Transcript of The Future of Warfare | EYES ON GEOPOLITICS New

Hey everybody, welcome to another episode of Eyes on Geopolitics. We got a special one today. We're joined by John Hackett, Eric Ulrich, Scott C. Scott, what's your last name, man? Because I only see Scott C. Scott Canino.

Most people can't pronounce it or spell it, so C works.

Okay, cool. Yeah, Scott Canino. They're both with Lobo Institute. They do a lot of work with our guy Mick Mulroy. They're right now at the Whitefish Security Summit happening this weekend. I think today's— tomorrow's the last day, right?

Yeah. Yeah. So it was basically Thursday through Saturday.

Cool. Yeah, it's going to be happening every year. So I want you guys to go to the link down in the description. Check it out there for future, future events. Super exciting. I think the Team House and Eyes On crew is going to be out there for year 2. So it's going to be— it's going to be fun. Guys, thanks for joining us. Really appreciate it.

Yeah, happy to be here. Thanks for having us.

Of course. So subject for today is going to be the future of warfare, future, and also I guess because you guys are all SOF guys, right? Former SOF guys with a bit of like a more of like an eyeball on what like special operations specifically. I mean, we're seeing what's happening now in the Gulf and stuff and in our bases around the Middle East with the Shahed drones, you know, blowing up E-3 Sentries and KC-135s, injuring and killing servicemen. I definitely want to start off with like, how do we— what can we do to counter that drone threat? And why isn't it happening already? That's my question, because it seems a little, you know, we're like moving in molasses a little bit in terms of like You know, defending ourselves essentially, for lack of a better term.

Do you want to, uh, you guys can—

my thing is like you guys could mud wrestle for it, whoever wants to take it first.

Easy. Okay, so de, I'll take that one. Eric Ulrich here. Thanks for having us on. It's a pleasure to be able to do this from the Whitefish Security Summit. And, uh, you know, we'll get this going. Specifically in 2018 and '19, and even a little bit in '17, the drones, the integration of drones on the battlespace really kind of started to take effect. All the way down to watching, you know, Al-Shabaab out in the very remote parts of Somalia testing and integrating drones into their awareness, um, and we had to deal with that on the battlefield. And then, you know, AQAP in Yemen, uh, they also were integrating and trying to buy DJI drones and see what they could do with it. Um, as a SEAL, I was watching my Army brothers in Syria deal with a much higher level of a threat than what we were experiencing, but it was all the way down to you know, reports of guys on the wall with a 12-gauge trying to like shoot trap and skeet, right? But they were trying to, trying to do, that was the most rudimentary counter-drone defense that you could think of.

And so that was, that was kind of the reality of what, what I was watching then. And then now you go all the way to the Shaheed drones, which are full motion video. Guided, you know, terminal guidance by, by a remote-controlled operator. Um, and so there's a couple different ways that you have to defeat the drones. You either have to defeat it, defeat the input signal coming in through electronic warfare, usually to cut that, so then the drone is now pilotless. It's either going to loiter and crash, or it's going to return to base. Or you need to fry the circuitry, some sort of directed energy, either a laser or something of that nature. That gets really hard. Lasers are hard because of the power requirements. Seems though Israel has figured that out, um, but it is a massive power requirement. So you're not going to be very portable with a laser for drone defense. And then last but not least, you can either do some sort of, of damage to the drone itself. So either you got to have nets or you got to have another drone, or in the case of some cities, an eagle that flies up and like they're trained to grab those drones and take them out of the sky.

So those are your options. The options aren't easy. And when you start to talk about it on a scope and scale, because now we're talking about counter-drone technology and counter-drone implementation for the Department of Defense. You know, and that, that typically will start with, you know, spec ops are typically the kinds of people that they're putting out there on the very pointy edge. They're usually fairly extended out into, into the battlespace, and they're kind of alone and unafraid. So they're, they're usually like a little island of, of American policy out there. Now they're the ones that need it. The logistics is always hard to reach them. The power requirements for a laser type thing are going to be very hard. So now you start talking about how quickly Can you develop another drone to, to go up and swarm on an incoming drone and do enough damage to it to drop it out of the sky? Is there something that you can take to fry, fry the circuitry in it? Or is there something that you can in place that's got the right spectrum covering the right bits of the spectrum to cut that, that command and control so that it, it will either loiter or return to base?

So it's not an easy problem, and it's only compounded when you talk about the, the levels of bureaucracy within DOD to implement change quickly. So that is why we are lagging behind. That's why in 2017, 2018, you had a man on the wall with a shotgun, and now why you still have Shaheed drones going into air bases, even, even in the Gulf countries. The, the technology has evolved faster on the offensive side than it has on the defensive side. That's as simple as it gets.

Yeah, and just to, just to add to that, kind of more topically, more broadly, especially, you know, Eric gave a good breakdown of the two, really the two main types of defeat being EW or a kinetic defeat. And what you kind of see is as different countries, the US included, start to figure out, you know, how they're going to defend against drones, and there's different types of drones, you know, UAS is a really broad term, and there's reconnaissance drones and tactical drones and kinetic drones. So it's how do you defeat all those things? And just as Eric mentioned, these— the technology is advancing so quickly, you know, you can't— you can't choose a side. You can't go with an all-kinetic option. And kind of what I'm seeing, to Eric's point of the kinetic defeat and the limitations, the bureaucracy, the funding is, you know, those Gulf states have been purchasing US Patriot missiles and other kinetic defense systems really for more traditional surface-to-air uses, not necessarily focused on drones. And you're talking about the time and the money it takes to build, deploy, and use a Patriot missile. You know, you're talking, I think it's $1.5 to $2 million.

Then the limitations on the manufacturing side. I think I heard the total number of Patriot missiles built each year is 600. You know, when you're facing a country that has in the thousands of just Shahed drones, you can see that there's a huge logistical challenge there.

What about GPS jamming, guys? I mean, what's the capability or possibility of using this also from space-based domain?

I mean, GPS jamming, you know, uh, very well could be another one of those— another one of those ways to sever that umbilical, that pilot umbilical to the drone itself. Uh, you know, the risks with doing that are you know, you have now done that from a space base. Like, look at where that cone of, of jamming is coming down to, and now you're starting to talk about large geographic areas. You may or may not want to, you know, to put that in. Um, and as soon as that drone is out of that cone, if it is on a, on a straight line flight, it very well could be picked up by control from another, from another controller pretty easy.

