Transcript of Alex Imas and Phil Trammell – What remains scarce after AGI?

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Episode summary

The episode features economists Alex Imas and Phil Trammell discussing what economics suggests about wages, labor share and scarcity in a world of advanced AI. They examine which goods and services might stay scarce when machines do most production, including human-delivered services, and why past forecasts about automation have often failed.

The conversation also covers whether a messy middle of layoffs without enough wealth creation is plausible, how wealth could be taxed and redistributed through options such as universal basic capital, and what developing countries outside the AI supply chain might do. Listeners will hear the guests argue that indexing to AI returns may matter more than retraining workers.

In this episode Dwarkesh Patel, Alex Imas, Phil Trammell

The transcript of this episode on scarcity after AGI was made with the technology behind HappyScribe's notes for Microsoft Teams meetings.

Dwarkesh Patel00:00:00

Today I'm chatting with Alex Imas, who is Director of AGI Economics at Google DeepMind and Professor of Economics at University of Chicago, and Phil Trammell, who is Head of Economics at Epoch and Research Scholar at Stanford. In general, in this interview, what I want to understand is what economics tells us about what we can expect in a world with more and more automation, more and more advanced AI, what that tells us about what will happen to wages, to labor share, what the best way to tax and redistribute the wealth that we've generated as a result of AGI will be, and what kinds of things will be scarce, because what is scarce kind of tells you where the value will accrue.

So I want to start there: what are some plausible candidates of what will be scarce?

Speaker 200:00:44

Something like the relational sector, which is what I defined as, you know, basically services and goods, where the fact that the human was in the loop was actually part of the value of that product. So because humans are naturally scarce, if we have automation where a lot of other things stop being scarce, we will still have scarcity in things that humans are kind of involved in and in the loop for.

Dwarkesh Patel00:01:05

Hmm. I'm curious to understand whether humans doing services for other humans can ever be a big part of the economy. And here's maybe one intuition prompt. So in a world where AI can physically do anything humans can do, you know, there's this whole machine economy where they're like building factories and doing research and coming up with new ideas, and humans may or may not be involved in the physical production of those things, but probably not, given that in the ultimate limit, if robotics is solved, if you don't care about humans being involved in that process, why would humans be involved in that process?

But then there's these other things, which you point out, where we actually, maybe in some cases, do want the ballerina or the barista or whatever to be a human that's part of the value of going to a café or a performance. But only humans have that preference. So there's this human economy where, like, humans are doing services for each other, and part of their wealth is flowing to other humans, but part of their wealth is also, like, they will want some of the automated goods that, like, machine-only economy is creating. And so part of that wealth is flowing out. And so if you just think of this as, like, this is not a closed loop, but a lot of things in the machine-only economy are a closed loop, because the machines don't care about, like, getting the human barista to make them a coffee.

And so within that model, isn't it intrinsic that, like, the human-only economy will become a smaller and smaller share?

Speaker 200:02:24

I would like to pitch kind of a rephrasing of that question.

Dwarkesh Patel00:02:27

Sure.

Speaker 200:02:27

So I think my view is that kind of forecasts that economists like us would make are not necessarily as individual forecasts, like me and Phil are talking right now, are not necessarily very useful. The reason I think that's so there was this blog post by Andrey Fredkin, Brian DeBerian, and Andrew Koh that came out yesterday, actually, that looked at, like, kind of people's forecasts, economists' forecasts about the labor market. And what they found is that there's a ton of disagreement, like, in every single direction. So what they advocate for, and I think I'm in agreement here, is rather than thinking about individual forecasts, like what me and Phil are going to do, rather than looking at kind of, like, basically generating prediction markets where you get aggregate forecasts, where you get, like, kind of wisdom of the crowd effects.

And kind of the reason that I think this is because we have been famously terrible at forecasting. And so let's take let's go all the way back to 1820. This sort of debate that we've been having actually is, like, 200 years old. So David Ricardo is one of the classic economists, not neoclassical, classical economists. And he, when the Industrial Revolution started happening, he wrote a bunch of stuff saying, like, look, this is going to be great for everybody. Prices are going to come down. But then he turned around and he's like, wait, I can actually see all of these jobs that are creating value.

They're going to be automated by these machines. This is going to be really bad. Everybody's going to become unemployed, and there's going to be political unrest and things like that. And if you look at Ricardo's predictions, they're actually right. If you look at all those jobs that made money in Ricardo's time, they got automated. So if I was David Ricardo and I woke up and somebody told me all those jobs did get automated, and you asked me, David Ricardo, like, what do you think the prime age employment rate is in 2026?

I think he would be surprised if you told him it was the highest it's ever been other than 2000. We have the highest number of employed people that could potentially be employed. Since 2000, that was, like, the peak, and now it's, like, the second peak, basically. So what David Ricardo ended up missing is the fact that, you know, essentially you have these economics of structural change where basically everything that got automated became cheap, people had more money to spend on things, and then they started spending money on services.

Speaker 200:04:43

And, you know, this is kind of like the lump of labor fallacy. That's what they call it. David Ricardo didn't think, hey, I should have, you know, considered the fact that new jobs would be created. But it's kind of not obvious that, like, money would go to services. Like, why wouldn't they go to more automated goods or something like that? And I'm not saying that, like, I'm not using this anecdote as to say, like, this is what's going to happen now, we're going to have full employment. I'm using that anecdote as to say it's really hard to make predictions. And what I think may be a really useful tool that economists have is instead start with a premise.

Like, maybe we'll start it today. Look, labor share is zero. Like, labor share has gone down. What could possibly explain this? Let's write down an economic model of what happened. Phil will talk about this later today. Or you can start write down a model to say, hey, what if labor share just stays the same? What can make that happen? And here's my main here's if you don't take anything out of this conversation from me, we don't have any data. I've been kind of saying we need a Manhattan project for data. We don't have data on basically consumer demand elasticities.

We don't know what they are. We don't know we're not really tracking what jobs are getting created or destroyed. Like, the ONET database with all of the tasks and different jobs, that's been rarely updated. It's super low quality. And so what I think is really useful is to think about, like, what are the potential scenarios? And we'll be talking about a lot of these scenarios, mapping them out and to say, what dimension of scarcity will generate that scenario?

Dwarkesh Patel00:06:14

Yeah.

Speaker 200:06:14

So if there's full employment, we could talk about the relational sector or something like that. If there's, you know, very labor share collapses, we can talk about other sorts of scenarios. And then that will tell us what data we should be collecting.

Dwarkesh Patel00:06:27

It's probably worth defining labor share and capital share real quick. So the whole economy, like, the total sum of goods and services sold is either paid out to people in wages.

Speaker 200:06:38

Yeah.

Dwarkesh Patel00:06:39

Or it's paid out to capital, which is to say that there's, like, rents on buildings, and then there's shareholders of companies that get paid out. And for many hundreds of years in the economy, 60-something percent of the economy or all the things that are sold in a given year basically gets paid out to humans in wages, and the other 30, 40 percent gets paid out to people who own machines and land and claims on companies and whatever. And the question is, well, right now if 60 percent is going to wages, does that shrink as automation or as AI gets smarter and smarter and better and better?

Speaker 200:07:14

And it's like it really this is a call-to-ore fact, like, right? So it's incredibly we should stress this. It's incredibly surprising.

Dwarkesh Patel00:07:22

Right.

Speaker 200:07:22

That it's over 60 percent after the Industrial Revolution, after all of the automation we've ever seen. The fact that it's almost like some people are worried it's an accounting error or something like that, that it's kept being been so constant.

Dwarkesh Patel00:07:34

Right.

Speaker 200:07:35

And the fact that it's, like, been over 60 percent. And, you know, there's there's even a controversy right now. So some might say, like, you know, labor share has been falling in the last 20, 30 years, but, you know, depending on how you there's been a lot of accounting changes.

Dwarkesh Patel00:07:48

Right.

Speaker 200:07:49

In the last 30, 40 years. So, for example, Andy Atkinson has this paper showing that actually, if you keep the accounting constant over the years, labor share hasn't even fallen ever.

Dwarkesh Patel00:08:00

But it's not it's not that surprising, right? I mean, if Phil, you made this point that if labor and capital are complements, you need both to do anything. It kind of makes sense that you'd kind of need to pay both of them to get something done.

Speaker 200:08:11

You have had stuff be completely automated.

Dwarkesh Patel00:08:13

Although you had that post where you were pointing out that actually sorry.

Speaker 200:08:17

Oh, yeah. Well, I was going to say there's a sense in which nothing's yet been completely automated. If you look at the network-adjusted factor shares of a good, which is to say you look down the supply chain and say, not just, like, the final step, how much of that is done by capital and labor, but what went into the machines that can automate that final step, you'll find that labor is adding a lot of value down the supply chain. So, like, you know, computer and electronic products in the U.S. have a very stable capital share, network-adjusted capital share of around 50 percent, not 100 percent.

I do think there's this qualitative shift that we I think we agree is coming, which is that there will be at least some goods whose network-adjusted capital share goes to one, right? Because the whole supply chain can be automated and there's no part in it that we care intrinsically about having a human do. So that'll be a, you know, that'll be a qualitative shift. Interestingly, the implications of that shift for the overall capital share are ambiguous, because if we let's say that we've got the two sectors, the human intrinsic sector with the ballerinas and everything else, right?

