so there's a difference in topology and bandwidth and there are trade-offs and advantages of both, right? Google gets to have a massive scaleup domain, but then they have the trade-off of you have to bounce across chips to get to from one chip to another. Um, you can only talk to six direct neighbors. And so there is like this trade-off and Amazon it has has mutated their scaleup domain. Uh, they're somewhere in between Nvidia and Google effectively where they're trying to make larger scaleup domains. Um, they try and do all to all to some extent, which is what with switches, which is what Nvidia does, but also to some extent they use tourist topologies like Google does.
Um, and as we as we advance forward to next generations, all all three of them are moving more and more towards a dragonfly topology, which means there's sort of like there are some fully connected elements and there are some elements that are not fully connected. So you can get the scale up to be hundreds or thousands of chips, but also have it not contend for resources when you're bouncing through chips.
Related question. Um, I heard somebody make the claim that the reason that parameter scaling has been slow and only now are we getting bigger and bigger models from uh OpenAI and Anthropic is that um so original GPT-4 is over a trillion parameters and only now are models starting to approach that again. Um, and I heard a theory that the reason is that Nvidia's scaleups have just not had that much uh uh memory capacity.
And so what was the claim exactly? If you have say one five let's say you have a 5T model running at FP8. So that's five uh 5 trillion gigabytes.
Yeah.
And then you have the KV cache. Let's say it's like just call it the same size. Okay. Let's say it's the same size for one batch. So you need 10 gigabytes, sorry, 10 terabytes to be able to run a single forward pass. Yeah. And then only with the GB200 and VL72 do you have an Nvidia scaleup that has 20 terabytes. And before that they were much smaller. Whereas Google on the other hand has had these um huge TPU pods that are not all to all but still have I think hundreds of terabytes of capacity in a single scaleup.
So does that explain why parameter scaling has been slow?
I think it's partially the capacity and bandwidth, but also um as you build a larger model, the ability to deploy it is is is slower, right? Like in terms of like, hey, what is the inference speed um for the end user? That's kind of irrelevant. What's really relevant is RL. Um, and what we've seen with these models and allocation of compute at a lab is sort of there's there's a few main ways you can allocate compute. You can allocate it to inference, i.e., revenue. You can allocate it to development, i.e., making the next model, and you can allocate it to research. Um, and in development specifically, you can you split it between pre-training and uh RL, right?
And so when you think about, hey, what exactly is happening? Well, the model, the compute efficiency gains you get from research are so large, you actually want most of your compute to go to research, not to development, because, you know, all these researchers are generating new ideas, trying them out, testing them, and continuing to march along this and push the Pareto optimal curve of scaling laws further and further and further. And at least what we've seen empirically is like model cost gets 10x cheaper every year or even more than that. Um, which at the same scale it gets 10x cheaper or it get, you know, at, you know, to get to reach new frontiers it costs the same amount or more, right?
So you don't want to train, you don't want to allocate too many resources to pre uh to pre-training and post and RL. You actually want to allocate most of your resources to research. Um, and then in the middle is sort of this like development period. If you pre-train a 5 trillion parameter model, now you have to spend all this time. How many rollouts do you have to do in these RLs? And these rollouts for a trillion parameter model versus a 5 trillion parameter model are five times larger, which then means it takes if you wanted to do as many rollouts, maybe the larger model is more sample efficient.
Let's say it's 2x more sample efficient. Okay, great. Now you need 2 and a half x much time of RL to get the model smarter. Um, or you could RL the smaller model for 2x the time and you'd be it'd be you'd still have a 50% or you'd still have a 25% difference in the big model which is 2x more sample efficient uh and doing x number of rollouts versus the small model which is a trillion parameters doing although it's less sample efficient is doing twice as many rollouts it's still done faster and so you get the model faster sooner and you've done more RL and then you can take that model to help you build the next models help your engineers train and do all these research ideas and so this feedback loop is actually weighed towards smaller models in in every case no matter what your hardware is.
And then as you look to Google, Google does deploy the largest production model of any of the the major labs, right? Uh, with Gemini Pro, it is a larger model than GPT uh 54. It's a larger model than Opus. And and so you end up with, yes, Google does this because they have a unipolar set of compute, right? Almost all TPU. Um, whereas Anthropic is dealing with H100s, H200s, Blackwell, Traniums, TPUs of various generations, right?