And you were talking about the innovation problem. What's a good way to kind of get around that? Do you think that we could, like, if we were in control of the DOD right now, we could actually say like, hey guys, implement this to speed up acquisition and production and testing and all that to get out to the field. What would kind of be a good way to get about that?

I hate for all of these drone conversations to end in the same cul-de-sac, but I'm going to take us right back into the same cul-de-sac. I would either take you know, a handful of SOF operators and put them in a Ukrainian bunker for 2 to 3 weeks. Or I'd take the smartest people in Ukraine that can come off the front lines and bring them right back to, you know, SOCOM headquarters or something like that and have them sit down for a week. And then I would say, unlimited funds, I need this amount of capacity, how fast can we do it? Um, because what has occurred over the, over the fight of in Ukraine is that the, the relationship between the drone and the operators has changed dramatically. And with the implementation of drones on the battlespace, now all of the other types of raids and things that we have grown accustomed to in the war on terror, and I'm sure you had too, John, It's totally changed. It's completely different now. So the— at times in Ukraine, the operator is doing nothing more to en— than enable the continuation of a flight of a drone.

And that's because, you know, the Russians are good with EW. They're very good with electronic warfare. So you have to— they have had to adapt and adjust the tactics to be able to fly those drones in through the, the layered mesh of EW that the Russians are putting out in order to effectively get the drone to where it needs to, to have the, the effect that they're looking for. You know, the kill, the collection, you know, whatever, whatever, whatever they, they want the drone to do. It's a recce drone or a kill drone or whatever. So the, uh, at times the operator isn't the most critical component in it, the drone is. But in other instances, like the longest sniper shot in the world now, the drone was enabling the operator. So it's, it's, it's this relationship that you gotta come to understand that you're no longer like the center of what this operational act is, and you might just be an enablement as a human in that process. Um, so like, uh, the, the drones, you know, that's how I would do it, John. I would go to where the innovation is occurring the fastest.

I would try to pull the smartest people either out of it or get next to them. And then you, you have to clear the bureaucracy Absolutely. And you have to open up the checkbook. It's that important and you gotta do it. Robert Gates, as the Secretary of Defense, did this during the Gulf War— or sorry, during the second Iraq War. And it was because of the IEDs and the casualties we were seeing in all the Humvees. So he, he just went scorched earth across the board, cut through all the bureaucracy, opened up the checkbook, and that's when you saw the implementation of the MRAPs coming in. And he brought them in a scale to, to—

I mean, that future of war kind of that theme that we're on to, like, um, if we were able to actually do that, innovate, now we're there on the battlefield, what would initiative and like seizing the initiative, being on the offensive, look like with our own use of drones against an adversary like Iran right now, for example?

I think, uh, and this is where I have a more moderate, um, philosophy or approach to a lot of this, um, and, you know, even Eric and I might differ on this in is this concept of everything's changing, everything's different, nothing applies anymore, whether it's military or even just the more broadly the AI discussion that's going on across the world of, it's going to replace everybody versus the counterargument of, is this just going to be another technology that augments human capacity? So I think I fall on the side of the fence that this is going to augment human capacity. Obviously, AI is a technology unlike any that we've ever seen. So it's going to take over and it's already taking over in knowledge work and things like that, some of the more mundane tasks, and we'll see that on the tactical side as well. So going, you know, whether you're talking about offensive employment or your previous question of how do we adapt quickly, I always go, you know, first principles and precedent. What's the precedent now? What are we doing now that's going to work so we don't have to reinvent the wheel? And to your point of innovating and innovating quickly, we have units in the military, specifically in special operations, that have special R&D and special acquisitions policies in place that we can use to do that.

So, you know, again, to Eric's point, yeah, absolutely bring those subject matter experts. Or I would say those guys are really good at testing R&D, identifying what's the right tool for the job and acquiring it quickly and then field testing it. But they need to be in the scenario. They need to face these drone swarm scenarios or, you know, counter-UAS scenarios so that they can develop the TTPs. Once they're exposed to it in training, they're really good at finding a solution and they've got those acquisition channels in place to get there quickly, being technology agnostic, just what's the best tool for the job. So that's kind of where I land on it of, you know, and then when you go to the tactical side, again, what works, what doesn't work? Again, I fall on the side of we have things, we have tactics, TTPs, doctrines that work and we need to use these tools to augment them. And they might look a lot like, what we have traditionally done in infantry, because you have, as I mentioned earlier, different types of drones. You have drones that focus on reconnaissance, you have kinetic drones. So the same as you had reconnaissance units and more kinetic units, light infantry units, now you're just augmenting the capacity and the capabilities of those, of those units.

So it's on them, you know, to Eric's point, get it in the hands of those guys and figure out how a reconnaissance element that's moving forward trying to locate the enemy can augment their capabilities through the use of drones. So falling in on TTPs that we already know work and then figuring out which ones don't work, removing them quickly and adapting.

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I—

and I do agree that underlying principle is How are you getting these tools to augment the human capability? Yeah.

Yeah, I mean, we've seen like the debate coming up now about like, you know, autonomous targeting and stuff like that. You saw like the big kerfuffle between the DOD and Anthropic, right? Where does, does a human hopefully stay in the kill chain, right? Like, it's not just going to be autonomous targeting and stuff like that. And, you know, let's be honest, like, even the human being in the kill chain doesn't exactly mean it's going to be perfect either, right? So where, where do you guys sit on that debate?

So the first time that I ever saw AI, AI completely unleashed and AI targeting in a lethal way was in eastern Libya. And I can't recall if it was 2017 or 2018, but effectively there were some Russian contractors that were on the side of Haftar, and they unleashed a wave of drones that had AI targeting built into them. And as soon as those drones went into, um, uh, into the militia lines, they, they just unmercifully targeted anything that met the criteria. And the article was written from a survivor's perspective. There were a couple guys that got out of it, and, uh, I mean, they just— they, you know, there is no surrender, there is no wounded, there is no, you know, ethical treatment of prisoners on this. It's You know, I mean, you were literally talking like, you know, kind of like Terminator days, Terminator-type killings. And I was amazed that that did not get more attention. It never even was a blip on the radar. Even, you know, even in like the you know, the soft and the military circles, it didn't really register. Um, but so that was the first time it was there.