Right now, everything else has been scarce because of the lack of labor in it, right? But if we fully automate the supply chains for everything else, right, and we satiate in everything else really fast, then the quantity of everything that's not a ballerina, say, goes to infinity, but the marginal utility in that stuff goes to zero faster than the quantity is rising.

Dwarkesh Patel00:09:48

Yeah.

Speaker 200:09:48

I also kind of want to move, if you don't mind, move away from the ballerina example.

Dwarkesh Patel00:09:51

Yeah.

Speaker 200:09:51

Because I think, like, the kind of point that I was trying to make in my post, again, and the point of the post was, like, to work backwards from a particular scenario, was that kind of the ballerina and the kind of performer, that's the wrong reference class. Right now, we have a lot of jobs where you have different tasks. So this is the task-based model of jobs where you have, like, a lot of different tasks. So, like, a doctor, what is their job? They're filling out insurance documents. They're, you know, going and, like, calling different pharmaceutical companies. And one of their tasks is to actually see the patient and talk to them.

But that's, like, actually not the main part of the job. So you could have you could have a job and a service or a good be a product of different types of tasks, and you can automate a ton of those tasks. And if the consumer is willing to pay more for a product or service where every single task is automated versus every single thing except for that one part where the doctor is actually delivering the diagnosis, providing support, and things like that, we would call that job a part of the relational sector, right?

Because a human is people are willing to pay more for the human to stay in the loop in the job.

Dwarkesh Patel00:11:02

Right.

Speaker 200:11:02

Right? So I think we don't have data to say, like, here are relational jobs, here are not, because you literally need to collect data of the following sort. Do a conjoint analysis of, like, here's my willingness to pay for this service, this good. Here's the counterfactual where everything is presumed to be by machine. Here's the counterfactual where this one task is not.

Dwarkesh Patel00:11:24

Right.

Speaker 200:11:24

What is your willingness to pay? What is your elasticity for that, for the human to not be in the loop? And, like, literally, if I don't have that data, what prediction am I going to make in this in this story, right?

Dwarkesh Patel00:11:35

Right. But I guess isn't there another point, which is that there's a lot of fully automated goods that don't even exist yet, and you can't collect any data right now about, say, how much people will.

Speaker 200:11:45

Absolutely.

Dwarkesh Patel00:11:46

Want to keep buying more and more of some drug that makes you healthier.

Speaker 200:11:49

Absolutely.

Dwarkesh Patel00:11:49

That's fully produced by the AIs.

Speaker 200:11:51

And that's kind of Phil's point.

Dwarkesh Patel00:11:52

That's right.

Speaker 200:11:53

And you can make it is that, look, you know, you could have an increase in variety in capital where you don't get the satiation, right? So you're increasing variety, so you're not hitting that really diminishing marginal utility point where you're, you know, you're basically most of your income is going to the human sector. If that increasing variety is fast enough and there is no such increasing variety in the human sector, then you can get all of the relational that you want, but it doesn't matter for labor share.

It goes to zero.

Dwarkesh Patel00:12:25

Phil, I liked your analogy to some Mongolian economist sitting there in 1400 thinking about what will be scarce and the limits of that kind of analysis. Do I think you should talk to that.

Speaker 200:12:35

Sure. Yeah. So if you just looked at the goods available to, you know, a Mongolian of the distant past, no expert on this society, but I know that they didn't have nearly the variety that we have now. And they looked at the jobs that were sort of intrinsically human, like being a singer, say, and they looked at the things that were not intrinsically human, like, you know, the transportation services provided by their horses or the different kinds of food they had.

If they just kind of held the varieties fixed on in both categories and asked what will happen once we have a lot more automation, they might have said, well, we'll just satiate in, you know, horse-like transportation and in yogurt and in yurts. Those shares will all go to zero, and we'll be left spending all of our money on singers. But, of course, that's not what's happened because as we've accumulated more wealth and, you know, more advanced machines and so on, we've expanded the range of things other than singers to spend our money on, and the share spent on singers has stayed sort of negligible.

So likewise, that's sort of my central prediction about how the future unfolds, though it could go either way.

Dwarkesh Patel00:13:52

I was going to make a point, and I realize it's a fallacy, but the reason it's a fallacy is interesting. So I was going to say, I mean, it's just hard to imagine a world where there's trillions upon trillions of robots, but there's only some billion odd humans. And then, like, the cumulative amount we're spending on robots and, like, building more robots and whatever is less than what we're spending to, like, pay, you know, Magnus Carlsen and.

Speaker 200:14:16

Or financial advisors or doctors.

Dwarkesh Patel00:14:18

Right.

Speaker 200:14:18

Or tutors.

Dwarkesh Patel00:14:19

Or podcasters or whatever.

Speaker 200:14:21

Or podcasters.

Dwarkesh Patel00:14:21

But then I realized that's a fallacy. The number of transistors in the world.

Speaker 200:14:27

Right.

Dwarkesh Patel00:14:28

Has, like, literally certainly trillion next, maybe quadrillion next or something. And your colleague, Chad Jones, has a very interesting result about how the share of the economy that is going towards paying for computing, basically, like paying for the transistors, has been decreasing. The point that you made is that one way to think about Moore's law, you know, what sets price? Well, the price is supply and demand.

And so not only are we producing more transistors more cheaply, but also we're like, the value of the marginal transistor is decreasing, right? So as you were saying, another way of saying Moore's law is you should say.

Speaker 200:15:12

Oh, yeah. I like the, yeah, the pessimistic framing of Moore's law is every 18 months, the value of computation halves.

Dwarkesh Patel00:15:18

Yeah.

Speaker 200:15:18

Right? Like, we're just running out of uses for computation so fast that it's sustaining Moore's law.

Dwarkesh Patel00:15:23

And this is, in fact, like, literally relevant to a conversation about AI where.

Speaker 200:15:27

Yeah.

Dwarkesh Patel00:15:29

Maybe for the first time, this is no longer true.

Speaker 200:15:32

Right.

Dwarkesh Patel00:15:33

So the famous fact here is that an H-100 costs more to rent now than it did three years ago, even though we have much superior technology and we have much more compute in the world, because as models get smarter, the opportunity cost of compute gets higher.

Speaker 200:15:51

But this is Phil's point about increasing variety.

Dwarkesh Patel00:15:53

Yeah.

Speaker 200:15:53

Right? What we have done is increase increase the types of things that people demand from capital.

Dwarkesh Patel00:16:00

Yeah.

Speaker 200:16:00

Now, all of a sudden, you have a new variety that you could be using capital for, and all of a sudden, you jump back up.

Dwarkesh Patel00:16:06

Yeah. You could imagine we just never satiate demand for compute. And as long as that stays the case.

Speaker 200:16:12

Yeah.

Dwarkesh Patel00:16:12

Then the share of the economy that is going towards compute would keep increasing.

Speaker 200:16:16

And that's the big question, right? It's like, that is the ultimate question that we need to be kind of looking at is, like, what number of new uses are we finding for that compute where you have the demand for these uses? So what I kind of want to emphasize is that a lot of models in economics, especially in the space that we're talking about, take demand as almost kind of exogenous, and they don't unpack, like, what is the, like, the psychology of what people actually want. And so what got me kind of also thinking about this, the idea of the relational sector's work that I was doing on the fact that there does seem to be this value, this intrinsic value that is it's not just because it's scarce, it's because there's some intrinsic preference that people have for, like, empathy and connection and, you know, getting getting interacting with another person.

So, like, one of the experiments that we ran was, like, there's an art print, right? And we actually have an incentive-compatible way of, like, basically saying, like, how much are you willing to pay for this art print? People are actually paying real money for it. And then we say, like, look, there's only one one of those art prints, and it's either made and these are between-subject conditions by AI or by a person. So with one, you get the effect that the person-produced art print is valued much, much higher than the AI version. And then what we do is to say, there's in a set of other conditions, there's 500 of these being produced.

So for the human-made one, the price goes down a lot because it's no longer seen as, like, you're not, like, making a connection with this one artist.

Dwarkesh Patel00:17:46

Yeah.

Speaker 200:17:46

Versus with AI, there's no difference. AI is already viewed as, like, a commodity.

Dwarkesh Patel00:17:51

Right.

Speaker 200:17:52

And, you know, we need to do a lot more research on this, but it seems like that's kind of, like, the key difference between, you know, something like, let's say, a horse, right? There's no a horse was an input into a into an output where you can replace the horse with something else.

Dwarkesh Patel00:18:05

Yeah.

Speaker 200:18:05

You only care about the output. The only way this relational story works, and this is what we need more data on, is if it's not a human is not a horse in the sense that it is providing value from the output, where if you replace the human, the value of the output decreases. And if that's not strong enough, and if it doesn't hold for enough sectors, if it doesn't hold for enough jobs, then this kind of story doesn't work anymore.

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Speaker 200:19:37

There's one possibility which Molly Kinder has written something about this messy middle scenario, and there's that possibility made me think about whether it might be better to have, at least as far as wealth distribution and redistribution goes, it might be better to have much faster AI takeoff.