And and uh OpenAI is dealing with mostly Nvidia right now, but going towards having AMD and Tranium as well. The fleets of compute like Google can can just optimize around a larger model and they can leverage a thousand chips in a scaleup domain to get, you know, the RL time speed much faster so that you can actually uh have this feedback loop be fast. But at the end of the day, in isolation, you almost always want to go with a smaller model that gets RLed faster and gets deployed into research and development so you can build the next thing and get more compute efficiency wins.
And then this compounding effect of, oh, I made a smaller model that I RLed more that I then deployed into research and development earlier and I spent less compute on the training itself because I was able and I was able to allocate more compute to the research. This like compounding effect of being able to do the research faster and faster and faster is potentially a faster takeoff. And that's all these companies want is fastest takeoff possible.
Yeah. Um, okay. Spicy question. Um, you know, you're explaining you make the semi-analysis sells these spreadsheets and you're always like, uh, six months ago or a year ago we told people the memory crunch or now you're telling people the clean room crunch and then the in the future the tool crunch. Um, why is Leopold the only person that is using your spreadsheets to make outrageous money? What is everybody else doing?
I think I think there are a lot of people making money in many ways. I think obviously Leopold Leopold jokes that you know he's the only client of mine that tells me our numbers are too low. Everyone else tells me our numbers are too high. Uh, almost ad nauseum. Um, you know, whether it's a hyperscaler saying, "Hey, that other hyperscaler, their numbers are too high, you know, and we're like, "Nah, that's it." And they're like, "No, no, no, no, it's impossible." Blah blah blah. And then you're like, finally have to convince them through all these facts and data when we're working with hyperscalers or AI labs that in fact no, that number isn't too high. Um, that's correct.
But eventu and eventually like sometimes it's like six months later it takes them to realize or a year later. Um, I think I think other clients like on the trading side also use our data, right? We we sell data to a lot of um, you know, I think roughly 60% of my business is industry. So, AI labs, data uh data center companies, hyperscalers, semiconductor companies, uh, you know, the whole supply chain across AI infrastructure. Um, but then like 40% of our revenue is like hedge funds, right? And, and, you know, I'm not going to comment on who our customers are, but I think a lot of people use the data.
It's just how do you interpret it and then what do you like view as beyond it? And I will say Leopold is pretty much the only person who tells me my numbers are too low always. Um, and sometimes he's too high, sometimes I'm too low, right? Uh, but in general, I think other people are, you know, doing that and you can check certain you can you can look across the space at hedge funds and look at their 13 apps and see actually they own maybe not exactly what Leopold does. Uh, because it's always like a question of like what is the most constrained thing? What's the thing that's going to be that's most outside of expectations?
And that's what you're really trying to exploit is inefficiencies in the market. And in a sense what our data shows is like is is like making the market more efficient by making the base data uh of what's happening more accurate versus like and but but in a sense I think many many funds do trade on information um that is out there and it's not I I don't think I don't think Leopold's the only person. I think he has the most conviction on the entire uh in the entire like about the AGI takeoff though, right?
Right. I mean but but the bets are not about like what happens in 2035. The bets that you're making that are at least exemplified by public returns we can see for different funds including Leopold's are about what has happened in the last year and the last year stuff could be predicted using your spreadsheets, right? So it's like it's it's less about it's about buying like the next year spreadsheets.
There's not just spreadsheets, you know, there's reports, there's API access to the data, there's a lot of data. But anyways, you know, I think but he do you see what I mean? Like it's like it's not about some crazy singularity thing. It's about like oh okay do you buy the memory crunch? A simple one though is like you you only buy the memory crunch if you believe AI is going to take off in in a huge way. And um the memory crunch a lot of it was predicated on like you know at least for like people in the Bay Area who think about infrastructure it's like obvious KV cache explodes as context lenses get longer so you need more memory and then you do the math and you and and you also have to have a lot of supply chain understanding of like what fabs are being built and what data centers are being built and how many chips and all these things.