I was shocked and I was like, okay, well, it— if your adversary is going to do it, do you, do you truly slow down the kill chain by putting a human in the loop? Even if it's for the last, or, or even if, if it's for a 2-second interval before you put it on terminal guidance. There are ways to maximize the use of what AI can do for you, but still have the proper interruption at the proper times. And personally, I don't believe that you're going to lose a competitive advantage with a 2-second delay or a 10-second delay even. I carried out hundreds of strikes. I do not see that as an impediment to the impact that you need to have on the battlefield with capabilities you have to use. So I personally have an ethical problem by taking a human completely out of a kill chain when it— when we start to talk about robotic or drone warfare. The one other instance, uh, of that was basically it was during the Cold War, um, and it was, uh, you know, the Russians had developed a, a, uh, they developed a missile, and if that missile received this, you know, received the launch order, it basically went up and transited across Russia and it was emanating the signals for any remaining missiles that were still intact to launch.

So it was— it's basically like a dead man's missile. So their, their thought was that if Moscow got hit from a nuclear strike from the United States, they still had potentially the ability to counterattack with a dead man missile that was going to automatically launch anything else they had. So I think that's kind of like the first instance of what we're talking about with— by taking humans completely out of the kill chain. I think it started in the Cold War, the idea did. I think we've seen it, um, be enacted here, uh, in, in 2017 in eastern Libya. And then yet again, you know, you now have large amounts of AI-driven targeting for sure. Um, and how far that AI goes into the actual kill chain now, is probably, you know, it's on a classified level. I, I don't have access to it, but, uh, I firmly stand that you have to have a human in the chain on this. I don't know if you see it differently.

Yeah, no, I think it's, you know, it's a nuanced answer to a very nuanced subject. How are you— because there's not a one-size-fits-all in, in combat. So how are you employing this discussion of in the loop, on the loop, out of the loop? How are you If you were to get to a point where we're going to accept out-of-the-loop technologies, how are you going to use it? Are you going to use it offensively in an urban environment? Probably not. Um, are you going to use it in a defensive posture on a defined forward line of operations against a uniformed combatant? That's probably an acceptable, an acceptable use of that. Um, and then, you know, to get into the counter-UAS, how do you counter UAS? Um, you get the discussion of decoys and spoofing. Which is going on right now. You know, Iran will launch a number of, of UAS that are not, uh, armed just to deplete kinetic defenses of Israel and other, you know, other Gulf states. So can a human make that decision to shoot down or to identify which are the decoys and which are actually armed drones? Probably not. That's a good, you know, it's a— and there's no collateral damage in shooting something out of the sky, assuming it's just, you know, it's just a kinetic, kinetic drone.

So great use of out-of-the-loop and AI targeting where the human doesn't have to decipher that when you only have so many seconds. The humans, you know, that defense system programmed can go ahead and identify, work through the math, figure out which are the decoys, which are the spoofs, shoot those, you know, leave those and shoot down the armed drones. So I think with all these things, you have to really specify what you're talking about before we make a decision as a country of, We can never accept out-of-the-loop, uh, you know, programming or targeting because there's, there's absolutely applications for it. But, you know, if we want to be the— continue to be the leader of the world, then, you know, we need to make sure that we have humans and commanders in charge ultimately at the end, you know, that kill chain decision.

What do you say to like, uh, you know, our enemies, right? I don't— I mean, I don't know if you guys have heard, like, is, is this happening in Ukraine right now? Like, is like fully autonomous targeting and execution happening? Like, because, you know, will China have those ethical qualms that we will, which I think we should, right? I think it's, you know, important that we at least discuss it. What do you say to the people that say that our enemies won't have those ethical qualms and that could be an advantage to them?

Yeah, to your first question, it's absolutely happening. It's happening in the Ukraine right now. There's several examples of that drone swarms that, you know, once launched and authorized, there's humans are completely taken themselves out of the loop. But again, that's a, you know, that's a defensive operation against a uniformed enemy combatant. Um, you know, what do you say— what do we, you know, what do we say to our enemy? We always know that we as the United States are going to be restricted, or we're going to have our hands tied in some way, because we want to be the leader of the free world. We want to set the example. Um, we also understand that as the leader of the free world and as the, the, the world's, you know, military superpower— only superpower, I would argue, at this point, as the last couple years have demonstrated in the Ukraine and now in Iran. Other countries don't want to fight us, nor can they militarily, but they win on the public affairs and the public opinion side. So regardless of what our enemy is going to do, and what we're seeing in Iran is, you know, in, in the case of decoys and spoofing, perhaps confusing an AI or a targeter to strike a school.

You know, whether that was the case or not, that's certainly a tactic that could be employed by an adversary who knows we can't win militarily, so we need to make this as messy as possible and sway public opinion in favor of our enemy. So I don't think it's any change to, um, to what we've been subjected to for the last 15 or 20 years in Iraq and Afghanistan. Uh, we know that our enemy's going to fight without limitations. We need to continue to adapt and evolve and employ these new technologies, uh, in a just way.

I'm curious more on the technology too. You're talking about— if we get a little more specific on like what's the brain of one of these devices look like, especially when we're talking about like reconnaissance versus attack, and like how does that change and differentiate based on the platform or the objective?

I mean, So the very first start point for any drone, for anybody that really develops them and knows what they're doing, they start with what the payload is. Is it a lethal payload? Is it a collection payload? What's the payload? Then you build the drone around that. So that is, that's in, in the way the drone started, they actually, it all started out 180 from that. It started with a drone and then what, what can we attach to it? And, and, and then you kind of bumbled along for a while. But the true people that are developing these things correctly, they start with payload. So whatever the payload is, whether it's a, uh, you know, a spectrometer, a camera, a cell net, uh, a cell network device, collection device, uh, or a mortar RPG round, you know, for, for more of a lethal drone, then on the drone around it really it just comes down to 7 critical parts, and all those parts are all the same. It's just in different dimensions or different, different aspects to get what you want. Um, you know, it's the, it's the frame, motors, the electronic, you know, speed control, flight controls, sensors, power, and then really the communication.