Dwarkesh Patel00:19:54

Yeah.

Speaker 200:19:55

And I want to ask you whether the following possibility is at all likely, or there's any set of assumptions that this can make it so, which is that AI makes it possible to automate jobs such that, like, many people are losing their jobs, but it doesn't create enough wealth while the process of automation is happening to pay off, basically, the people who are getting laid off. So there's, like, a Pareto improvement. Everybody's getting better as a result of AI automation. And, of course, there's a trivial sense in which that must be true because whatever money you're saving, whatever money the company is saving by not paying the humans instead of just paying the AIs, those resources still exist in the economy, and they can just be paid off to people.

But there's going to be some allocative inefficiency, like the government doesn't know exactly who got laid off because of AI. There's some political problem of, like, if the meta worker gets laid off first and they're making 200K a year, is there a politically sustainable situation where you give them a 200K check a year when there's many people who are working who are making much less? So do you at all find this scenario plausible where AI is actually automating a bunch of things, but there isn't enough wealth creation as there is automation?

Dwarkesh Patel00:21:06

I think it's.

Speaker 200:21:06

Is that plausible?

Dwarkesh Patel00:21:07

Possible. To me, it does seem like a pretty narrow window. My guess is that if we have the technology to automate so many jobs that it becomes, like, a new kind of political problem, then the pile will also be growing really fast.

Speaker 200:21:19

Wow.

Dwarkesh Patel00:21:19

Unless in all of those professions that it's automating, it's just a hair more productive. So, like, the cost of all the capital to replace all the software engineers is just, you know, a hair less than the cost of what we would make the software engineers.

Speaker 200:21:33

And why is it implausible that it just, like, a company can save money by laying off a bunch of software engineers, but and in the long run, there's a Jevons Paradox thing, and, you know, we can't anticipate in advance what we do with more software, and surely there's going to be more uses. But in the short run, the effect is just that a lot of people are laid off, and they still need to figure out how they can use a million X more.

Dwarkesh Patel00:21:53

Yeah.

Speaker 200:21:54

JavaScript tokens.

Speaker 300:21:54

I think the thing that, like, is in either, like, you know, Phil and I have been, like, writing about these things, and we have mathematical models in the back of these things. We don't have any political economy in any of our models. Andy Hall wrote a really nice blog post about the politics of AGI, and he made a really interesting observation. If there's a 2% increase in unemployment, the political winds completely change. Like, unemployment, it has a huge effect on what happens politically. So, you know, to Molly's excellent essay, by the way, I think in some ways, like, one of the worst scenarios is a drip scenario because of the political economy piece, right?

Because, like, you know, people essentially, what you might see is, like, people not really being unemployed in mass, but kind of, like, moving into sectors that pay them less money, kind of basically getting what happened with phone operators in the mid-century of the between 1920 and 1940, phone operators were completely automated, right? But it took 20 years, even though the technology existed. And therefore, there was this drip. It wasn't like this giant sector just disappeared.

Dwarkesh Patel00:23:00

Yeah.

Speaker 300:23:00

And what ended up happening, there's a really nice QGE paper on this, basically showing that they got reabsorbed into the economy, but at lower salaries, and they were mostly underemployed. And I think that's the scenario that Molly was writing about this, like, kind of messy middle where, like, things aren't a disaster because we saw with COVID, like, the fiscal response can move quickly if there's an emergency.

Dwarkesh Patel00:23:26

Right.

Speaker 300:23:26

And an emergency is a quick uptick in unemployment, which could even look like 2 or 3%. That's, like, a national that becomes a national emergency if it becomes fast.

Dwarkesh Patel00:23:35

The concern is that suppose whatever you're saving on those white-collar workers, if that's not growing the economy, but it's just creating some, you know, saved resources that can be allocated elsewhere, is that enough to do a broad-based redistribution scheme? Because then you have, like, the money you've saved off a couple of people.

Speaker 200:23:56

Yeah.

Dwarkesh Patel00:23:57

And unless you can figure out exactly how to get it to them specifically, you got the problem of, can I do, like, can I do a UBI off the money I've saved?

Speaker 300:24:04

Yeah. So you're basically saying, like, look, the pie did not grow that much.

Dwarkesh Patel00:24:07

Yeah.

Speaker 300:24:07

You're just basically you're just basically displacing a bunch of people, but that actually didn't grow the technological frontier of what the economy can produce.

Dwarkesh Patel00:24:16

Right. And so then there's a question of, like, well, maybe every time I don't know if this is the case. Maybe every time this has happened in history, the technological frontier has expanded a bunch. And so.

Speaker 300:24:23

I think that's the case. I think simply in history, the technological frontier has expanded.

Dwarkesh Patel00:24:28

Yeah.

Speaker 300:24:28

So it's kind of and I think Phil made the same point. Like, it's hard to imagine that sort of scenario where you are getting, like, intelligence that's kind of just enough to replace the software engineer, but still costs a lot of money.

Dwarkesh Patel00:24:44

Right.

Speaker 300:24:44

Like, it's just a hair less expensive than the software engineer. So you're not getting this abundance effect.

Dwarkesh Patel00:24:50

Right.

Speaker 300:24:51

And so where is the redistribution going to happen because the pie didn't grow?

Dwarkesh Patel00:24:54

Yeah, yeah. OK, so this is very helpful. So there's many different things that would be true for this scenario to come to pass, each of which seem unlikely. One, it has to be the case that it is possible to automate entire white-collar jobs, but only in a piecemeal way. That is to say that you can only automate software engineers, but that same program can't also automate an accountant and an analyst and whatever, where I think at least my model of intelligence is such that both of, like, the breadth of tasks that it requires to do something like software engineering and what intelligence is, is such that, you know, if you can really just, like, lay off all the software engineers, you've got enough in the bucket there that you could, like, automate all kinds of white-collar work.

So, yeah, you're saving there's huge amounts of potential savings that have happened as a result of these layoffs, and also that AI is going to be cheaper than human labor. And if both of those things are true, this messy middle scenario where we literally don't have the wealth to go around seems unlikely. And then the question is, like, what is the best way to tax it and redistribute it?

Speaker 300:25:56

Yeah, I have some thoughts. I think it's just really important to outline the costs and benefits. Like, it's also important to know that they're so first, there's differential complexity in, like, implementing these things. Two, they differ in the timeline of, like, being actually helpful. So, like, something like universal basic capital, that's not, like that's not going to generate returns for something that happens in six months. So you probably are going to end up with a layer of things. So, like, for example, like a negative income tax, like, you implement it, and the day it turns into law, that is already you already have this sort of insurance that, like, you know, there's a floor for which, you know, everybody gets a certain amount of money.

And then, you know, if you earn more money, you get taxed more and things like that. And but, you know, there's positives and negatives to negative income tax. With UBI, the for example, the I worry a lot about, like, the political economy implications. Like, for example, like, if people are just kind of dependent on a check, it really matters who's in power. Like, right now we're endowed with labor that can turn into that could turn into income. When that is no longer the case, and we are now at the mercy of the elected official for, like, basic needs, right?

So that, to me, feels like a power-sharing arrangement that's really dangerous.

Dwarkesh Patel00:27:21

But wouldn't that be true of any sort of government redistribution program?

Speaker 300:27:24

So something like universal basic capital, where you have, like, an ownership share and you have property rights for capital, then you just you're just.

Dwarkesh Patel00:27:31

You're just a normal shareholder.

Speaker 300:27:33

You're just a normal person.

Dwarkesh Patel00:27:34

And but this goes back to the question of indexing, because if indexing is hard, then universal basic capital is hard.

Speaker 300:27:38

Yeah. And that's the problem of universal basic capital is targeting.

Dwarkesh Patel00:27:41

Right.

Speaker 300:27:41

Right? What do you target to put into people's portfolios?

Dwarkesh Patel00:27:44

Like, what if Anthropic goes to zero, but some random robotics company takes all the surplus?

Speaker 300:27:47

Exactly. Exactly. So that's the risk of universal basic capital. With a negative income tax, you have the same sort of issues that with UBI, where, like, you know, somebody comes into power and says, like, this is we're not going to do that anymore, and people can't work. And then, you know, you have the issue of the floor being low.

Dwarkesh Patel00:28:02

Right. One concern with the wealth tax is that, you know, there's no politically sustainable equilibrium at, like, 0.5% wealth tax. And, you know, I mean, this happened with the income tax, of course, right? It starts low, it's like 4 or something, and then it slowly and slowly escalates until the marginal tax rate in the US is probably on the order of income tax rate is, like, 40% or something, and in certain states, upwards of 50%. With a capital tax, is there a reason to worry? Would that distort investment because people would just be like, why would I invest in Anthropic or Intel?

The government is going to take larger and larger shares of it and dilute my share.

Speaker 200:28:41

Well, hold on. So I think it's worth separating, like, how the revenue is raised, like, what's tax, and then how it's distributed. It could be that the government hands out shares of Anthropic to everyone by a broad-based tax and then buying Anthropic.

Dwarkesh Patel00:28:54

Yeah. OK.

Speaker 200:28:55

Mm-hmm.

