Transcript of How Iran Could Attack The U.S. From Inside New

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Welcome to the watch floor. I'm Sarah Adams. Today we're going to talk about an organization that most people have never heard of, but you should, because it operates across continents, including right here on US soil. It's called IRGC unit 840. And if you understand how unit 840 works, you understand how Iran conducts covert war in the 21st century. It's not through armies. It's through deniable operations, proxy relationships, false identities, criminal intermediaries, and most importantly, through patience. Before we dive into Unit 840, it's important to understand the broader organization. So Unit 840 falls under Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, right, the IRGC. Now, in Iran, the IRGC is not the conventional military. You have to look at Iran as having basically two armed forces. So they have the artes, which is their traditional military, and this is like their territorial defense. So we're talking about tanks, aircraft, borders. And then you have the irgc, which is in place to protect the regime itself. So it reports directly to the senior leader of Iran, and it controls missile defenses, cyber operations, internal repression. And what matters most for today's episode, external covert action. If you look at Artesian as a national military, you have to look at IRGC as like a state within a state.

It has its own intelligence service, its own economy. It has its own foreign policy tools. Within the irgc, external operations fall under the Quds Force, which of course a lot of Americans are aware of because, you know, back in 2020, the US government took out the then head of the Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani. Now, they are essentially Iran's expeditionary arm. It's the simplest way to put it. When you have unit 840, then it's not just a regular unit within the IRGC. It is a covert action element. So they do intelligence operations, but then they also do military operations. So they basically go right on top of each other. So it would be like if you took the CIA and JSOC, you know, enrolled their operations together as one. When you look at the operational structure of unit 840. It's very interesting how it reports. For a long time it was believed that it only reported and fell directly under the Quds Force. But now it's clear that the organization reports to both the Quds Force and a whole other element within IRGC that is IRGC's intelligence organization, or a lot of people call it IRGC IO so just be aware it's actually involved in two reporting mechanisms, you know, depending on the mission, the location and the target.

So if we do an analogy and the Quds Force is like the muscle of Iran. If you just take unit 840, it's more focused and precise. It's like the scalpel part of the operation. At the center of this organization, there's two key names you need to know. And besides that, it's very complicated because all the operatives within this organization are in alias. So even when you learn their names, you're likely not learning their true given birth name in Iran because everything is an alias. So it's just something to keep in mind. It's just like how CIA has undercover officers, a very similar model. So we have Mohammad Reza Shalahi. So this is the founder of Unit 840. So he was an IRGC covert action officer and he created this unit to effectively operate in the shadows. The interesting thing is it then passed down to his son who's now running it. His son is Mohammed Jafar Shalahi and he runs the covert operations unit. And right now, because a huge focus of course is Yemen, he's currently based there and then running the whole organization out of Yemen, we're going to walk through some of the tradecraft today as to how he's able to pull something off like that and how the organization really operates different per theater it's in.

Unlike here in the West, Iran doesn't strictly separate intelligence, military operations and criminal organizations. So when we look at 840, it's working at the intersection of a number of things. First, of course, Iran's covert action program and then its proxies and of course terrorist groups that are partners with it, and then these transnational criminal organizations and trafficking networks. So all play a role in, you know, in making this unit work. Now that you generally know what unit 840 is, let's talk about how it works in practice. I want to spend a lot of time on tradecraft because if we understand tradecraft, it's easier to understand the organization. So we're just going to go by different locations they operate in. First is they adapt by environment. For example, if in Syria they recruit local Syrians to run their operations on the ground. So it's not an Iranian commander in Syria leading the troops, it's a Syrian commander. So it's done very smart. And then it's the Syrian commanders who absorb the risk. And also it gives them some deniability because you're not going to assume the Syrian, Syrian is linked to the Iranian regime. It's very smart.

And even about 18 months ago there was a huge weapons cachet uncovered in Syria and a piece of it belonged to unit 840. So even though they have put these safeguards into place, you know, they still haven't been able to hide all of their activities in Syria. Another great example is in Lebanon. So Lebanon, they did the exact opposite. Of course. Lebanon is a high profile and priority target for iogc. So there they said, nope, we are sending a commander to handle Lebanon. But we're going to be smart about it. We're going to send him to Tire, which is in southern Lebanon and we're going to embed him, you know, within Hezbollah units. So he isn't going to be just protected by irgc, he's going to have this whole other layer of protection and by Hezbollah and then run covert act operations from on the ground in Lebanon. So this leader, his name was Hussein Mahmoud Mashad Al Johari. Even though they did put all these layers of security and he was killed, the interesting thing is they planned for that possibility and there was redundancy, you know, in this piece of the operation. So even though he was killed, it didn't really affect the cell structure and they still stayed operational in Lebanon.