So there's 7 critical components, and then there's an 8th one if you just add the payload to it. So, um, it, it, you know, when you're talking about the brain, it just comes down to the, to that motherboard and how the comms, the speedometer, and everything is coming into that motherboard. It's, you know, it's, it's not rocket science. Um, and, uh, you know, there isn't a big differentiation between a terminal drone or a recce drone. It's really just the payload.

And actually, you mentioned the direct-to-cell, which kind of piqued my interest because with the Iran war right now, they've got their internet down. It's like 99% without internet in the a huge communication problem for domestic communication, trying to get out in the streets, communicate, coordinate, get out and protest and whatnot. And I'm thinking about, you know, I, in my mind, I was thinking about a low Earth orbit satellite mesh network solution to try to give them a direct-to-cell capability. And I'm curious what your thoughts on the feasibility of, you know, without the issue of money or resources, if we could turn those things up, what would be the feasibility of actually using drones to help with that kind of mesh network to actually get the people to communicate with each other so they can get out and take over in the streets?

Absolutely.

I mean, you know, like when you— if I, if I, if I rewind a little bit in the discussion, you just go back to the EW that Russia is putting on the front lines of Ukraine. There are portions of that flight where it's guided by Starlink, which is a low orbit satellite system, right? Low orbit internet satellite system. And then there's portions of that flight where it goes all the way to either a line of sight or even almost like, uh, the old school antenna, like an HF repeater. Yeah, HF repeaters, right? And so it's different phases of the flight. They have to have different communications that they're controlling the drones with. And, and that's where I'm talking about the relationship between the operator and the drone. There are portions of that flight where the drone is good, and then you got a forward staging operator, and the operator is actually acting as a repeater with the capability to continue the drone to get it to target. And, um, so yeah, I mean, whether you do that with low orbit satellites from, you know, from SpaceX, or whether you do that by drones that are within, you know, or Gotana type capabilities that are literally padding the C2 of that drone, yeah, it— that's all very doable.

It just comes down to funds and how you're going to deploy it, power it, and then employ it and use it.

Yeah, we were talking a couple of weeks ago about the Kurds in western Iran coming, perhaps doing some kind of a conventional warfare activity, you know, getting training perhaps to go over across the border. And to me, that sounds like a pretty good layer to add in there as if they do in fact move in to have that overhead to be able to communicate and also use it as, you know, a weapon platform, but also reconnaissance and communication too at the same time. It's like a very robust capability to have this layered activity with drones overhead.

Yeah. And, and, you know, and then, but to Scott's point on it needs to be a tool that enables human capabilities, um, the, the blend of the drones has got to be different in each instance as well. I mean, there, there are plenty of drone companies out there that are making an umbilical drone. So it's, you know, it's attached to an umbilical. It's coming from the ground. It's going up. The payloads on those things can be, you know, whatever you can have it be as a comms hub. You can have it be as a camera hub. You could have it act as a cell phone tower. Um, and you're feeding it power up the cable anyway. So now you've extended the flight time and all that, and it can maintain station. So if you put that on the back of a four-wheeler, you put it on the back of a side-by-side, you put it on the back of things. You, it can roll the battlespace with you, providing that on an umbilical that can't— EW isn't going to jam your ability to control your drone and do whatever you're, you're wanting to do there. But then, or that can— thing could also be kind of like considered like your, your C2 node, while you then have these other disparate drones that are going out and doing it.

But all of this, all of this, you know, this is exactly Scott's point. You got to get these kinds of things in the hands of the people that are the most innovative, that have the right authorities already in place, that have the right budgeting to match it, to just get after it. And, you know, one of the things that really opened my eyes about the reality of what's going on in Ukraine was listening to how they would mass assault force to have an effect on a target for a very short period of time. Recky drone goes out, it's gathering the information, it's pumping that information into basically, you know, an ATAC, so everybody is getting at the same time. But now what used to be a, you know, a 40-man infantry platoon or a 40-man assault element, they're not, they're not patrolling in 40 people. They're coming from all points of the compass. They're riding battery-powered motorbikes, singles. And if one or two of them get hit by Russian drones, the majority of the time it's, it's actually hitting the motorbike. Next guy just comes by and picks up the guy that, that needs a lift.

And they are massing from all points of the compass to have the effect that they need to, and then they're dispersing again. And, and, you know, just if you think about that for a minute, there go the days like you're only massing the combat power that you need for a very short period of time and you're getting them there in a very innovative way. You're not putting them in a Bradley, you're not putting them in a CH-47 within 5 kilometers of the target. You're not doing the things that we learned and we were able to do successfully because the battle space has changed.

And actually, I was thinking about something a little topical. You know, the pilots just went down today in Iran and thinking about, you know, the way we used to do personal recovery did not include drones. And now I'm sure it does. I'm curious, you know, like in a future situation with a little bit more time to actually integrate, what is kind of the best way to use these platforms, especially looking at where the pilot went down? It's like 300 kilometers from friendly lines, so you've got line of sight problems. There's obviously terrain issues and enemy issues. You know, what's kind of the way forward if you, if you could crystal ball it?

Crystal balling anything in this space right now is a challenge.

That's why it's fun, you know.

So it's like, you don't want to use the term crystal ball, it's more like magic wand. You know, if you could magic wand anything right now, Obviously, anything that you can use autonomously gives you a competitive advantage against the enemy and preservation of force. That's a big magic wand to create a UAS system that, you know, has a payload of 200 to 250 pounds. Like I said, that's a big ask. So I think kind of just being more judicious with where the technology is headed, current capabilities and limitations, I think that absolutely You've got the recce drones. I don't think today, fortunately for those pilots and everybody that was involved in the search and rescue, that the surface-to-air missile was a threat. But if you still did have a surface-to-air threat, drones to confuse, destroy, overwhelm those systems to allow something with a larger, more traditional means, rotary wing with a larger payload to go in, locate and extract those pilots. I think that's That's more of a crystal ball versus the magic wand, you know, if I could wave it and have a capability tomorrow.

Yeah.

Yeah.

I wonder too if it could be used for authentication or something with like signature measurement or something like that as well to kind of figure out like, is this the guy? Is he where he's supposed to be? When was the last time he was there? That kind of stuff as well.

Yeah, absolutely.