Dwarkesh Patel00:28:56

Which would probably be the right thing to do. I mean, hopefully, some, like, populist proposal doesn't interfere with that and, like, expropriate some, like, particular company that everyone happens to know about.

Speaker 200:29:06

Yeah.

Dwarkesh Patel00:29:07

But how so you're suggesting there could be a tax that is some sort of optimal tax. It's we're taxing externalities, or we're taxing land, or we're I guess we probably need to tax something other than just those two things. But that tax.

Speaker 200:29:20

More consumption.

Dwarkesh Patel00:29:20

Yeah.

Speaker 200:29:21

Huh?

Dwarkesh Patel00:29:21

More consumption.

Speaker 200:29:21

OK. So a consumption tax, like a European value-added tax type thing, that allows the government to go buy a bunch of stocks, and then it just distributes those stocks to everybody.

Speaker 300:29:34

That's David Otter's.

Speaker 200:29:35

Yeah. Yeah. I mean, that's not going to be that different from just, like, redistributing the stocks, but it'll be a little different.

Dwarkesh Patel00:29:41

Yeah.

Speaker 300:29:41

That's what Social that was the proposal for Social Security, by the way. That was privatizing Social Security, right? So it's like you turn, like, this sort of weird, like not weird, but it's been working. It's worked so far, but, you know, there's questions for how long it's going to keep working. Like, basically, privatizing Social Security was giving everybody a basket of stocks.

Dwarkesh Patel00:30:01

Right. OK, I'm curious to understand. People talk about whether there's a white-collar apocalypse already. Is there any evidence that suggests that there is mass automation or unemployment as a result of AI already?

Speaker 300:30:17

I think there's a lot of people are looking at it. So this is an area where there's, like, a lot of eyes and a lot of data being produced. So the Budget Lab over at Yale is doing really good analysis on this. They just recently released a report. And I think, like, you really have to squint to see anything happening. Like, basically, if you want to take kind of, like, an approach across the entire economy and looking at even looking at, like, software engineering, like, the most exposed sort of sectors, there's just, like, not really anything going on. There might be a little bit of a signal about, like, junior developers getting jobs less than before, but that's, like, a less than before rather than a level shift as in there's actually an increased demand for senior manager, for senior software engineers, if anything.

And so if you look at trend, it's kind of, like, for junior managers, it's a bit below trend.

Dwarkesh Patel00:31:08

So as in you're saying the growth is slower than before.

Speaker 300:31:10

Yes.

Dwarkesh Patel00:31:11

But there is still growth even on entry-level software engineers.

Speaker 300:31:14

Yeah, exactly.

Dwarkesh Patel00:31:14

And what do you think is going on with the anecdotal evidence of graduating college students saying that they're finding it harder to find CS jobs or something?

Speaker 300:31:22

I think that's anecdotal evidence.

Dwarkesh Patel00:31:24

You think it's always been hard to get jobs for some people, and now it's getting turned into an AI narrative. Same with the layoffs, where it's probably just normal layoff, and they turned it into an AI layoff.

Speaker 300:31:33

Yeah. I mean, you have to be careful with all of this. I think, like, there are these, like, you know, there are these, like, coordinate public coordination devices for, like, let's say we get into a narrative where, like, if you're a firm and you're not laying people off, then you're seen as, like, not adapting AI enough.

Dwarkesh Patel00:31:48

Yeah.

Speaker 300:31:48

So, like, then you're going to just get a cascade effect.

Dwarkesh Patel00:31:51

Right.

Speaker 300:31:51

A firm's, like, just needing to keep up with the Joneses in terms of, like, starting to lay people off. And that's kind of, like, that's super worrying where, like, actually, the firm might be worse off.

Dwarkesh Patel00:32:01

Right.

Speaker 300:32:01

After the layoffs than before the layoffs, but it's just doing the layoffs to have the perception that, look, we're not behind the times. We're, you know, using AI. Like, you have the you probably heard these anecdotal stories of, like, these token counters that, like, you have to maximize tokens and things like that. So again, like, right now, we have we don't really have any evidence of a white-collar bloodbath.

Dwarkesh Patel00:32:23

And is that surprising at all? I feel given the fact all these things AI is going to do, it's just, like, this is a story that's old this time. If you automate some complementary task, the overall bucket of things that the human labor, which complements the automation.

Speaker 300:32:37

Yeah.

Dwarkesh Patel00:32:38

Will increase in value.

Speaker 300:32:39

So this is one of the statistics that's really important for that argument is elasticity of demand.

Dwarkesh Patel00:32:44

Yeah.

Speaker 300:32:44

So, like, the you take the O-ring model of jobs. So, like, again, jobs is a series of tasks. Let's say the AI automates, like, 9 out of 10 9 out of 10 tasks. One task is not automated. If that person can now kind of focus in on that task, the job will become more productive. If that translates into a price effect where the product is actually cheaper, if the demand responds enough where now there's it's being bought more, it's being used more, the service is being used more, that could actually lead to more hiring.

Dwarkesh Patel00:33:16

Right.

Speaker 300:33:16

And a lot of people on the internet have been, like, kind of making that argument kind of very generally, saying, like, look, we're seeing if anything in the data, we're seeing an uptick in software engineering.

Dwarkesh Patel00:33:25

Right. Yeah, yeah.

Speaker 300:33:26

Which suggests that, at least for now, given the way the jobs work, it might be elastic.

Dwarkesh Patel00:33:31

But I think this elasticity of demand argument is incredibly important both for a lot of arguments that people make or just a lot of labels that people use without understanding what the underlying causation is. So people often talk about Jevons paradox.

Speaker 300:33:47

Yeah.

Dwarkesh Patel00:33:48

This is this idea that as something gets cheaper, you will want so much more of it that the total amount you spend on the thing increases. And so famously, this happened to coal in Britain 200-odd years ago. But really, this only happens if there's the demand for something is highly elastic. There's many things for which there is not super elastic demand. If oil, for example, gets super cheap, it's not, like, magically.

Speaker 300:34:12

Or insulin, right?

Dwarkesh Patel00:34:13

Yeah, exactly.

Speaker 300:34:13

That was another one.

Dwarkesh Patel00:34:14

Magically, there's going to be so many more cars that now we're going to be using way more oil than before.

Speaker 200:34:19

At least not in the short run.

Dwarkesh Patel00:34:20

Exactly. So the long run elasticity is higher than the short run elasticity. But even in the long run so agriculture famously is the example where we can produce way more food if we dedicated the same portion of the economy that we dedicated to agriculture. We're already producing more food regardless, but we could produce even more food if the same portion of the economy that was producing food 100 years ago was currently producing food. But, you know, you eat enough, and then you're done. And so the claim with software is that it is a it is not some inherent property of markets that as it gets cheaper, you'll just keep wanting more of it.

Speaker 300:34:54

Absolutely not.

Dwarkesh Patel00:34:55

It is the claim about software is this is a particular kind of good, where as it gets cheaper, we'll want more and more of it. And it is also highly relevant, and you were nessy about this. A lot of this a lot of this podcast is me summarizing your essays. Back to you. That there's this very viral scenario planning about the future by Citrine, where they're predicting as a result of automation, as a result of very powerful AI, there will be a recession because white-collar workers will get automated. Their salaries, which were, you know, paying for a bunch of things, will no longer be available, and so there will be a slump.

Do you want to recapitulate why this might be implausible?

Speaker 300:35:31

Well, I mean, so part of it is plausible. Part of it's not plausible. So, like, the part that's kind of, like, within the this is something that we started the conversation with is the idea that there could be unemployment, a lot of unemployment. If the speed of automation is quick and things like that, people could get laid off, and they may not find work very quickly. So that part of the Cetrine essay about the unemployment, you know, we can quibble about that, but that's not the issue. The issue is that they talked about negative economic growth.

Dwarkesh Patel00:36:00

Right.

Speaker 300:36:01

And so what I did in the piece that actually Phil and I had a back and forth on was to say, like, let's start with the proposition that there's negative economic growth. What conditions do you need on the economy to get negative economic growth? And it turns out the conditions are pretty improbable. So one thing that you need is, like, for the holders of capital, like, rich people, basically, like, basically what you have in this in those sorts of scenarios is, like, you have a reallocation of wealth and income from, like, lower-income people who are working, who are using their labor towards capital owners.

So what you need is that basically demand to be bounded, like, a hard bound, not even, like, a soft sort of, like, diminishing sensitivity. You need for them to eventually say, I've had enough. I don't want to spend any more money, and for that money to not enter as investment.

Dwarkesh Patel00:36:49

Right.

Speaker 300:36:50

Right? Which is and then you could get negative growth, which is, like.

Dwarkesh Patel00:36:53

And the crucial thing is even if we don't want more shit, the world in which there's a singularity and we don't want to invest more money is crazy, right? Where we're not, like, let's build more data centers. Let's build more fabs. Even though we have AGI, we're not, like, investing in more data centers to run the AGI.

Speaker 300:37:10

Yeah.

Dwarkesh Patel00:37:10

And that's, like, driving more economic growth.

Speaker 300:37:12

Yeah. And so I sent the essay to Phil, and Phil actually wrote back being like, this is pretty dumb.

Dwarkesh Patel00:37:17

Yeah.