And so we we we we track all these different data data sets like very tightly. But at the end of the day, it takes, you know, someone to fully believe that this is going to happen. Like I think a year ago, if you told someone memory prices were quadruple and smartphone volumes are going to go down 40%, um, you know, over the over the year or two after that, people were like, "You're crazy. That never happened." Except a few people do believe that. And those people did trade memory, right? And and and people did. I don't think like Leopold was the only person buying like memory companies.
I think there were a lot of people buying memory companies. He, of course, sized and positioned and did things in a better ways than some. Um, maybe most, right? I I don't want to comment on whose returns or what. Um, but he certainly did well. Um, but other people also did really well, right? Um, trying to be like this is wow. You made me diplomatic for the first time ever. No, no, you're fine. You're fine. I think it's hilarious, right? I being a diplomat, you know, whereas usually I'm like spicy.
Yeah. Okay. Uh, maybe some rapid fire uh to close out. Um, can TSMC if you're saying look the the memory logic etc the N3 is mostly going to be AI accelerators but then there's N2 which is mostly Apple now and then in the future I guess AI would also want to go on N2. Can can they kick out Apple if Nvidia and Amazon and Google say hey we really we're willing to pay a lot of money for N2 capacity?
So I think the challenge with this is chip design timelines take a long while and so that's more than a year and the designs that are on 2 nanometer are more than a year out. Yeah. And so what would really happen is Apple or sorry Nvidia and all these others will be like hey we're going to prepay for the capacity and you're going to expand it for us. And then Apple would be and and maybe TSMC takes a little bit of margin but not a ton. They're not going to kick Apple out entirely, right? What they're going to do is when Apple orders X they may say hey we project you only need Y or X minus 1. And so that's what we're going to give you is X minus 1.
And then that flex capacity Apple's kind of screwed on. Um, whereas traditionally Apple's always overordered by like 10% and cut back by 10% over the course of the year. And some years they they hit the entire 10%. Just, you know, volumes vary, right? Based on the season and macro blah blah blah blah blah. Um, and so I don't think TSMC would kick out Apple. I think Apple will become a smaller and smaller and smaller percentage of TSMC's revenue and therefore be less relevant for TSMC to cater to their demands. And TSMC could eventually start saying, "Hey, you got to prebook your capacity for next year for two years out and you have to prepay for the capex because that's what Nvidia and Amazon and Google are doing."
Yeah. I I wonder if it's worth going to specific numbers on like I I don't have any of them on hand of like how many N2 wafers uh or what percentage of N2 does Apple have its hands on versus over the coming years versus AI?
Yeah. I mean this year Apple has the majority of N2 that's going to get fabricated. There's a little bit from AMD. They are trying to make some AI chips and CPU chips early. There's a little bit, but for the most part, it's it's Apple. Um, and as we go forward to the year after that, Apple still, you know, gets closer to like half of it as other people start ramping, but then it it falls drastically, right? Just like for N3, they were half. Um, we'll we'll we'll see. And and when I say N2, that includes A16, which is a variant of N2.
Um, over time, those those nodes will be the majority. And what's also interesting is traditionally Apple's been the first to a process node. 2 nanometer is actually the first time they're not. Well, besides Huawei, right? Huawei back in 2020 and before was the first with Apple, but they were both making smartphones. Now with 2 nanometer, uh, you've got AMD trying to make a CPU and a GPU chiplet that they used advanced packaging to package together, um, in the same time frame as Apple. Um, and this is a big risk for AMD that causes potential delays potentially because it's a brand new process technology.
It's hard. But at the end of the day, this is this is a bet that they want to do to, you know, scale faster than Nvidia and try and beat them. As we move forward, actually, when we move to the A16 node, the first customer there is not even Apple. It's AI. And as we move forward, that will become more and more prevalent. Not only will Apple not be the first to a node, they will also not be the majority of the volume to the new node. And then they'll just be like any old customer. And because the scale of TSMC's capex keeps ballooning, but Apple's business is kind of not growing at the same pace, they become a less and less relevant customer.
And they also will just cut their orders because things in the supply chain are kicking them out. Whether it be uh packaging or materials or DRAM or NAND, these things are increasing in cost. They can't pass on all the cost to customers likely because the consumer is not that strong. And and you end up with like this conundrum where they are just not Apple TSMC's best bud like they have been historically.
Do you think um if Huawei had access to 3 nanometer, they would have a better accelerator than Ruben?