Do you think it's Do you think it's quicker to implement the drones, larger style drones, or do you think it's quicker to implement a flight control system that is driven off AI to basically remote pilot in a Little Bird, you know, or something that's already in the assets? Yeah.

You talking as like use it like a flight lead? Yeah.

I'm just, you know, so instead of putting two pilots at risk to go get a pilot, you're, you're putting something with an autopilot in it.

Yeah.

It's using the same asset to close the distance. I mean, if it gets smoked, well, you didn't, you don't have two more people on the ground or two dudes dead. Yeah.

Yeah. I was just thinking my first thought when you said that, um, was more of the discussion of drone enabling the operator, operator enabling the drone. You know, now we have flight leads that spend a lot of time to do all that planning and lead a rotary wing force in. I was thinking a drone leads the force in now. You know, not just necessarily for navigation because pilots obviously do that really well, but defeating threats and, you know, identifying the individual you're trying to pick up, all the location and everything like that.

Yeah.

Junior, it's almost like a remote JTAC.

Yeah. I was going to say, trying to crystal ball this space right now is just, it's advancing so quickly. Countermeasures are advancing so quickly, new technologies every day, countering technologies. So it's, yeah, it's a, that's, it's a challenge.

Junior man, walk out, you're all fired.

Yeah.

You know, that's what you're doing.

Yeah.

Here's your, you know, here's your L-shaped flashlight and your pistol going and going to find it. That's, you know, that's how, again, it comes down to, you know, to basics.

What works?

What do we know works? And that's how we're seeing the employment of these things, even how we used canines during the Global War on Terror, you know, to get something mobile in front of the assault force. Okay, well, what if we can get something, and that's not a human, what if we can get something that's not even a living organism that's easily replaced or more easily replaced than a canine? So that's kind of where my brain goes every time I, you know, somebody asks me a question on tactics or employment or how do we incorporate this into the assault force. It's like, okay, well, what are we doing now? How can we augment it? And what tasks can we replace, just like we're doing in the corporate world? What tasks can we replace to free the, the, the guy on the ground up to do more important work or to keep them safer at a higher— preservation of force?

You know, it goes beyond— like, we're definitely focused kind of on that, on that last, like, kind of kinetic, but, you know, the last 10 yards, the kinetic piece. But if you rewind that a little bit, you know, these UGVs, the unmanned, you know, ground vehicles. Look, there's multiple articles, there's multiple instances here where they've got an M2, so a.50 cal Browning machine gun, you know, belt-fed, mounted up, plenty ammo. And it is in this sector, it is holding up enough pace of a fire every now and then and sporadically from different locations. This denying the Russians the ability to advance. It comes offline for a 2-hour stint, gets maintenance, reloaded, it's right back up there crawling around doing it. I mean, there's multiple Zs. The ability to resupply your force— if you do have folks that are out there really far forward, and maybe they're the ones that are enabling those drones in that last, you know, that comms lily pad that we've been talking about— the ability to resupply those people without getting you know, a Hilux shot or destroyed. It's a small UGV with a box of bullets, Band-Aids, beans, and they put lots of them out there, and they're just slowly moving through the landscape, and they just know that they have a GPS coordinate to show up at.

I mean, you know, it's— yeah, it just, you know, it, it kind of goes on and on.

We talked a lot about like the air component and now we're talking about UGVs. What about the subsurface underwater capabilities? Are those developing kind of on par or is that sort of an afterthought as far as the drone, the air drone thing that really grabs headlines?

Well, I think that the, uh, the, the air piece is definitely more publicized, but the, the, whether it's surface or subsurface is absolutely, is, is it keeping pace or is it slightly behind? Personally, I think it's slightly behind, but it's absolutely not forgotten. I mean, the Russian fleet had to come out of the Black Sea. I mean, you think that that wasn't because of persistent maritime drone swarms, you know, and it's everything from jet skis to now really revolutionized, you know, fully submersible or semi-submersible drones that are— then they are, they are going off AI targeting and video feeds to come in and swarm and hit those, hit those, uh, those ships. Repeatedly. So no, I think that the maritime aspect is, is just as important. I just think it, it just isn't quite as much of a headline grabber, but it's, it's absolutely.

Yeah.

Especially with the counter mine stuff that we're talking about, like the US got rid of its 4 minesweepers. We got the littoral combat vessels that are not supposed to be used for that, that are metallic. Japan has these wooden boats that they actually use for minesweeping.

And these all have people in them.

And what you were just talking about, you know, removing the person back a little bit past that line of COVID and concealment so that the thing in front of them can actually action it. I mean, this sounds like a good place also for this unmanned capability.

Yeah.

That seems like a really simple solution. You know, doing it the way we're doing it now reminds me of the sappers and, you know, Iraq driving roads to locate IEDs by making them explode.

Driving as fast as possible.

Yeah.

Yeah.

Yeah. Yeah. Versus, yeah, and adding some armor to it and hoping for the best. So, you know, that's just, it's a great, great opportunity for employment for preservation of the force, especially in a denied space.

So generally though, like the trend is take the human out. I mean, you know, the M1A1 Abrams tank. Is so much more effective without people in it. People is actually a limiting factor of that tank, and the tank is designed to, to preserve the people inside of it. If you could, you could take half of that armor off and make it twice as fast and a lot more lethal if you, if you didn't have to have the armor protect people. Same thing with, with airplanes. I mean, you know, the F-18 can outpull the pilot. That's what— there's, there's more or less a governor cap in the F-18 because you can pull— that, that plane will do, or that jet will do more G's than the pilot can withstand, right? So if you take that out, now you're increasing the capabilities of your assets. But then that puts us right back into the, well, okay, at what points are you again going to inject the human control so that you can, you can, you can ethically say that you are still within the laws of armed conflict? And you do have the ability to take prisoners.

You do have the ability to attend a wounded that are on the battlefield. You do have the ability to do those things that fall within laws of armed conflict.

So, uh, moving more towards, uh, the naval capacity, I wrote in like the outline, um, about aircraft carriers, and I wish we had Andy Milburn on here today. He's in, he's in Riyadh and he's jet-lagged, so he couldn't make it because he's a fervent, uh, He's fervently opposed to aircraft carriers. And we do see it, what's happening in the Gulf right now. Like, our aircraft carrier had to back up about 300 miles from where it was because we're worried about ballistic missiles and probably Shahids. Are aircraft carriers worth the $13+ billion price tag that they're on? When will they even be effective in a fight versus China?