Speaker 300:37:17

Like, my essay saying, like, you're trying to say that there's going to be negative economic growth, but these are very implausible conditions. And I was like, actually, that's the point of the essay.

Dwarkesh Patel00:37:26

Right.

Speaker 300:37:26

These are very implausible economic conditions. So that's where I think, like, scenario planning really shines is you have the Cetrine essay, which I think is, like I think it was great that it's written because it kind of started a conversation. But it's just, like, you it's so intuitive, this idea that, like, look, if there's demand collapse, we can get the economy to shrink. But it's actually you could get that with a depression, right, where in the depression, the technological frontier didn't expand.

Dwarkesh Patel00:37:54

Right.

Speaker 300:37:55

Here, the technological frontier is expanding. You actually have abundance, and for abundance to generate negative economic growth, that's really hard to get.

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Dwarkesh Patel00:39:44

And maybe that's a more general model of how goods are produced in the economy, that you've got to make sure everything is reliable and works well. And you can't automate an entire job to an AI right now. Even though it might be able to perform it at some probability, you need extreme reliability in order for it to not destroy the finished good. I think this is yeah, so this might explain why there's less automation now than there otherwise could be. But I think it works in the other direction. Once AIs get advanced enough, that integrating humans into the production flow of future goods, even beyond the arguments about how humans will be more expensive or dumber or whatever, even beyond that, just there will be whole production flows that are organized for AI labor where they're talking in neural ease.

They're thinking many thousands of times faster. So even if there's some comparative advantage where it makes sense to hire a human, there will be, like, transaction cost and worries about reliability that will actually make it hard to integrate humans into future production flows.

Speaker 200:40:41

Yeah, that seems right to me. In particular, I just want to distinguish between the point that if you automate, like, 9/10 of a job, then people might kind of shift over to the last 10th, but, like, there might be 10 times more work demanded of them from the model of O-ring automation from, like, Gans and Goldfarb recently, which was that if you can only automate 9/10 of the job, but you can do it to a lower standard of quality than the human could do it, you might not want to automate even those 9/10. And that's the thing that could totally port over to, like, symmetrically, it could be a reason why we don't use a human for 1/10 of the job anymore because a human just can't perform it to the level of quality that the AI can perform the other parts of the job or the level of speed or whatever.

And they end up pulling down the quality or speed of the finished product.

Dwarkesh Patel00:41:35

By the way, the model you're talking about seems extremely plausible to me of why more lawyers or accountants or whatever are not automated. Like, there are cases in or even software engineers where there's a pretty good probability that the thing worked as you expect, but the thing you're paying the lawyer for is, like, no, really, my company's not going to go under because.

Speaker 300:41:52

You're also paying for a lot of, like, regulation type stuff, right? So, like, with lawyers particularly, you need some entity to back up the product. You need kind of, like, an ownership of the product. You need somebody to be able to fire or hire, like, licensing issues. There's a lot of, like, sort of, like, regulatory layers that are, like, also going to be keeping even if there's no relational element, human in the loop, that have nothing to do with, like, the ability of the human to actually perform the service.

Dwarkesh Patel00:42:23

Yeah.

Speaker 200:42:24

Yeah. I mean, you know, all of these frictions on the political type decisions that we are accustomed to only trusting humans, you know, only having humans for, like legislation and being a judge, being a jury, or all the licensing that keeps certain professions human, that all strikes me as transitional, right? I mean, what we expect to come from a human and, like, how we organize our politics, that's changed so many times throughout history, right, from little hunter-gatherer bands to empires to whatnot.

And, yeah, once an AI-run political system is much more efficient than the alternatives, then those will probably tend to outcompete the others and, you know.

Dwarkesh Patel00:43:07

So speaking of which, we've been talking about what preferences humans currently have and what impact that has on what kinds of goods will be scarce in the future. But, of course, we'll have different kinds of entities in the future, AIs, right? There was a time when there were no humans on Earth, but evolution selected for agents that have specific drives and preferences because those tend to survive the most. And those preferences now basically determine how a $100 trillion world economy, what it produces. And so why not expect the same thing of AIs in the future?

This is not even a world with catastrophic misalignment, that is to say they just kill everybody. But there will be evolution of even if not individual AIs, then firms which have AIs as part of them. And what will that evolution favor? Well, it will favor probably firms or agents that grow, right? There's, like, a selection argument that things which grow will be more prevalent. And maybe just based on that, you can make some predictions about what their preferences will be. But is the kind of entity which prefers to have human intrinsic goods going to be the kind of entity that accumulates resources the most?

Probably not, right? Probably, like, saves more. It, like, has unsatisfiable demand for things like whatever the relevant resource happens to be compute is an obvious one. And can we use that to make some prediction about what the non-human preferences that will be guiding the future?

Speaker 300:44:34

Yeah. So I think if there's, like, an AI that's, like, has its own welfare and it's fully autonomous and it's, like, making its own decisions that are welfare relevant, to be honest, I have absolutely no prior that it would, like, at all prefer other to, like, deal with humans. There's, like, no reason.

Dwarkesh Patel00:44:52

Right.

Speaker 300:44:53

But let's but let me take, like, the other side of that argument. Will humans' preferences to be interacting with one another and to trust and empathize and all of these sorts of, like, things with other humans versus a simulated AI? I think it's a really important question whether those will change, right? So I've heard a lot of arguments saying, like, look, you know, right now we're just not used to the technology. And at some point, like, what you're thinking of relational or something like that, people are just going to see, like, an AI therapist as a superior product.

Dwarkesh Patel00:45:27

Right.

Speaker 300:45:27

And they're not going to need the sort of, like, empathy or whatever that the human is providing. I think this is actually a really complicated question. Here's one argument for why it's not going to go away and that that has to do with evolution. So let's say there's two types of people. One person doesn't really have this preference. They can just interact with other AI, whatever can simulate it better. The other one has almost, like, a moral emotion, like, from the using Jonathan Haidt's framework, moral emotion against interact like, offloading those sorts of social interactions to an AI.

Which of those two people are going to reproduce, find a mate, all of these sorts of things? I think the answer is kind of clear, right? It's the second one that has the preference for other people.

Dwarkesh Patel00:46:10

It doesn't have the reproduction is happening.

Speaker 300:46:12

Fair. But if we're in, you know, the world where, like, reproduction is still happening the way that it's happening, I think and this is a big question. I'm not even, like I'm not making a prediction. Again, I'm just saying, like, if we're thinking, you know, you had David Reich on the show. Like, his point on the last podcast was that, you know, we're buzzing with natural selection.

Dwarkesh Patel00:46:32

Right.

Speaker 300:46:32

So even if, like, you get some sort of indifference now, you might get selection to point into, like, an even stronger preference for other humans.

Dwarkesh Patel00:46:40

Yeah. Here's one way to think about it. How is the wealth of the richest people in the world instantiated? Of course, they can as you were we were having a call earlier and making the point that their consumption is more geared towards relational goods. Like, Mark Zuckerberg is hiring MMA instructors and dancers for his wife's birthday and so forth. But most of his wealth is just stock in Meta. And he, as a controlling shareholder, could say, hey, Meta, just give me all this income or turn all this wealth into dividend income, and I will just spend that on consumption.

But instead, he rather would have his wealth compound and Meta to build more data centers, basically. So you don't even have to change humans for this to be the case. It is just the case that the humans, which are wealthiest and are growing wealthier because their wealth is compounding, just have this, like, almost Nick Landian preference for, like, accelerating capital. And that does seem to suggest that, yeah, is that an important determinant of what kinds of things are produced in the future?

Speaker 200:47:41

Yeah. Could I just say, like, there's two ways you could get the two kinds of people, one of whom prefers a human therapist and one of whom is fine interacting with the AI. If they both satiate equally quickly in capital, right, but the one who likes the human therapist just also likes having some human intrinsic services, then the marginal value like, how the marginal value of capital in the future compares to the marginal value of capital today for each of them, if they start out equally rich, should be basically the same.

I mean, there could be interactions and whatnot, but basically, that should be the same. If what's driving the difference is that one person just doesn't satiate in capital because they're engaged by the prospect of, you know, exploring the universe and turning their head into a galaxy brain or whatever, and the other one satiates.

Dwarkesh Patel00:48:31

Yeah.

Speaker 200:48:32

Then the person who doesn't satiate in capital is going to if they're being rational, they're going to have a higher savings rate.

Dwarkesh Patel00:48:38

Yeah.

Speaker 200:48:38

OK? So in the long run, they're going to have most of the wealth, and the overall capital share will basically be the capital share of that person's spending, which is going to be one.

Dwarkesh Patel00:48:49

And it's important that this is we're not talking about a hypothetical future.

Speaker 200:48:52

Yeah.

Dwarkesh Patel00:48:52

Like, Elon Musk is talking about mass drivers on the moon.

Speaker 200:48:54

Right.

Dwarkesh Patel00:48:55

And he's, like, by far the wealthiest person in the world. I mean, obviously, currently, his investments are going towards humans as well as machines. But I don't think he cares particularly that his, like, future researchers and engineers are humans versus AI.

Speaker 200:49:09

And he managed to reproduce fast as well.

Dwarkesh Patel00:49:10

So.