Potentially. Yeah. I think I think Huawei they were the first with a 7 nanometer AI chip as well. They were the first with a 5 nanometer mobile chip, but they were the first with a 7 nanometer AI chip. Uh, the the Huawei Ascend was like two months before the TPU and like four months before um Nvidia's I want to say was it V100 or A100? A100 I think. And so, you know, I mean, that's just moving to a process node that doesn't imply uh software, it doesn't imply hardware design, all these other things. But Huawei is arguably the only company in the world that has all the legs, right?
Huawei has cracked software engineers. Huawei has cracked networking technologies. That's in fact their biggest business historically, right? And they have cracked AI uh talent. Um, but furthermore, beyond Nvidia, they actually have better AI researchers. And furthermore, beyond Nvidia, they have their own fabs. And furthermore, beyond Nvidia, they have, you know, their own, you know, end market of like selling tokens and things like that. And Huawei tends to be like they're able to get the top top top talent. Nvidia is as well, but not as not as in in much concentration.
And Huawei has a bigger pool in China. It's very arguable that Huawei, if they had TSMC, would be better than Nvidia. And there are areas where China has advantages outside of um areas that Nvidia can't access as easily, right? Around not just scale, but also like some things around um, you know, certain optical technologies China is actually really good at. Um, so there's there's certain I think it's very reasonable that if uh in 2019 that is that that was not that Huawei was not banned from using TSMC, Huawei would Huawei had already eclipsed Apple as the biggest TSMC customer and Huawei has huge share in networking and compute and CPUs and all these things.
They would have kept gaining share and they'd likely be TSMC's bigger biggest customer.
Wow, that's crazy. Um, I've got kind of a random final question for you. So, the other part of the Elon interview was robots. And so, if um if humanoids take off faster than people expect, if by 2030 there's millions of humanoids running around which each need local uh local compute, any thoughts on what that implies? What would be required for that?
You know, there's there's a lot of like difficulties with like the VLMs and all these things that people VLAs that people are deploying on on on robots, but to some extent you don't need to have all the intelligence in the robot. Um, and it would be much more efficient to not do that, right? Because in the server, in in in cloud, you can batch process and all these things. So, what you may want to do is, hey, a lot of the planning and longer horizon tasks are determined by a much more capable model in the cloud that runs at very high batch sizes. And then it pushes those directions to the robots who then interpolate between each subsequent action or is given like, "Hey, pick up that cup."
And then the model on the robot can pick up the cup. And it's like as it's picking up, it's like, oh, you know, in fact this, you know, you know, things like weight and all these things might have to be and like force may have to be like determined by the model on the robot, but not everything needs to be like, you know, hey, pick up the rob uh, you know, this, right? Or like, hey, that's a headphone. Actually, I'm the super model in the cloud. I know that this headphones are, you know, Sony XM6s, which is not a dark ash ad spot, but, you know, this guy plugging this thing so hard. It's like on the table.
It's like on his neck when we're entering Satya together. Like, is he getting paid by Sony? Um, unfortunately not. Unfortunately not. But anyways, like, you know, it might say, "Hey, the headband is soft and and this is the gr this is the weight of it and all these things." And then the model on the robot can be less intelligent and take these inputs and do the actions. And it may get told by the model in the cloud every second, every 10 times a second. Maybe, you know, depends on the hertz of the action, but a lot of that can be offloaded to the cloud because otherwise if you do all of the processing on the device, I believe it would be more expensive because you can't batch.
Two, you couldn't have as much intelligence as you do in the cloud because the models will just be bigger in the cloud. And three, we're in a semiconductor shortage world and any robot you deploy needs leading edge chips because the power is really bad for robots, right? You need it to be low power and efficient. And all of a sudden you're taking power and chips that would have been for AI data centers and you're putting them in robots. Yeah. So now that 200 gigawatts gets lower if you're at if you're deploying millions of humanoids.
I I think this this is very interesting because something people might not appreciate about the future is how centralized in a physical sense intelligence will be. Where right now with humans, your compute like there's 8 billion humans and their compute is on on their heads, on their person. And in the future, even with robots that are out physically in the world, I mean, obviously knowledge work will be done in a centralized way from data centers with huge like hundreds of thousands of instances or maybe millions of instances. But even for robotics, the future you're suggesting is um one where there's like more centralized thinking and centralized computation that's driving, you know, millions of robots out in the world.