Okay, so I would love, and I'll give Andy a call. I've got his number.

Okay.

And I thought about your, when you inject that in the outline, I thought about it a lot, de. So I appreciate you bringing it up. I absolutely loved and continue to love a sovereign piece of the United States that I can put within 12 miles of any coastline I want on Earth and, and stage and do whatever I want off of it. You cannot replicate that. Now, in certain instances, due to a ballistic missile or a drone threat, you either are going to develop a better countermeasure, which puts the onus on our intelligence community to go out and, and, you know, surreptitiously get the components that are going into that final seeker head so that you can develop the right countermeasure for it so that it is ineffective, or you, you got to back it off. Just, just like what happened here, you know, with, with our, with our aircraft carrier coming out 300 miles. Fine, 300 miles. You can still, you can still push in at times for critical things and take that sovereign piece of U.S. territory to then have and, and do you know, combat capability support or launch operations to do it.

So, uh, does it have to be an aircraft carrier? No, I am not fully wedded to an aircraft carrier. It could be something cheaper. It could, but at the end of the day, it's got to be something that has the capabilities to launch, you know, aircraft or munitions, launch boats, launch amphibious vehicles, and have the ability to project power. That is, is a floating island of U.S. Power that you can project from. I don't want to give it up.

Yeah, I mean, I mean, I would love to have Andy here, but I mean, just from it, from what I've gathered, from what he said in the past, and I kind of believe it too, it kind of seems like a big target. And like, even, you know, Iran's not even technologically advanced, right? And we're having an issue. I mean, we haven't been hit, thank God, but somebody against China who's like, their whole doctrine is basically, you know, a big part of it is trying to sink aircraft carrier, American aircraft carriers. How do they survive? Like, how many SM-3 missiles can you like stick on there? It's like, see, or stick on destroyers around it to, to fight off a drone swarm or ballistic missiles, anti-ship missiles.

I think it just ties back to the, that, you know, the same discussion of innovating and iterating and finding the right solution. Um, you know, again, I'm not on the doom and gloom party that AI is going to replace everybody and these technologies are going to replace everybody. We're going to get to the countermeasure solution to protect those aircraft carriers. And as, you know, as we discussed previously, we might be able to extend the range of the platforms that operate out of, off of those carriers because they're no longer manned. Some of them or all of them are no longer manned, so they don't have to be within you know, firing distance of some of those projectiles. But, you know, full faith that countermeasures will get there at the same time that unmanned platforms will start to take over and, and increase the lethality range with, well, you know, maintaining preservation of the force.

Yeah, it's, um, it's gonna evolve. It has to, you know. I mean, they, they used to call the, uh, the frigate Um, I don't, I don't want to use foul language here on your podcast.

You can go ahead. Yeah, go ahead.

But, but, um, they called it the douche. It emanated all the signals of the aircraft carrier and the aircraft carrier was silent. Still, you know, do flight ops and all that stuff, but it can do it comms, comms, comms dark. And that was, that became the electronic aircraft carrier. So anything that was inbound that didn't have FMV to it would be going into, into that, right? There are ways to put like sacrificial lambs out there to do things to confuse the battlespace enough so they can still work and still have the ability to project power. And, and like I'm saying, I'm not wedded to that $13 billion price tag for, you know, a 5,000-person manned aircraft carrier, but I am wedded to the ability to have something that is a U.S. sovereign piece of territory that you can jam anywhere you want to it and start to project power. You can't replace that.

Yeah, it's going to be interesting. I mean, I hope there's, you know, nerds in a room somewhere figuring out ways to do this. Like, seriously, I mean, because we've seen what's gone on with the Iran operation. Like, it seems like we're really behind and it's unfortunate, right? Because we've had over 4 years of to see what's been going on in Ukraine and stuff and see like the innovations they've made. And it's kind of a bummer, like, we haven't made those same innovations because we know what's coming, right? Or at least have that arrow in your quill or whatever, right? Like, be able to protect, you know, have some force protection.

So can I rewind a little bit?

Um, please.

We were, we were, we were dancing a little bit on the, our inability to effectively do mine countermeasure operations. And that is due to a systemic problem that we have had now for over a decade, and we've lived through it and it's still currently happening, but it's called continuing resolution. And what happens as the— is our, is our nation has become more polarized with politics and the left and the right continue to kind of grow further and further apart. Is that with different priorities and, and, you know, dying on that sword or willing to fall on that sword and not approve an annual budget and only do it in short segments. What it is, what happens is systemically the long program items that you have in your defense capability your ability to produce ships, your ability to produce submarines, your ability to produce strategic bombers, your ability to crank out strategic munitions— that goes away because you don't have a steady funding stream. Instead, you have continuing resolution, little, little bits that go here, here, here, and here, but it undermines the long-term programmatics of your defense capabilities. And so now the mine counter— or the MCMs have gone away, the, the US does.

And so effectively, yeah, you need a wooden-hulled non-magnetic ship to be able to go in there with right search surface, subsurface, bottom, and do the searches to be able to, to basically mine countermeasure operations. And we don't have it. It's out of our— it's out, it's out of our quiver. And that is a an absolute secondary impact because of our inability to pass annual defense budgets, which is driven by our political polarity. And we've had it for too many years, and this is the first instance where we're really seeing it on a strategic level and it's playing out. But this is, this is, this is, this is a systemic problem, is the polarization of politics. Unfortunately, I'm apolitical. Sometimes I vote left, sometimes I vote right, depending on what I see as the most important issue at the time. I'm not registered in either party, but that's the reality of how the political polarization is playing out in our defense readiness.

And Dee, you know, to your wish, I can tell you those nerds do exist, but better than that, because I'm not one of those guys, you know, those are the guys I call to ask questions. Those are the guys that used to program my radio because I was incapable. And now they're working on these much more complex problems. So I'm reaching out to them constantly trying to, you know, what is, what's new in the space? What's new? What's— because the space is becoming crowded quickly because there's a need and there's capital available. So how do I separate the wheat from the chaff? You know, what are the, what are the good technologies and what shouldn't I spend my time on evaluating so we can incorporate into our training? But better than that is the problem solvers, the, you know, the guys that are going to actually employ it, who have now moved on from active duty, are also entering the space. So I have a lot of friends that have moved on to, to UAS companies. You know, it would have been unheard of 10 years ago, the guys that were just doing con— not just doing contracting, but doing contracting and working in the defense space, you know, selling uniforms and body armor and things like that.