Speaker 200:49:12

Yes. So anyway, so I just think it's worth drawing that distinction. Yeah, there are currently some rich people that don't seem to satiate quickly in capital, and so maybe in the long run, they'll save the most and.

Dwarkesh Patel00:49:25

Right.

Speaker 200:49:25

Yeah. That does seem sort of right to me. And I would just also say, even if they do reproduce more slowly, like, biologically, that might just not matter that much in the long run, right, if they can live forever and, you know.

Speaker 300:49:40

The living forever is key.

Speaker 200:49:42

Yeah.

Speaker 300:49:42

Right. So I think again, like, and we're scenario building here, right? So I think if you could live forever, like, a lot of stuff changes for my story as well. I think it's to your point about, you know, rich people just consuming not consuming a lot and investing, I think this will all depend on the returns to capital, right? So, like, right now, the returns to data centers are super high, right? But if we get into a situation where people are satiated with capital, then the returns to accumulating capital are going to be lower.

And so then these rich people are going to be consuming more, right? So because the incentive to invest is smaller. So basically, you kind of think about this in general equilibrium.

Dwarkesh Patel00:50:27

Yeah.

Speaker 300:50:28

The general equilibrium of this sort of process, like, we have gotten tremendously more richer since, you know, 1820. We've gotten many more people are investing, but you're still getting a consumption response which keeps, you know, people employed and labor share high. And that's because.

Dwarkesh Patel00:50:45

Wait. Hold on. Not necessarily. I think you're probably making the same point. But, I mean, they could just it could be that their investment has to be titrated through actual laborers who have to go, like, do things for their investment work, which, like, would not in the future, only the consumption is human-mediated, right? Because the investment can just be done by the robots.

Speaker 300:51:04

But if the returns are if you so we're in the scenario with, like, how you can keep high labor share, right?

Dwarkesh Patel00:51:10

Yeah.

Speaker 300:51:10

Let's take that scenario. In the scenario with high labor share, for whatever reason, the returns to capital are going to be lower.

Dwarkesh Patel00:51:17

Yeah, that's right. And, I mean, to the earlier thing where the messy middle we were saying why this is implausible, I feel like we can do a similar thing here. Where for returns to capital to be lower, the growth rate has to have be lower, right? I mean, it certainly has to be lower than what we're expecting through the period of transformative AI. You know, if there's explosive growth.

Speaker 200:51:37

Yeah. Yes and no. I mean, so the capital stock could grow quickly, but the price of capital goods relative to consumption goods could be falling faster than the capital stock is growing.

Dwarkesh Patel00:51:45

Exactly. Oh, interesting.

Speaker 300:51:46

Yeah. It's the difference between, like, the potential frontier of technology and, like, what the realized prices of these things. Because you have relative prices that are really important here.

Dwarkesh Patel00:51:55

So you're saying I could be putting my money towards, you know, earning 30% interest and investing in data centers or whatever. There'll be something in the future if the growth rate is high that earns high returns. Or I could, as a result of all these technological breakthroughs, there's some cool product that I really want to buy right now. And both of those will be compelling options.

Speaker 200:52:19

Yeah. It doesn't have to be a new product. It could be a human intrinsic product.

Dwarkesh Patel00:52:23

Right. Although if it's a human intrinsic product, we would want to have it much more in the future than we want it now because the sort of the thing it compares against is.

Speaker 200:52:33

So we might want it the same as we want it now in the sense that, like, the marginal utility and the value performance is exactly the same as now, right? But the margin utility in a robot might just be a lot lower than now, right?

Dwarkesh Patel00:52:44

Yeah.

Speaker 200:52:44

So in units of robots, we want it a lot more than we want it now, right?

Dwarkesh Patel00:52:48

Right.

Speaker 200:52:48

So would the interest rate be 30%? It depends what you mean by the real interest rate, OK? It might be that every robot now can turn into, you know, 100 robots next year, right? So in units of robots, the interest rate is 10,000%.

Dwarkesh Patel00:53:03

Right.

Speaker 200:53:03

But if the price of robots is falling really fast.

Speaker 300:53:06

Prices adjust. I mean, that's the whole I think that's the whole point is that.

Speaker 200:53:09

Yeah. But here prices are adjusting in this interesting way that too many macro models don't allow for, right? So what's happening is what would be called investment-specific technical change, where, yeah, the price of capital is, like, falling relative to the price of consumption instead of, like, the standard doing the standard macro thing of saying there's just output.

Speaker 300:53:28

Yeah.

Speaker 200:53:29

It's like chimera of a thing called output, which is one-for-one can be allocated to capital or consumption, right? That's not going to be true in this world.

Speaker 300:53:36

Yeah.

Speaker 200:53:36

Every unit of capital next year is giving up way less consumption than each unit of capital this year because, like, the just one robot now turns into many robots next year, but the number of value units is the same.

Speaker 300:53:49

And again, we're going to go back to the increasing varieties thing where, like, if all of those extra robots next year are actually different varieties of robots and I'm not getting satiated on those robots, then it's a very different story.

Dwarkesh Patel00:54:04

Yeah. Right. But now we're talking about the consumption world, whereas for the investment side of things, there could be just some greedy titan of industry who keeps wanting more and more robots. And that alone would be enough.

Speaker 200:54:20

It would.

Dwarkesh Patel00:54:20

To increase the marginal value of robots and therefore decrease labor share?

Speaker 200:54:25

Yes. Yeah.

Dwarkesh Patel00:54:26

OK. But why are we not expecting greedy titans of industry to keep existing?

Speaker 300:54:30

I mean, greedy titans of industry historically have, like, built libraries and.

Dwarkesh Patel00:54:35

But that's because they die. And they're like.

Speaker 300:54:37

Well, they all die. Everybody dies.

Dwarkesh Patel00:54:40

Well, we'll see.

Speaker 300:54:42

But I mean, like, conditional on people dying, I think, like, you know, like, again, you had a guest on the show who said, like, you know, to understand the future, you should think about the past. And I think, like, you could have new types of titans being born where their entire reason for accumulating wealth is just to accumulate wealth.

Dwarkesh Patel00:55:07

Yeah.

Speaker 300:55:07

But a lot of the time, you know, at least historically I'm just talking about historically. The wealth accumulation process is part of a large social sort of, like, social interaction amongst peers, amongst the community, where you want to be admired in some way or something like that. So then people end up like, the stylized fact of titans of industry is, like, you accumulate the capital, and then you, like, buy a bunch of stuff.

Dwarkesh Patel00:55:33

Yeah. I mean, I guess this is sort of a historical question, but it does seem to me in a lot of cases what is happening is that as they near the end of their life, they either hand it off to their children, who are worse stewards of capital than they are, and they don't even manage to grow their wealth at the rate the economy grows, much less fast than the economy grows, which their parents were doing. And also, they're like, well, I care less about my children having it than me sort of playing this game of accumulating wealth, and so I'm just going to give it to some trust.

And if people are living longer or if they can figure out some way in which to align their trust to this wealth accumulation process. It just feels like the evolution here is so strong where you just need a couple of agents that think this way for this to be the dominant thing determining the preferences of the whole economy because this part is growing much faster than the other parts of the economy.

Speaker 300:56:22

I think you just like, the part about satiation and diminishing marginal utilities, I think keeps coming up, but I think it's really, really important.

Dwarkesh Patel00:56:30

Yeah.

Speaker 300:56:31

Like, you know, if a person has an intrinsic preference for accumulation.

Dwarkesh Patel00:56:35

Right.

Speaker 300:56:36

That's just, like, that's what they want. I think your story is totally right.

Dwarkesh Patel00:56:39

Yeah.

Speaker 300:56:39

But that's just, like, not how usually preferences work.

Dwarkesh Patel00:56:43

Right.

Speaker 300:56:43

Like, you have enough whatever you hedonics in your life, and then, like, the social status, all of this sort of, you know, Rousseau wrote about this. Saint Augustine wrote about this. This is, like, a kind of, like, a basic part of preferences. Now, two, you guys are arguing about something else where, like, you could have such high concentration that you could just have a couple of exceptions to the rule, and that's going to be enough. And I have nothing to say about that.

Dwarkesh Patel00:57:09

Yeah.

Speaker 200:57:10

Yeah. I mean, I think the claim's a little stronger. Not just, like, you could have some exceptions, but that it seems that historically and today, we see the exceptions, and they just haven't really taken over the economy historically because they've there have been these dissipation shocks, as they're called. So they've, like, given it to their kids who spawned it, or they put it in foundations which vented. I mean, it's not really a shock, but, I mean, it was.

Dwarkesh Patel00:57:35

Right.

Speaker 200:57:35

People went people might have liked to, you know, fill the universe with monuments to themselves and sort of whatever, live forever, very wealthy. And it's like a weird preference, but it's not a hypothetical preference. I think that's the claim.

Dwarkesh Patel00:57:49

Yeah.

Speaker 200:57:49

But who knows what's going on in their heads? I think even without those, like, the kind of intrinsic preference for accumulation, there are some instrumental reasons why people some people might value accumulation, which is also worth bringing up. So there's a desire for political or philosophical or religious influence, right? So people get into sort of an arms race over, like, what, you know, what society looks like and what people believe.