And that's really important to understand. So you can't just cut off one head in this situation. Another example was in Germany. So in Germany they wanted to target this well known Iranian rapper and dj. His name was Shaheen Najafi. But as you can imagine, Iran did not want to look like first off, they are operating on German soil, but that they were planning to execute an assassination on German soil. So they actually recruited locals and intermediaries and this was actually a longer operation. So they did surveillance and they really focused a lot on Hay. We have to set this operation up. So Iran has a hidden hand. Obviously that wasn't successful. The plot was found out and they haven't been able to target him. But it's just another example of how they chose to do it in a different location. Now another thing they do is they don't just always recruit a local to be kind of one of their ground commanders. In some places they, they go to one of their partners or their proxies and they say, hey, we want you to assign a commander to lead these operations for unit 840 in the country.

So it is a local commander, again, not an Iranian. And we saw this in Thailand, Georgia and India. In all three locations, the goal of Unit 840 was to target Israelis and Israeli interests in those locations. Another thing is they also focus on the use of these criminal intermediaries. It's a lot of times in Europe, but it's specifically in Turkey. And this is done very smart. So they get a criminal organization to support their operations and do a large piece of it. So like surveillance, logistics, even things like weapons movements. Now if that piece gets thwarted and that criminal element gets picked up, first off, they're not Iranian. Second, they're not tied in any way to the Iranian regime. So it's a really smart way to keep a distance from things. I mean, think about it. If you pick up this criminal moving some weapons in Turkey and then you start saying, oh, he was working for irgc, it's sounds crazy, it sounds like a conspiracy theory and Iran is taking advantage of how absurd that sounds. Like, yeah, why would a nation state be working with this low level criminal where they do. And it's honestly a good thing for us they do because those people aren't always as sophisticated as intelligence organizations and it does give you opportunities to thwart some of these activities.

A really good example of when they didn't do this well was recently. So if you saw in the news back In May of 2025, four Iranians were detained in London and they were working for unit 840 and they were plotting an attack on the Israeli embassy in London. The thing thing is they use four Iranian operatives. It's probably one of these situations. If they went back and replanned it, they probably would have used four locals who weren't of Iranian descent because that piece probably made them more exposed and we quickly knew who they belong to. They couldn't really do any kind of deniability and say it wasn't us because of course these were Iranians. They have to track back to somewhere in some organization and some command and control leadership. So the way I like to look at it is a 40 uses the right tool for the right location. It's really that simple. That's how their tradecraft is. Sometimes they get it right. And we gave you examples of sometimes when they get it wrong. Now just as an organization. I do want to kind of explain, explain what their key focus is when they're overseas because it's like, well, what are their targets?

What is their mission? So their number one goal is targeted assassinations. And that's a piece I've been working on. And we're going to talk about one of the investigations we did into one of their assassinations. Another thing to focus on is kidnappings and renditions. Right? They want to deal with some of these Iranians who got out to the west or they're overseas and they want them back in their custody or they want them detained or they want to silence them. Another thing is sabotage. Obviously this is a covert action program. And lastly, they're focused like a big chunk of IRGC is on, hey, we need to help support our proxies, whatever that may be. It could be training, weapons, logistics, just cover for them. So that's a huge piece of their operational planning as well. Now I want to go back into tradecraft for a minute because we talk tradecraft as the commander who's leading an operation on the ground for unit 840. But of course there are so many other layers of their tradecraft that are important to understand. The first, first is insiders. We explained how they recruit locals to lead their organization, but they also recruit insiders against their targets.

So if they're targeting institution, they're going to recruit insiders in those institutions. If they're targeting a person, they're going to recruit insiders who are close to that person. I mean, very simple concept, but it's very important. Important to them to have someone with eyes on. Right? You need first hand access and information when you're running successful covert operations. I mean it's a benchmark. Another key element is compartmentation. So when they put an operation together, so let's say they put an assassination plot together. So there's a plot planner, there could be some sort of facilitators and at least at the end you have someone who's going to carry out this operation. Well, the person who planned the operation likely does not know the operative chosen to carry out the plan. So it's very smart. So if you wrap up a piece in the planning, they don't know the entire structure of, of the plot and every single person involved in the plot. So you can't wrap up an entire network by just pulling one person from the puzzle. So it's a very smart way to do it. Another thing is, and Al Qaeda does this extremely well.

It's focusing on identity as Infrastructure, So they lean very heavily to false identity. So when I tell you the current leader of unit 840 is in Yemen, well, he's in Yemen under Yemeni documentation as a Yemeni in false name. He's not obviously in country with his real passport in his real identity. Now when they do this, there's so many other pieces, right? So now they're in the banking systems with a false identity. They're able to get properties with this false identity. It's building out this entire cover mechanism. So they always can fall back to these, let's say, fake companies that they built, right? There's always going to be some backstopping for their operatives because they took this piece of tradecraft, you know, and really ran with it and made it a priority. Another thing is, and we explain this clearly, so I won't spend it too long, but they really decided, hey, the more criminal cutouts we have as part of our operations, the more risk we can absorb and the more our hand can be hidden. So if you're going to do, let's say, an assassination and you need surveillance, well, I'm not going to take my Iranian operatives to do surveillance.