Are now all gravitating towards UAS and counter-UAS for the same reasons. So the problem is being solved by a lot of folks. That's why I'm so confident that we'll get to the right solutions. You know, and since Olli popped the lid on politics, I wasn't going to go there, certainly not on your podcast. But, you know, it's like, how did we win World War II? We mobilized as a country and built a manufacturing base that our enemies couldn't keep up with. And we're in a similar situation right now, but it's technology, you know, so how are we going to innovate with these new capabilities, these new technologies, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, things like that? How do we innovate and iterate and employ faster than our enemies? And that, you know, goes to the broader discussion of within the States, you're seeing to this, you know, political division Some states are really wanting to regulate AI at a state level and other states are opting to let the technology just kind of, you know, let the market decide where this technology goes. And I think until the federal government, they've started to step in most recently and do what they can as far as executive orders to just kind of let the technology develop, give it some guardrails, some obvious guardrails for safety of citizens and things like that, but just let the Let the market decide where this goes.

Tie our hands behind our back while our enemies, as we discussed earlier, are doing none of that. In fact, a lot of these technologies are state-sponsored in the case of China. So not only are they free to iterate, you know, they're iterating freely, but they're being backed by their federal government. Just some of the things that we need to resolve as a country and kind of come together and solve this regulatory issue. We can't have 50 states each regulating AI and autonomy differently. How are we going to power these engines? Get on board on those big problems and kind of understand that we are at critical mass right now with this new technology and its capability to be used against us. And we need to be innovating as fast as we can. We're so competitive right now. We've been ahead of our peers because we've got a culture of innovation and incredible entrepreneurs, incredible founders. And we need to support them and not hamstring them through regulation or billionaire wealth taxes, things like that that force them to, that make it harder to create these small startups and or move offshore.

Yeah. I mean, it's going to be an interesting next few, you know, 5 years to a decade. Listen, I hope AI, you know, cures cancer. You know what I mean? It's like, it's a killer pitch, right? Like, it's a killer pitch for raising seed funding.

It already killed or cured cancer in a dog in Australia. Wasn't that cancer that the guy—

I don't know, but I thought it was—

way through, diagnosed his dog, came up with a solution. And yeah, that's, that's real. I don't know if it was cancer, but he definitely saved his dog.

So yeah, listen, I hope it makes the world a better place and doesn't like, you know, enslave us all. Or if it does enslave us all and gets us all out of jobs, like at least like, you know, some universal basic income or something, right? Like so the human race can actually like survive while we're not— well, we don't do anything.

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

Just like— yeah, like The Matrix. Yeah. Guys, what, um, what are you guys up to? Let's talk a little bit about Lobo and, uh, what you guys doing. Also, Eric, I'd love to talk about End Child Soldiering too, uh, that great nonprofit or charity that you guys run? Yeah.

Yeah. So Lobo, you know, we advise, consult, and teach. We act. And really, as it relates to, you know, kind of the future of warfare on that teaching aspect of it, we have absolutely pressed since we started Lobo in 2019 to develop facilities and a mindset of pushing the envelope. And we are, we have, you know, we've got a great urban range or sorry, rural range down in South Central Montana. It's about 70,000 acres in total that ties in all sorts of public land and we have all the relationships in place. But you know, we have everything you need to, to, to kind of challenge and run realistic training for the tactics that we know right now. And what we did was in 2020, we pressed to make sure that we had the, also the right FAA permitting to do all of the, uh, unmanned drone integration as well. I saw how important that was. I knew it was going to be the next evolutionary step. Kind of warfare. So our ranch manager, great guy named Bill Wood, he did that. So we have the air ground speed waiver, the nighttime waiver, and then there's one that's kind of the holy grail.

It's really hard to get and it's a beyond line of sight waiver. And so it's a very unrestricted airspace, South Central Montana. It's very remote. So we have the ability to train and run all of these, this drone integration. Into either mobility training or ground training or a combination thereof. So we've been doing a lot of winter mobility training over the last couple of years. We're now evolving that into, you know, the summer, spring, summer, and fall. But that ability to, to, to walk, to help these units break this evolutionary step and not just get in, in, in one thing that's going to get them killed. But let— allow them to have the right, uh, air assets, drone assets, and the right range facilities to do things like come in from all points of the compass on motorbikes or, or razors or things like that and run these style of FMPs and let them work out the TTPs that work for them. But we're ready to help, and then we have everything in line, and we're in discussion with, you know, a multiple multiple numbers of units to come out and do that, whether that's federal or DOD, doesn't matter to us.

So that's kind of the main focus that we have right now on Lobo is, is really just making sure that we're a part of the dialog for these guys to come out and we have the right ways to facilitate them to help find what the new tactics, techniques, and procedures will be for them to take that next step.

Yeah.

In addition to, uh, you know, we, you know, this is the first annual Whitefish Security Summit that we have going on. And, you know, that's basically, you know, kind of soft meets intel meets influence. But it's a very interesting blend of discussions across the spectrum. I've learned a lot over the last two days just by being a fly on the wall with the resident experts that decided to come be a part of this security summit. Learned a lot and it's, it's a very, it's a destination place. Obviously you can see behind us, it's, you know, it's scenic Montana. It's a nice place to be. But then when you combine it with really high octane discussions, it's, it's, it's a great event. We're going to keep it going every year.

Yeah, I'm excited about it. I'm definitely excited for like us to come out there and like, you know, set up a ton of interviews and stuff like that, be a part of it too. So like, if anybody wants to check it out, the link is in the description for the Whitefish Security Summit. They had General Stanley McChrystal this year as like the keynote. You know, it's pretty big wig, you know, it's a big wig. Scott, what are you up to? You working with Lobo? Are you doing anything else? Like, you tell me about yourself. Also, Scott, I have a question for you too. I'm going to ask you publicly. We had John Hackey, he had to jump out real quick because he had another thing. He had a BBC interview or something he had to jump to. We've had John on the show on TeamHouse. We've had Eric on the show. We've had Mick on the show. When's Scott Canino coming on the TeamHouse to talk about his career?