And then similarly, but differently, because it's not an arms race, there's just a total utilitarian philanthropy, right? So when I think about why it might be good to have a lot of wealth in the future as a good classical utilitarian, to me, the value is at least one way you could have a kind of almost unsatiating utility function in having wealth in the future is to create new happy beings, right? They just add to the total welfare of the world. You know, I mean, this idea goes at least as far back as, like, Bostrom's astronomical waste point that we could, like, put Dyson's spheres around the stars and turn all the energy into really happy simulations and whatnot.

Dwarkesh Patel00:59:02

I think the particular greediness of this optimizer doesn't matter what they're greedy for. I think forgetting about utilitarian philosophy or whatever, like, just a pure von Neumann probe has I don't know what the is this an accurate way to say it? They just have high marginal value for, like, the random solar system they'll occupy because that turns into, like, more solar systems. It turns into more solar systems. But, like, a von Neumann probe is a thing that can exist, right? And that's, like, a very greedy optimizer.

Speaker 200:59:27

Yeah. I mean, if we're talking about, like, whether they'll dominate the economy, maybe this is a technicality. But, you know, we only count final consumption goods and investment goods as GDP, right? If there's just this phenomenon.

Dwarkesh Patel00:59:42

How does a von Neumann probe show up in GDP?

Speaker 200:59:44

Well, yeah, exactly, right? So if it's, like, if we recognize it as a person that, like, owns itself and it's, like, sort of, you know, optimizing on the margin between, like, spending a bit more on a baby von Neumann probe that colonizes another star system or, like, a ballerina or something, and it's just, like, it doesn't value the ballerina very much, but it's, yeah.

Speaker 301:00:00

Yeah. When we're talking about, like, AI beings or, like, like, it just completely depends on how we're doing the accounting there.

Dwarkesh Patel01:00:06

Right. Yeah. But I just, like, what does the world look like in a world where, like, von Neumann probes are possible? Is it possible labor share is high? Anyways.

Speaker 201:00:13

Yeah. I think it's possible that the labor share is high the way we usually account it.

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Dwarkesh Patel01:01:32

If you're not either producing the AI models, you're not producing the hardware that goes into AI models, if you're not Korea making HBM or Taiwan making with the FAS or not the Netherlands with ASML. Like, what is India or Nigeria? What should they be doing right now?

Speaker 201:01:50

Yeah.

Dwarkesh Patel01:01:50

If you're talking to Modi right now, what do you say?

Speaker 301:01:52

I think the biggest lack of resources that we have allocated in the economic profession is thinking about middle-income developing countries in the age of AI. And, I mean, this is my fault. You know, this is something I fault myself with as well. There's not enough people thinking about this question. Like, there are scenarios where, you know, you get, like, AI technology, you know, being allocated and dissipating to Nigeria and developing countries and things like that. And, like, that leveling the playing field, like, essentially, like, giving them, like, a level up as far as capabilities.

But there's another world where, like, because they don't have enough resources, they're not making they're not training the models. They don't have the hardware where they just completely get left behind.

Dwarkesh Patel01:02:36

Yeah.

Speaker 301:02:36

And because of, you know, automation, we can produce commodities in developed countries now.

Dwarkesh Patel01:02:43

Right.

Speaker 301:02:43

Then we don't even have, you know, the consumer market. And then that world looks pretty bad.

Dwarkesh Patel01:02:49

Yeah.

Speaker 201:02:49

This seems to me like an extension of the messy middle case, right? One of the ways in which the messy middle might only be bad in a narrow range of scenarios isn't just that, like, it would be easier to redistribute because the power would be bigger, but because the interest rate would be way higher and/or sort of equivalently, the price of everything except the human intrinsic goods would be falling really rapidly. It's sort of two sides of the same coin. A little bit of savings would turn into a lot of consumption next year, right?

So things have to go really wrong for us to, like, just get over the threshold of, you know, capital being productive enough to automate lots of work but not be productive enough that the interest rate is high and/or the price of capital-produced goods is falling a lot, OK? So even without redistribution, a little bit of savings will save a lot of people.

Dwarkesh Patel01:03:39

Sorry, you're saying that the developing countries have some savings?

Speaker 301:03:41

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

Dwarkesh Patel01:03:42

In the developed world, that will be enough to produce a lot of surplus that they can then.

Speaker 301:03:46

They will now be able to consume a lot.

Dwarkesh Patel01:03:47

Right.

Speaker 301:03:48

Using their savings.

Dwarkesh Patel01:03:48

So, but, I mean, the messy middle could be, like, wider in this case. I mean, they're starting from such a lower level in terms of, like, how much.

Speaker 201:03:57

They've saved and.

Dwarkesh Patel01:03:58

They haven't and how much it's, like, actually indexed to the global economy.

Speaker 201:04:01

Right. Yeah.

Dwarkesh Patel01:04:02

And I think it's important for them to get on it now. And I don't have strong feelings about whether it should take the form of, like, sovereign wealth funds that invest in.

Speaker 201:04:09

Right.

Dwarkesh Patel01:04:10

The right supply chains or just, you know, subsidies to their own citizens to buy a little bit of.

Speaker 201:04:16

This is actually, I think, a crucial point. We were talking earlier about why the Rockefellers are whatever the world, why their descendants don't control everything, if our argument about the selection of these kind of greedy optimizers hold. And one argument is just that it's, like, very hard to index the economy. And maybe they would have just decided to have their heirs index the economy and have it grow at the rate of economic have their wealth grow at the rate of economic growth, and they would be, you know, trillionaires. Their heirs would be trillionaires by now. But it just before index funds existed, it's just very hard to just get it represented.

It just a very small fraction of the economy going back 100 years accounts for a majority of the value created now. And if you miss those particular things, you would have basically your wealth would have just kind of stagnated. And maybe there was a brief golden window from the creation of index funds up until, I don't know, five years ago where actually you could index the economy and you could have your wealth grow at the rate the economy grows. But now that we're in this world with very concentrated returns, especially to private companies, which is capital that is, as we were making a point in our blog post, the average person has disproportionately less access to as opposed to, you know, most of their capital is, like, having a random house, at least in the US.

Dwarkesh Patel01:05:28

Or a part of a house.

Speaker 201:05:29

Yeah. Which is, as we were saying, is sort of unique a capital that is uniquely ill-suited to be complementary to the production of AI or the serving of AI or to robots.

Dwarkesh Patel01:05:43

Or the kinds of goods that the rich will bid up the price of.

Speaker 201:05:45

Exactly, right? Because what is the value of a house currently? It is really the land is close to other humans and modular relational stuff that is just not going to be the main factor of production.

Speaker 301:05:57

And this was where Georgian tax would not raise enough money for the sort of programs that we were discussing.

Dwarkesh Patel01:06:05

Right. Stepping back, the point I was trying to make is if it gets harder to index the economy now and that is supposed to be the main way in which both one and normal people are supposed to modularize some sort of use of universal banking income.

Speaker 201:06:18

In the developed world.

Dwarkesh Patel01:06:18

In the developed world are supposed to have some leverage on or have some purchase on the wealth from AI. And it's also the way that developing countries are supposed to have some purchase on the wealth gains from AI. But it's very hard I don't know. Does Nigeria own a lot of SK Hynix and, like, Anthropic? I'm guessing not, right? It's not enough for them to just own the S&P 500.

Speaker 301:06:40

So actually, this brings up a really important point. Like, is AI going to be, like, electricity or social media?

Dwarkesh Patel01:06:46

Right.

Speaker 301:06:47

If it's so think about ComEd or ComEdis and whatever the electricity provider here is. It's a monopoly. It provides a resource that everybody uses. But do we think about electricity as, like, generate creating concentration of power? And is ComEd, like, having, like, this huge amount of political power, social power, something like that? No, because with electricity, a lot of the downstream benefits actually came to, like, the users of the electricity rather than the rather than the actual entity producing the electricity.

On the other hand, with social media, it was the opposite case, right? Social media, you know, it was everywhere. Everybody uses social media, but the rents went to the platform.

Dwarkesh Patel01:07:29

But that's a really interesting point. The more you think I don't endorse this take yet. I'm going to talk out loud. The more you think AGI is going to be our economy is going to be run on AGI the way our economy currently runs on electricity, that is, there's a broad fundamental transformation of the entire economy, the more it looks like electricity and the more it's, like, every company in the S&P of the future.

Speaker 301:07:54

Exactly.

Dwarkesh Patel01:07:54

If it's going to make it to the S&P 500, it is because it has leveraged AI.

Speaker 301:07:57

Exactly. And then you're indexed again.

Dwarkesh Patel01:07:59

Yeah, exactly. But then again, I guess it is totally if you just look at how concentrated the S&P is over time, you know, just, like, these big tech companies much more so. I guess this is a good sort of fundamental point that it's hard to reason about about how much of the gains from AI these individual private companies will be able to control.

Speaker 301:08:20

And I think, like, the open model thing is going to be a big point here, right?

Dwarkesh Patel01:08:24

Right.

Speaker 301:08:24

So, like, if we're indeed, like, we're in a world where it's, like, the open models are six months behind the frontier, nine months, then, you know, we'll hit AGI, we'll hit whatever. And, like, in six months, like, everybody has access to this resource.