Um, and so I think that just like yeah, that's there's an interesting fact about the future that I think people might not appreciate.
I I think Elon recognizes this, which is why he's like going to different places for his chips, right? He signed this massive deal with Samsung to make his robot chips in Texas because he thinks, you know, like I I personally think he thinks that, you know, Taiwan risk is huge. And because of that and the centralization of resources in Taiwan, him having his robot chips in Texas and also being a separate supply chain that is not as constrained by no one's making AI chips really on Samsung besides uh Nvidia's new uh LPU that they launched uh they're launching it next week, but we're recording it the week before.
It's coming out this week. This episode coming out Friday.
Oh, this episode's coming out before. Sick. Um, so they're launching this new AI chip um next week for which is built on Samsung, but that's like sort of a recent development from Nvidia. And then that's the only other AI like AI demand there. Whereas on TSMC, everything is competing. So he gets this like both geopolitical diversification, but also uh supply chain diversity for his robots. And he's not as competing as much with with the like willingness to pay of infinity of the data center of geniuses.
Okay, final question. Um, on Taiwan, if we believe that tools are the ultimate bottleneck, how much of Taiwan's uh uh place in the AI semiconductor supply chain could we de-risk simply by having a plan to airlift every single process engineer or TSMC out when things come to if they get blockaded or something? Or do you actually still need to ship out the EUV tools uh which would be multiple plane loads per single tool and would not be practical?
If you ship out all the process engineers and assuming it's like hot enough that you destroy the fabs, no one has all the fabs in Taiwan now. Uh, which is a big risk, right? Um, you know, these tools actually use a lot of semiconductors which are manufactured in Taiwan. So, it's like a it's like a, you know, a snake eating its own tail sort of like meme because you can't make the tools without the chips from Taiwan, which you can't use without the tools in Taiwan. You know, there's obviously some diversification there, but and and they don't use super advanced uh chips in lithography tools, but at the end of the day, there is some tail eating the dragon.
Um, just shipping out all the engineers and blowing up the fabs means China has a stronger semiconductor supply chain than the rest of the world, right? In terms of verticalization, now that you've removed Taiwan and now you've got all the know-how, but you've got to replicate it in, let's say, Arizona, um, or wherever for TSMC. And it's going to take a long time to build all the capacity that TSMC has had built over the years. And so you've drastically slowed US and global GDP.
Not just growth, you've shrank the GDP massively and you've got a lot bigger problems. Uh, and your incremental ability to add compute goes to almost zero, right? Instead of hundreds of gigawatts a year by the end of the decade, let's say by the end of the decade something happens to Taiwan, now you're at maybe like 10 gigawatts across Intel and Samsung or 20 gigawatts. It's like nothing. Um, and now all of a sudden you've like really caught some crazy dynamics in AI. Uh, of course you have all the existing capacity, but that existing capacity pales in comparison to the capacity that's being expanded.
Yeah. Okay, Dylan, that was excellent. Thank you so much for coming on the podcast.
Thank you for having me and uh see see you tonight.
Yes.
Dylan Patel, founder of SemiAnalysis, provides a deep dive into the 3 big bottlenecks to scaling AI compute: logic, memory, and power.
And walks through the economics of labs, hyperscalers, foundries, and fab equipment manufacturers.
Learned a ton about every single level of the stack. Enjoy!
Watch on YouTube; read the transcript.
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Timestamps
(00:00:00) – Why an H100 is worth more today than 3 years ago
(00:24:52) – Nvidia secured TSMC allocation early; Google is getting squeezed
(00:34:34) – ASML will be the #1 constraint for AI compute scaling by 2030
(00:55:47) – Can't we just use TSMC's older fabs?
(01:05:37) – When will China outscale the West in semis?
(01:16:01) – The enormous incoming memory crunch
(01:42:34) – Scaling power in the US will not be a problem
(01:54:44) – Space GPUs aren't happening this decade
(02:14:07) – Why aren't more hedge funds making the AGI trade?
(02:18:30) – Will TSMC kick Apple out from N2?
(02:24:16) – Robots and Taiwan risk
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