I'm happy. You come to Montana, sign up for one of our training events, and we can go at length on my career and everything I learned. Now, yeah, I would love to have you guys up for the Whitepear Security Summit or any other event. I think you guys would really benefit. There's just, as Eric had mentioned, there's a lot of folks that would be happy to sit down with you, you could do a really a best of show. I was fortunate enough a couple of years ago, Eric and Mick brought me on to kind of head up Lobo Tactical. And the vision there is they were already running it was let's, you know, let's fill the holes that a lot of other training companies aren't doing. Winter warfare is easy in Montana based on setting. But better than that, we have guys on staff, Eric, a lot of our mountain guides. That have done this real world. So we take, uh, it's complimentary. We take the best of the tactical world, we take the best of the civilian recreational world, we marry those two up. So those are the instructors that are in front of students, and you get the best lessons learned both from a recreational side, how to do, conduct things safely, tactical side, you know, how do you keep yourself alive, uh, and, and remain deadly.

So heading up Lobo Tactical, and really again, we're just trying to find those training opportunities where we believe based off of our backgrounds and our network that are out there developing technologies like UAS and counter-UAS, get those in front of the guys. And then really the entire training philosophy is we're not just going to dictate how you do business. It's come in and it's let's focus on the why. What are you guys trying to do? And let's work with you to understand what, how you develop these TTPs. Because again, you know, we're generally not training traditional small unit tactics. We're employing these technologies, what we're doing in a winter environment. Every unit has a different requirement, a different mission. So we just want to have the conversation with you, help you develop these tactics and TTPs, but most importantly, understand the why. Because eventually you're going to leave us, you're going to go do this real world. The environment, the battleground is going to change, and you still need to get to the best end state, the best solution. And you may not have us, you know, next to you to do it. So I want to facilitate the discussion so everybody knows how to communicate, how to be tough on one another, and how to solve problems.

Yeah, sounds like I'm in. You know, if I was a cop or, or a DOD guy, you know, it does sound like super interesting. And I want everyone to go check it out. Those links for everything are in the description down below. Uh, Eric, talk to me about child soldiering again one more time, because that's—

yeah, and child soldiering is, uh, You know, I mean, that came about after— I mean, Nick and I really, through the eyes of two former child soldiers that had been involved heavily with the Lord's Resistance Army in northern Uganda. So that was, you know, Darfur. And there was this army that was made almost entirely of children, 20-plus, 20-plus thousand kids that had been weaponized. And they were, they were, you know, extraordinarily lethal guerrilla fighters, but through the eyes of two child soldiers that came out of the bush and then had started to help the Uganda government, you know, in ways that— of not killing kids, but, but bringing— drawing kids out of the bush to reintegrate them into society. We saw how dark and how cancerous the art of child soldiering is. And so we decided to do something about it. We made a documentary. That documentary then has led to a book, All the Glimmering Stars. It's for sale on Amazon. And part of the proceeds of the book go towards a 501(c)(3) we stood up, which is called End Child Soldiering. And End Child Soldiering, we are, we have, we're centering, what we're looking to do is we're looking to stand up basically a center of excellence.

in Uganda. And what it'll do is there's no place on the planet that is, is, you know, it's a place for the trainers to come and get trained. If you train the trainers, right? I mean, it's, it's, it's a military moniker that we, we adapt during the GWAT, like, hey, train the trainer, they go back, it's an exponential return. So there's, there's no, nobody really doing that in the child soldiering realm. Um, and unfortunately, the child soldiering realm is growing. Uh, even just the other day, Iran just lowered the age of, uh, for military mandatory military service at 12. Um, every single year, uh, our allies are, are given a pass on the funding of the use of child soldiers. I personally watched when, uh, desperate parents in Somalia had no more to pay their taxes to al-Shabaab. They had no more camels, they had no more money, they had no more, more crop to give to al-Shabaab. So they gave them kids. Crazy. Al-Shabaab was taking the kids and turning them into an army, right? So yes, it's growing and it's growing across the planet. It isn't just something that happens in Somalia. It's, you know, it's, it's, it's across, it's growing.

It's, you know, all the way down through like Central and South America, the Philippines, Colombia. It's alive and well. So we are, we are acting. I mean, through End Child Soldiering, we're looking to stand up this center of excellence in Uganda that will be the first train the trainer because that is the place we know has done the complete cycle. And there are a number of retired re— recovered child soldiers there that can walk the whole process through effectively to other people that come there, for them to then go back and, and start to do that where, where they live, where they, where they have child soldier problems.

Uh, the website, if I remember correctly, is endchildsoldiering.org.

It is, it's a.org.

Yep, that link is in the description. If anybody can donate a little bit of money to it. It's a righteous cause for sure. You know, it's, you know, insane to really think about and like, look at and see what's going on in the world with kids, like, right? Like, kids aren't supposed to be fighting in wars. Guys, incredible show. Scott, you'll think about it, right? The team house?

Oh, yeah, you can get it. I'll think about it.

Yeah, because I'm relatively relentless too, you know what I mean?

Yeah, de is like a pit bull.

I'm trying to get the whole Lobo, you know, Holobo, you know, the About Us page. I want to get all everybody.

Oh, yeah. Yeah.

Because there's some incredible people on that.

I was going to say, if you add the advisors, that'll take you a while. There's a lot of them.

Yeah, I know. That's the thing. I've been chasing Andy Hartzog for like a year, 2 years.

Oh, yeah. Yeah.

Yeah.

Mom's the word out of Andy. It's been tough, but I will not relent. Not either on you, Scott.

He's at a Whitefish security summit. He should just come on up.

Yeah, no, but I like getting one-on-one because you guys can get a little bit more in depth, you know. Come on, we don't want to— we don't want to like a quick 30 minutes. We want to, you know, you guys had insane careers. You should, you know, a lot of time should be allotted for it, I think.

Yeah, no worries.

Cool.

Got to think about it. Okay, I'll write that down. I'll check in again with you in like a couple months. Don't worry, guys. A pleasure. Really appreciate this.

Thanks, D. Appreciate everything you're doing, man. Have a good one.

See you next time.

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