I'm just going to get some criminals I can pay at a low cost to do the surveillance piece for me. I don't need to risk my best guys on the ground to do that piece when I can get plenty of people to easily do that piece for me. Lastly, and I do want to go into this one in detail, it's this patience as a weapon. This is kind of one of their benchmark pieces of tradecraft and it's incredibly important. And almost everything we talked about really rolls in under this. So the example I want to bring up is the one we worked on, and it was a st assassination of General Ekwamuddin Sari. So if you don't know him, he is an Afghan general. He's obviously now anti Taliban. He's not a Pashtun, and he runs a number of resistance networks against the Taliban. And he was hiding in Iran to stay away from the reach of the Taliban, at least he thought to keep this revolution going against these terrorists who now run Afghanistan. So as you can imagine, he's really more of a Taliban target than an Iranian target. So, yes, this is a joint operation.

So on the Iranian side, we had IRGC, IO and then we have unit 840. And then on the Taliban side of this operation, we have the Taliban's General Directorate of Intelligence, and it's their Directorate 197. So these three organizations got together and plotted this assassination, right? So a joint operation. Now, the way they did it was very simple, but again, it's going to show you that level of patience. So they took a former Afghan army officer, so he did serve in the Afghanistan military. And then after the fall of Kabul, he really joined the dark side. He joined the Fethuin Brigade. You know, it's a terrorist group in Iran. But not a lot of people were aware he joined this terrorist group. So they took him to be the operative in this assassination plot. And so all they did is they said, hey, reach out to the general, say you want to be a part of the resistance against the Taliban, you want to join his movement. And so he did that and he went into these resistance groups as an insider. He got close to the general, you know, spent the time understanding the general, his habits.

And really, at the end of the day, all they did is they made a phone call to the general. He walked outside to take that call, and he was ambushed, you know, by this former member of the Afghan military. So this is really interesting. So, because there's multiple pieces of tradecraft when you just look at this one assassination. First off, patience, right? We had months and months and months of this insider gaining trust, you know, proving his bona fides as part of the resistance. We had this insider leverage and insider threat piece. That's very important, right? You had firsthand access to the information. You didn't have to make assumptions about what the general's doing or thinking or where he's going. You have someone there to watch it and report it to you. We also had cross border coordination. So here we have an Afghan in Iran as the target. We have an Afghan in Iran as the operative. And then of course, we have Iranian intelligence and we have Afghan intelligence supporting this operation. And lastly, this was heavily compartmented. So if you go to Taliban's GDI and ask them who led the operation on the Taliban side or what is the name of the operative who carried this out?

Right. Who's an Afghan? Plenty of them don't even know. They weren't given a need to know regarding this operation because as you can imagine, neither the Iranians or the Taliban wanted it to get out that this was a joint targeted operation. They just wanted it to look like he fell victim to some sort of violence in Iran. Now, I want to do just a quick recap when we talk about 840's partners. So they are partners with the Taliban, obviously. That's clear. I already told you, they're partners with Hezbollah in Lebanon. They're partners with Hezbollah, obviously, in other locations, especially Iraq. They're partners with the Houthis in Yemen. And then of course, they have other allegiances and alliances, especially to different Al Q affiliates. And then on top of that, they do have all these relationships with like, criminal networks, organized crime, trafficking networks. So this is a really big structure. If you were going to like, lay it all out and map it all out. They have a lot of different affiliates they can reach out to and leverage, you know, if they need to do certain operations, kind of. In conclusion here, I really want you to understand that 8 flow 40 is resilient due to their tradecraft, so they adapt to their environment.

I showed you if didn't matter if it was Syria, Lebanon, Europe. Even though they had the same operatives and the same structure running those, they used different tools in each of those locations. Another thing is they had extended expendable layers. Could be local recruits, intermediaries, proxy facilitators, some of these criminal networks. They had those layers that could fall off and they could keep their organization running because nobody really knew that peace was Iranian. It wasn't Iranian backed from just a first look at the situation. Another thing is they have redundancy. So if a piece of a plot or a piece of a cell is thwarted, right. They have the backup in place to replenish that pretty quickly. So it's very difficult to fully stop all 840 operations. So let's say we want to. We're going to end their operations in Syria. Well, you go after one of these Syrian commanders running them, they have his replacement already lined up. So it's something to keep in mind. The last piece I really want to talk about is this network is really not built for efficiency. I told you. They might have three cells to back up one if it gets wrapped up.

But it's built for survivability, and it's mostly built to be invisible. So we talked about these examples, be it Thailand, Germany, Syria, et cetera. But that's only because in those locations, their activities were threatened, thwarted, or some piece of the plot was disrupted. Now think about it. We don't really talk about this organization in the United States, even though it operates here. You know, that's really scary. That means it's not like it's silent because they're not here. It's silent because we're not disrupting that operational activity. And it's really something we have to keep in mind and we have to pay attention to, to these threat actors who can operate here with really out any sort of scrutiny. Thanks for being here today on the watch floor. Okay. Nicola Quiss frage Home Office moment.

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