Dwarkesh Patel01:08:39

And this goes to show you that every question is connected to every other because then that question about whether there's runaway gains connects to questions about recursive self-improvement. And even if not recursive self-improvement, then continual learning, which or online learning, which lets a model learn on the job. So if it's deployed, it gets to learn more. And these are just sort of, like, technical questions or forecasting technical questions, which then impact, I guess, whether Uganda will have any purchase on.

Speaker 201:09:03

Yeah.

Dwarkesh Patel01:09:03

The returns of AGI. But it sounds like your answer really the reason I'm emphasizing the question is I think both for the messy middle and for developing countries, a recommendation that is often made naively is you got to do some kind of retraining. You got to do some kind of, like, jobs program or you got to have them build data centers in your country. And I think you guys are suggesting something closer to just buy the index of AGI. That's, like, a probably a much more cleaner and much more likely to succeed strategy.

Speaker 301:09:34

It's really good. These are the two scenarios, right? So I think there is a world where it is concentrated.

Dwarkesh Patel01:09:40

Yeah.

Speaker 301:09:40

In which case it's going to be really hard to index AGI.

Dwarkesh Patel01:09:43

Yeah.

Speaker 301:09:44

There is another world where it is not it's electricity. Then, like, basically, every company has access to AGI. So you just buy you just buy the index. So, like, you know, Nigeria just needs to buy the index.

Dwarkesh Patel01:09:55

Right.

Speaker 301:09:56

And Nigeria has access to AGI.

Dwarkesh Patel01:09:58

Yeah.

Speaker 301:09:59

Right? Like, because of the open models.

Speaker 201:10:01

Yeah. So just to get back to the question of, like, about whether to go with retraining or just trying to index, I would prioritize trying to index, but just given how fast AI could, you know, hit the world. But I definitely wouldn't just rely on that because, like, it could the sort of messy middle type cases or just the long timelines cases on which, like, you we don't get anything like AGI all that soon.

We'll still you'll just be, like, leaving a lot of value on the table if you could have, like, retrained to be a bit better, you know, like, educated to how, you know, how to use the latest wave of computing. And, yeah, so I don't think there's that much of an either/or there. Like.

Dwarkesh Patel01:10:45

I mean, maybe the reason to be pessimistic about this is because one of the reasons the country is poor is that it has a bad education system. And so becoming the best in the world at retraining people, at using AI, it doesn't seem like a particularly promising particularly promising strategy for that poor country.

Speaker 301:11:02

Although there are cases where, like, in developing countries, you had this, like, leapfrogging effect.

Dwarkesh Patel01:11:09

Right.

Speaker 301:11:09

With, like, for example, like, mobile banking or something like that.

Dwarkesh Patel01:11:11

Yeah.

Speaker 301:11:11

It's much more prevalent in, like, Nigeria than it is in Germany or something like that. Like, they're everybody is doing mobile banking. They have it on their phones. They're constantly doing this sort of thing. So, I mean, I again, I'm not putting probabilities on this, but, like, with a transformative technology like AI, you could get leapfrogging.

Dwarkesh Patel01:11:31

Yeah.

Speaker 301:11:32

Where, you know, you skip the step in the middle and you can get, like, really astronomical growth.

Dwarkesh Patel01:11:38

Maybe.

Speaker 201:11:38

Just about the ease of indexing, can I just quickly say?

Dwarkesh Patel01:11:41

Yeah.

Speaker 201:11:43

I think it's definitely something to worry about a bit and keep an eye on. But as discussed in our own essay and as other people have pointed out, it's already not that hard to index. So it's not there's been a bit of an increase in the privatization of returns, but it's still, like, you know, well under 20% of the total market cap of non-tiny companies in the US is private. And, you know, everyone thinks about OpenAI and Anthropic. And then if that's where all the wealth will accrue, then, yeah, like, all these questions about whether open models will stay only a little bit behind.

Dwarkesh Patel01:12:18

Yeah.

Speaker 201:12:18

You know, those are important. But, you know, even they look like they're going public before too long, probably. And the frictions that have been keeping companies from going public might themselves be alleviated by AI a lot, right? Just all the disclosure requirements and whatnot. They want to get access to more potential investors too. And if I had to guess, I would guess that the kind of long kind of general trend of just, like, lowering those frictions and making it easier for more and more people to index more and more will continue despite the recent bump in the other direction.

Dwarkesh Patel01:12:54

This actually makes me hope even more so than before that the labs do get commoditized or at the very least, they go public as soon as possible. But hopefully, they just get totally commoditized because I think AI will be much more popular and, more importantly, will be much more likely to lead to broad increases in prosperity if the gains are just not particularly it is as hard to capture the gains of AI as it is to capture the gains of electrification.

Speaker 301:13:22

Yeah, exactly. So I think, like, everybody there's no anti-electricity people out there, right?

Dwarkesh Patel01:13:26

I mean, electricity doesn't take your job, but.

Speaker 201:13:29

Well, it took some people's jobs.

Speaker 301:13:32

Yeah, yeah. And I think it's I, you know, this is maybe tangential to the conversation. I think, like, there's, like, a really narratives matter and there's this, like, really negative narrative around AI right now. But that's because people are not putting out the positive narrative or because and there's a reason. It's more difficult to imagine something that doesn't exist that's a good thing than losing something that exists.

Dwarkesh Patel01:13:59

Right. Yeah.

Speaker 301:14:00

Right. So it's very easy for somebody to go on a podcast and to say, like, these jobs that you like, they're going away, than to somebody to spin up, like, a utopia which doesn't exist yet.

Dwarkesh Patel01:14:10

Right.

Speaker 201:14:10

I hope this isn't too out of left field, but I think I would be remiss if I didn't point out one big cost of having commoditized frontier AI models, which is the tech race dynamic, right? That, like, for safety purposes, you might want fewer frontier companies so that each one has a buffer in case they want to slow things down to make things safer. And the way this relates to our point before about the kind of widespread access, you know, of the returns is that I think there's a lot less of a trade-off there than some people imagine where, you know, some people think either frontier AI gets commoditized and we all enjoy the benefits, but there might be some risk because, like, it's the market's really competitive and cutthroat or things are safer because there's a big gap between the leader and the laggard.

But that means that the leaders get fantastically wealthy. No. Like, you could just have a relatively big gap, but it's a public company ownership and it's widely distributed.

Dwarkesh Patel01:15:12

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

Speaker 201:15:13

Yeah.

Dwarkesh Patel01:15:14

More recently, I have been thinking that the risk of commodification, which is that it sort of diffuses the it diffuses the ability to use AI to harmful ends, is worth the benefit that I just feel I worry that not only having these concentrated labs makes it so that the sort of surplus isn't as widely distributed through society, but also it creates a very tangible, clear political target for the government to I mean, we saw this with the Defense Production Act threat against Anthropic.

If there wasn't one lab that is or a couple of labs that are clearly ahead of others, this kind of threat would be much harder to make. Thank you guys for doing this.

Speaker 301:15:55

Yeah, thank you.

Speaker 201:15:56

Thank you.

Dwarkesh Patel01:15:57

I feel like there's a lot of unresolved questions, but I it is helpful to know what the relevant at least, like, what is the first branch along all these important dimensions.

Speaker 201:16:05

Great. Thank you.

Dwarkesh Patel01:16:06

OK. Well.

Episode description

Economics of AGI episode w Alex Imas and Phil Trammell.

There’s a bunch of important questions about how we deal with AI that only economics can answer.

What is the optimal way to tax and redistribute the wealth that will be generated? How should countries not in the AI supply chain index into the gains? Is there any world where inequality doesn’t explode?

It might seem like these questions have obvious answers, but the first thing economics teaches you is that your intuitions can often be entirely wrong.

It was very helpful to chat through these things with Alex and Phil.

Watch on YouTube; read the transcript.

Sponsors

Jane Street invests heavily in turning smart people into exceptional researchers and engineers. In addition to their apprenticeship model, Jane Street runs lectures and bootcamps in their in-office classrooms -- managers clear their teams’ schedules to encourage attendance. If you’d like to work at a place that takes learning this seriously, Jane Street is hiring. Check out their open roles at janestreet.com/dwarkesh

Google’s Gemini Omni has incredible video editing capabilities -- you can upload a video and have Omni change the background, adjust lighting, or add specific elements. But Omni is also a preview of how future frontier models will be trained -- fully multimodal on both input and output. You can try it yourself in the Gemini app at gemini.google or in Flow at flow.google

Cursor used targeted RL with textual feedback to help train their Composer 2.5 model. One of their researchers, Sasha Rush, gave me an impromptu blackboard lecture to explain how this form of on-policy self-distillation works -- I posted the full thing on X. If you want to try Composer 2.5, go to cursor.com/dwarkesh

Timestamps

(00:00:00) – Will capital share increase?

(00:19:36) – Messy Middle scenario

(00:25:57) – How to tax and redistribute AI wealth

(00:30:02) – Why demand collapse is unlikely

(00:39:26) – Human employees would be hard to integrate into the machine economy

(00:43:08) – What if some humans (or AIs) value wealth accumulation intrinsically?

(01:01:28) – What should developing countries do?

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.dwarkesh.com